Integrative Modeling of Emotions in Virtual Agents by Siddiqui, G.F.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT 
 
 
 
 
Integrative Modeling of Emotions in Virtual Agents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan 
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 
op gezag van de rector magnificus 
prof.dr. L.M. Bouter, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen 
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie 
van de faculteit der Exacte Wetenschappen 
op dinsdag 28 september 2010 om 13.45 uur 
in de aula van de universiteit, 
De Boelelaan 1105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
door 
 
Ghazanfar Farooq Siddiqui 
 
geboren te Mandi Baha Uddin, Pakistan 
 
 
promotor: prof.dr. J. Treur 
copromotoren: dr. T. Bosse  
dr. J.F. Hoorn 
 
 
 
  
Acknowledgements 
 
 
It was a sunny afternoon of June 6, 2006 when my plane landed at Schiphol airport, 
Amsterdam. It was my first journey abroad. My Pakistani friends warmly welcomed me 
at Schiphol. I spent my first night with my friends. The next morning I collected the 
keys from the DUWO office, and headed towards the university. My friend guided me 
to reach the AI department of VU Amsterdam. I can still remember the first question 
Mark asked me: what is your first impression about the Netherlands? My answer was 
???? ???????????? ??? ???? ????????????? ?????? ???????? ??? ???????? ??? ???????? ?????????
(giving me the impression that I answered wrongly). Over the last four years I have 
been tramping a research path, hoping to reach a milestone from which to look back and 
realize that I had made it. Now I am there. It was truly a great experience. The truth is 
that I would not have been able to successfully complete this PhD without the 
encouraging people around me. I was lucky to have colleagues, friends and family to 
support and help me through this journey and see me through to its end.  
First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to Allah (SWT), for 
providing me the blessing and picking me out of the millions of my kind in Pakistan, 
and making my foreign stay and research possible through His obvious and obscure 
ways. I thank Him for guiding me through my whole life so far and bestowing on me so 
much of His bounties which I so little deserved.  
I wish to express my profound thanks to my supervisor Jan Treur for providing me 
the opportunity to work at VU Amsterdam in the ASR group. Both from a logistic and a 
research point of view, Jan has been very supportive, helpful and patient throughout my 
stay in Amsterdam. I learnt a lot of professional skills from him, of which scientific 
research is just a subset. Again I thank Jan Treur for all his personal and professional 
help.  
Next, I would like to thank my daily supervisor Tibor Bosse for his competence, 
encouragement and endless support during all of my PhD activities. He always has a 
positive, and helping attitude. I like the way he gives feedback about my research. I am 
also thankful to Johan F. Hoorn for his guidance as my second co-????????????????????
comments were always concise and very insightful.  
Let me also take this opportunity to thank my doctoral reading committee: Prof. dr. 
John-Jules Meyer, Prof. dr. Mark Neerincx, Dr. Peter Roelofsma and Dr. Michel Klein 
for their valuable comments and suggestions after reviewing the dissertation.  
The office environment plays a key ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
to thank all of my colleagues of the ASR group at VU Amsterdam who gave valuable 
feedback throughout my research. Especially, I thank Matthijs with whom I had a very 
productive collaboration during the last 3 years. At the VU, I really enjoyed the 
VIII 
different activities of the ASR group. I will always remember all the outings, bowling 
events, dinners, Sinterklaas celebrations and especially the Russian and Pakistani night. 
Further, I would like to acknowledge my colleagues Alexei, Annerieke, Arlette, Azizi, 
Charlotte, Fiemke, Mark, Natalie, Nataliya, Peter-Paul, Rianne, Robbert-Jan, Umair, 
Vera, Waqar and Zulfiqar for the wonderful time.  
In the Netherlands, I enjoyed the company of (Pakistani / Indian) friends. They are, 
Asad, Faraz, Irshad, Jamil, Mazhar, Sabir, Sadeeq, Saleem, Shahaab, Shumais, and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
known each other in Pakistan, but we lived here for the last four years as an extended 
family. I thank them all.  
I owe this thesis work to my family: my very capable parents who did a lot for their 
kids, my sister Rubina and brothers Qaisar, Ansar, Moazzam and especially Nasir, who 
guided me in every aspect of my professional life. I like to thank them for their endless 
love and support during my entire life.  
Last but not least, I would like to thank Zomra for being a loving wife and a good 
friend, and bearing with patience all the hard work and tribulation that came with my 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
her: to keep me trouble free and focused on my research and for singly taking care of 
our children, Ahmad and Haris. 
 
 
 
 
Ghazanfar Farooq Siddiqui 
Pakistan, July 2010. 
 Contents 
I. Introduction  
1. Introduction        1 
 
II. Modeling Involvement between Agents 
2. A Robot's Experience of Another Robot: Simulation  11 
3. When the User Is Instrumental to Robot Goals:    35 
First Try – Agent Uses Agent 
4. Affective Agents Perceiving Each Other's Actions    71 
 
III. Integration of Appraisal, Involvement and Regulation   
5. Comparing Three Computational Models of Affect   99 
6. Silicon Coppélia: Integrating Three Affect-Related Models   111        
for Establishing Richer Agent Interaction     
 
IV. Modeling Involvement in Economical Context   
7. Modeling Greed of Agents in Economical Context   145 
8. A Personalized Intelligent Agent Model for Financial Decision             157 
Making Incorporating Psychological States and Characteristics                    
for Greed and Risk       
 
V. Embodying Emotions in Virtual Agents 
9. Incorporating Emotion Regulation into Virtual Stories  175 
10. A Virtual Therapist that Responds Empathically to Your Answers 187 
11. An Affective Agent Playing Tic-Tac-Toe as Part of a Healing        197 
Environment        
12. Enhancing Involvement in Financial Services via Intelligent                 215 
Virtual Agents        
 
VI. Discussion and Future Work 
13. Discussion and Future Work     231 
Samenvatting        241 
SIKS Dissertation Series       243 
 
 
PART I  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
  
 
Introduction 
1 Background 
Over the past years, there has been an increasing interest in the application of 
intelligent virtual agents in various domains. Intelligent virtual agents (IVAs) 
are autonomous, graphically embodied agents in a virtual environment that are 
able to interact intelligently with the environment, other IVAs, or with human 
users (e.g., [20] and [22]). Typical examples are conversational agents (e.g., 
[16]), agents in (serious) games (e.g., an instructor in a naval training simulator 
[10]), and agents in computer-generated virtual stories (e.g., [8]). Recently, 
much research has been dedicated to developing virtual agents with more 
realistic graphical representations. However, the affective properties of such 
agents are usually rather limited, and not very human-like. For example, 
although many IVAs currently have the ability to somehow show emotions by 
means of different facial expressions, it is quite difficult for them to show the 
right emotion at the right moment. One step further, it is even more difficult for 
them to actually understand and react empathically to the emotional state of 
other agents. This is in conflict with the requirement of virtual agents to closely 
mimic human affective behavior. Several studies in Social Sciences have 
shown that this is an important prerequisite for an agent to increase human 
involvement in a virtual environment [13]. Therefore, existing systems based 
on IVAs are not as effective as they could be. Properties that they typically 
lack are the ability to show emotions (not only in terms of facial expression, 
but also in terms of behavior), in relation to ???????? ??? ????? ???????? and 
??????????????????????????????? states. 
To deal with this problem, some authors propose to increase the affective 
properties of interactive software agents by using knowledge from psychology 
and cognitive science as a basis for computational modeling of the cognitive 
and affective processes involved (e.g., [2], [9] and [15]). Recently, a variety of 
such computational models have been (and are still being) developed for 
different aspects of human behavior. Examples include models for reasoning 
processes [21], visual attention [14], emotion regulation [17], mindreading 
[18], stress and workload [11], and moods [5]. If such computational models 
are available in a formal format, this opens the possibility to equip IVAs with 
them. However, the step from existing computational models (that are mostly 
used for simulation purposes) to models, that can directly be plugged in to a 
virtual (3D) environment, in such a way that the IVAs behave according to the 
cognitive model, is a nontrivial one. In reality, this step involves an iterative 
process, consisting of, among others, the following sub-tasks: refinement of the 
computational model, translation to a specific programming environment, and 
testing and evaluation of the resulting model in the virtual setting.  
4 
2 Research Goal 
The main research goal for this thesis was to explore how computational 
models of affect can be integrated within virtual agents. To this end different 
models have been analyzed, formalized, combined, simulated, and evaluated 
within applications in health care, business and game context. 
3 Research Methodology 
To examine the design of virtual agents with appropriate emotional behavior, a 
generic methodology has been used to analyze models of affective processes. A 
library of models was developed for aspects that are related to affective 
behavior, with a focus, among others, on emotion, emotion regulation and the 
balancing of emotional ambiguities (i.e., involvement-distance trade-offs). 
Modeling is an important activity in many different areas. A model is a 
representation of an object, system, or idea in some form other than that of the 
entity itself [24]. Such a representation describes the most important elements 
and their relations. Cognitive or affective processes cannot be easily studied 
directly, as it is not easy to measure things that go on in a human mind. In 
contrast, one can analyze relatively easily how a model of it behaves. 
Computational models are able to imitate what would happen with the 
processes over time. This feature is called simulation. The result of a 
simulation is a sequence of states of the elements of the model at subsequent 
time points. Simulations experiments with computational models can be used 
to improve the understanding of the processes, and to make predictions. The 
modeling and simulation cycle consists of four activities: 
 
i. Conceptualization: determining the main aspects and their relations; 
ii. Formalization: specifying the detailed model; 
iii. Simulation: performing experiments with the model; 
iv. Evaluation: verifying whether the model behaves as expected, and 
validating the applicability of the model in practice 
 
If the evaluation reveals that the model has some shortcomings, the process 
starts again with a new conceptualization phase. The behavior of cognitive and 
affective processes was studied by conducting a number of simulation 
experiments under different circumstances and by evaluating the results against 
patterns and properties expected from the theory the models are based on. 
Moreover, the internal consistency of the models was verified. For validation, 
the models have been incorporated in embodied conversational agents that 
were confronted with real persons in serious game settings or in a clinical 
setting. 
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4 Modeling and Implementation Techniques 
The reported research has made use of a number of modeling and 
implementation techniques, which are briefly indicated below. 
 
LEADSTO 
 
Modeling the various aspects involved in the models to be built in an 
integrated manner poses some challenges. On the one hand, qualitative aspects 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
hand, quantitative aspects have to be addressed, such as levels of involvement 
and distance. The modeling approach based on the modeling language 
LEADSTO [6] fulfils such desiderata. It integrates qualitative, logical aspects 
such as used in approaches based on temporal logic e.g., [4] with quantitative, 
numerical aspects such as used in Dynamical Systems Theory (e.g., [3] and 
[19]). To test whether the behavior of the affect regulation and engagement 
models shows the same patterns as would be expected from the theory, 
simulation experiments have been performed using the LEADSTO simulation 
language [6]. These simulation experiments also have verified the internal 
consistency of the theory. 
 
In LEADSTO direct temporal dependencies between two state properties in 
successive states are modeled by executable dynamic properties defined as 
follows. If  and  are state properties of the for?? ????????????? ??? ???????
???????????????????????????????????, the notation  e, f, g, h , means:  
 
 If state property  holds for a certain time interval with duration g, 
 then after some delay (between e and f)  
 state property  will hold for a certain time interval of length h. 
 
Here, atomic state properties can have a qualitative, logical format, such as an 
expression desire(d), expressing that desire d occurs, or a quantitative, numerical 
format such as an expression has_value(x, v) which expresses that variable x has 
value v.  
 
C++ 
 
C++ is a general purpose programming language developed by Bjarne 
Stroustrup, in 1979 at Bell Labs; it was originally named ?C with Classes?. The 
language C++ is an enhancement of the language C. It is a strictly typed and 
compiled language. It is also known as a middle level language, because of its 
low level and high level language features [23]. It was used for simulation 
purposes, among others, due to its computational efficiency over the 
LEADSTO simulation environment for more complex multi-agent simulations. 
However, although the implementation of the models was done in C++, for the 
model specifications LEADSTO was used. 
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HTML 
 
HTML stands for Hyper Text Markup Language [26]. It is widely used for files 
that are posted on the internet and viewed by web browsers. HTML is a 
relatively simple language. All text, graphics, and design elements of a web 
page are ?tagged? with codes that instruct the web browser how to display the 
files. Such files are easy to recognize because they contain the file extension 
such as ???????or ?????.  Through HTML one can create structured documents 
by representing structural semantics for text such as lists, forms, paragraphs, 
radio buttons, headings etc. It also provides links and quotes to other items. It 
was used in combination with JAVASCRIPT and scripts provided by the 
Haptek software to develop web pages for different IVA applications. 
 
JavaScript 
 
JavaScript is an object-oriented, cross platform scripting language [1]. It is a 
small and lightweight language used to enable programmatic access to objects 
within both the client application as well as server side applications. It is 
mainly used in the form of client-side JavaScript. It is used for the 
development of user interfaces and dynamic websites.  JavaScript can be 
expressed as a dynamic, weakly typed, prototype-based language. JavaScript 
provides a set of objects, such as Array, Date, and Math, and a set of language 
elements such as operators, control structures, and statements. It was used in 
combination with scripting commands provided by the Haptek software [12] 
(see below), to control the Haptek player within a web browser, in order to 
develop IVA applications. 
 
PHP 
 
PHP stands for Hypertext Preprocessor. It is a server-side scripting language 
used for the development of dynamic web pages. PHP is a cross platform and 
open source software [25]. PHP supports many databases like MySQL, 
Informix, Oracle, Sybase, Solid, Generic ODBC, etc. PHP files can contain 
text, HTML tags and scripts and are returned to the browser as plain HTML. 
PHP originally stood for personal home page. PHP syntax is similar to C and 
JAVA syntax. PHP was used in combination with MySQL, JAVASCRIPT and 
HTML to store and retrieve data from databases used in the IVA applications.  
 
Haptek PeoplePutty 
 
People Putty is a 3D character building tool that is used to create personalized 
characters [12]. People Putty includes a wide selection of character features 
and functionality, e.g.; it can import graphics files to use as textures, alter 
facial features and shapes of heads. It can also use 3D accessories like hats and 
clothes. People putty 3D characters can be hosted in web pages using script 
provided by the software. One can record sound, and the character will read 
with its lips synched with speech. The Haptek peoplePutty software [12] was 
used for creating the virtual agents in different applications. Through this 
program different faces of the virtual agents were created. 
Chapter 1                                                                                                         7 
5 Thesis Overview 
The thesis is based on a collection of articles. The majority of the chapters are 
reprints of the refereed papers that have been published elsewhere, or 
extensions thereof. These articles are exactly the same except for their layout. 
As a result the overlap between the papers has not been removed, for example 
concerning the introduction to the modeling approach. Furthermore, the 
articles can be read separately. All authors are cited in alphabetical order and 
all can be regarded as having made a comparable contribution to articles 
presented in the thesis, unless explicitly indicated otherwise. The thesis is 
composed of six parts. 
 
I. Introduction 
This preliminary part describes the topic the thesis is about. After that, 
the goal of the thesis is formulated. Furthermore, the generic 
modeling approach, as well as the more specific modeling and 
implementation techniques that are used throughout the thesis, is 
described briefly.  
 
II. Modeling Involvement between Agents 
Part ?? describes the extent to which an agent becomes involved with 
another agent, or stays at a distance from it. These extents depend 
upon different aspects of the other agent such as ethics (good or bad), 
aesthetics (beautiful or ugly), epistemics or realism (how realistic or 
unrealistic the other agent is), similarity (resemblances between the 
two agents) and affordances the other agent offers as an aid or 
obstacle for task performance of the agent. Chapter 2 introduces a 
computational model for involvement-distance trade-offs, based on 
the existing informal model I-PEFiC (Interactively Perceiving and 
Experiencing Fictional Characters). The main relations within this 
model have been formalized as regression equations, using the 
LEADSTO modeling environment. Furthermore, simulation 
experiments indicated that the model is adequate for simulating the 
dynamics of involvement-distance trade-offs and their influence on 
satisfaction. Chapter 3 addresses an extension of this model, which 
explains affect-driven interaction with mechanisms for goal-directed 
behavior. Simulation experiments have been conducted, and it was 
found that agents preferred affect-driven decision options to rational 
decision options in situations where choices for low expected utility 
are irrational. Chapter 4 is an extension of the work described in 
Chapter 3, which manages that the actions agents undertake have an 
effect on other agents. The agents change their perceptions and beliefs 
about other agents if actions are taken.  
 
III. Appraisal, Involvement and Regulation   
Part ??? describes the integration of three affect models: CoMERG 
(computational model of emotion regulation based on Gross theory), 
EMA (emotion and adaption) and I-PEFiCADM (Interactively 
8 
Perceiving and Experiencing Fictional Characters, i.e., the model 
?????????? ??? ????? ??). Chapter 5 offers a short comparative expose 
about the three models concerning the generation and regulation of 
affect, which each in their own right have been successfully applied in 
the agent and robot domain. It argues that the three models partly 
overlap in a consistent manner, and where distinct, they complement 
one another. This chapter provides an analysis of the theoretical 
concepts, and presents a blueprint of an integration, as a basis for a 
more advanced representation of affect simulation in virtual humans. 
Chapter 6 is an extension of the work described in Chapter 5 in which 
the integrated model, called Silicon Coppélia, was implemented and 
simulation experiments were performed to test the behavior of the 
model. These experiments show that the model can simulate richer 
agent behaviors than any of the models could have done alone. 
 
IV. Modeling Involvement in Economical Context   
Part ?? focuses on affective states of a person in economical context. 
This economical context is considered a large scale multi-agent 
system consisting of thousands or millions of other agents.  The 
cognitive and affective processes and behavior of a person with 
???????? ??? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????? ????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????cal 
context concerns forms of involvement with them. More specifically, 
in this part it is described how involvement in the form of individual 
investment decisions depends on a personal risk profile, the state of 
greed of the person, and the state of the world economy. Chapter 7 
explores the differences and similarities between a population-based 
and (individual) agent-based modeling approach in such an 
economical context. For this purpose a case study on the interplay 
between individual greed and the global economy was addressed, and 
a model was developed inspired by the well-known predator-prey 
model from the literature, where the predator was metaphorically 
related to greed and prey to the state of the world economy. 
Simulation results show that agent-based simulations can be closely 
approximated by population-based simulations. Chapter 8 presents a 
different agent-based model of human financial decision making, 
based on psychological states and characteristics such as greed and a 
personal risk profile. A number of simulation experiments have been 
performed, which show the ability of model to mimic investment 
behavior depending different personality types and the state of the 
economy. 
 
V. Embodying Emotions in Virtual agents 
Part V addresses applications of virtual agents that show emotions. 
Chapter 9 presents an approach to incorporate emotion regulation as 
addressed within the psychology literature into virtual characters. To 
????? ????? ??????? ????????? ??????? ??? ???????? ??????????, which was 
formalized using a dynamical system style modeling approach [7] in 
previous research, was taken as a basis. The chapter reports how a 
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virtual environment has been created, involving a number of virtual 
agents, which have been equipped with the formalized model for 
emotion regulation. Chapter 10 presents a virtual agent that guides a 
person through the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) questionnaire, 
which is used to estimate the severity of a depression. The agent 
responds empathically to the answers given by the user, by changing 
its facial expression. This resembles face to face therapy more than 
existing web-based self-help therapies. Chapter 11 presents an 
affective agent playing tic-tac-toe with a person. Experimenting with 
a number of agents under different parameter settings shows that the 
agent is able to show human-like emotional behavior, and can make 
decisions based on rationality as well as on affective influences. 
Chapter 12 addresses a financial investment application. This web-
based application is equipped with a virtual agent, which tries to 
mimic human emotions, for example, related to greed and 
disappointment when a person makes investment decisions and learns 
about the returns. 
 
VI. Discussion and Future Work 
Finally part VI summarizes the research and discusses its relevance to 
the main research goal established in the current chapter. 
Furthermore, this part discusses the areas for future work. 
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Abstract. To develop a robot that is able to recognize and show affective 
behavior, it should be able to regulate simultaneously occurring tendencies of 
positive and negative emotions. To achieve this, the current paper introduces a 
computational model for involvement-distance trade-offs, based on an existing 
theoretical model. The main mechanisms of this model have been represented as 
regression equations, using the LEADSTO modeling environment. A number of 
simulation experiments have been performed, which indicated that the model is 
adequate for simulating the dynamics of involvement-distance trade-offs and their 
influence on satisfaction. More specifically, the experiments confirmed the 
empirical finding that positive features do not exclusively increase involvement.  
Keywords: emotions, computational modeling, involvement-distance trade-off, 
simulation. 
1   Introduction 
We are a research group on a mission. Our aim is to model aspects of emotion 
regulation and involvement-distance trade-offs to build a robot that can contribute to the 
wellbeing of patients in need of psychological support. Once the software is capable of 
simulating emotion-regulating mechanisms and, where appropriate, can trade 
involvement for distance (or vice versa), we will develop a prototype virtual therapist 
that is tested against real patients. This therapist should be capable of recognizing 
emotional behavior and should respond to that in an emotionally appropriate way. 
People often find it hard to admit that they are in need of therapy or coaching. 
Experimenting with a virtual therapist as a support tool for self-diagnosis may help to 
overcome that barrier more easily. 
However, as luring as this far horizon may be, there is quite some groundwork to be 
done first and this paper is addressing some of the modeling issues involved. In a 
counterpart paper in this volume [8], we dealt with theoretical matters of humans 
perceiving a virtual other and the way to formalize this (i.e. fuzzy sets). The idea was 
that the empirically validated models of human encounters with agents (e.g., [15]) and 
models of emotion regulation (e.g., [5, 6, 11]) could be integrated and used to do the 
reverse, have a robot determine its level of engagement with its user and have it choose 
the appropriate affective response to it. 
14
There are two things we want to do in this paper, leaving aside many of the other 
important issues (e.g., [8]). First, we want to test the formula of Werners [17] to see 
whether it represents the trade-off well between involvement (the robot becomes 
friendly with its user) and distance (the robot stays aloof). This involvement-distance 
trade-off is the fundamental mechanism in user encounters with agents (e.g., [15]), film 
characters (e.g., [10]), and photographs of people (e.g., [9]). Although one would expect 
t????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
tendency to stay aloof) to be part of one and the same continuum, the above studies 
have pointed out that their interplay is in reality more subtle. For example, humans can 
at the same time find another person attractive but morally repulsive, useful to achieve 
certain goals but distasteful in his or her manners (e.g., [10]). We want to see whether 
????????? ?????? ?????-off works well enough to implement this mechanism in our 
????????????????????e.g., [7]).  
Second, we want to show that we can simulate the way perceptual and experiential 
factors feed into the involvement-distance trade-off. A number of factors help establish 
the involvement-distance trade-off. For the body of empirical work that sustains this 
view, see [8] . The ethics of the user, for example, whether the user is of good or bad 
intent (take care of or kill the robot) directly affects how the trade-off develops. Another 
important factor is the affordances a user offers as an aid or obstacle for task 
performance. A user that performs a simple task causes less trouble for the machinery of 
the robot than a demanding user does. Additional factors are the aesthetics of the user 
(beautiful or ugly), epistemics or realism (realistic or unrealistic), and similarity (user 
resembles robot or not). The upshot is that not anything positive leads to involvement 
but can increase distance as well ( e.g., [14, 16]). This has to do with the goals of the 
robot. If it admires the skills of a user but if those same skills mean it is going to be 
dumped soon, being skilled raises involvement - but for different reasons - distance as 
well. This redistribution of information runs via the factors of relevance (whether user is 
important to achieve robot goals such as being needed or timely maintenance), and 
valence (the expected positive or negative results of interacting with the user). For an 
overview of the complete model, see [14], Figure 1.  
The involvement-distance trade-off that is fed by all these factors is used for affective 
response selection see [8]. This is the process of (qualitatively) evaluating the emotional 
significance of events, see [4, 11]. In this paper, we focus explicitly on events related to 
what (e.g., [6]) calls situation selection, i.e. selecting situations that bring the robot in a 
more desirable state. Examples are walking away from a person the robot feels 
uncomfortable with and looking for another conversation partner. Thus, in our model 
the term satisfaction indicates the level of appreciation that a robot attaches to a certain 
situation it is in. If this level of current satisfaction is too low, the robot may want to 
select another situation based on the expected satisfaction in the future situation. 
To account for the trade-off between conflict???? ???????? ??????? ?????????????? ????
???????????? ????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ??? ?????????????? ???????? ?e.g., [17]) employs the 
fuzzy_AND-operator . Following this approach, each feature u in a trade-off has a 
membership function  in the fuzzy sets of involvement ( I~ ) and distance ( D~ ), which 
allows the feature to move between the minimum and maximum degree of membership 
to these sets: 
 
dan~  (
I
~ (u), D~  (u)) =  
  min{
I
~  (u), D~  (u)} + ((1 - )( I~  (u) + D~ (u)) / n), 
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where u  U,   [0, 1], and n is the number of fuzzy sets ( I~ and D~ ) for which the   
mean is calculated1. Basically, then, there are two ways to calculate a trade-off, using 
the (   min) option or the (   max): 
  max{
I
~  (u), D~  (u)} + ((1 - )( I~  (u) + D~ (u)) / n) 
????? ???? ?????? ?????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ????? ?????????????? ???? ?????????? ??????
either option may lead to quite different results for the level of satisfaction. When the 
mean of involvement and distance (the part after (1 - ) in the formula) is the same, the 
(   min) version favors decision options in which the involvement and distance values 
are close to each other, i.e., to decision options which involve relatively more doubt. 
The (   max) version favors options in which involvement and distance differ more 
from each other, i.e., options of which the robot feels less ambivalent. 
Our hypothesis (H1), then, explores whether our system can simulate counter-
intuitive empirical results concerning the influence of features on involvement and 
distance: 
 
H1: Positive features do not necessarily and exclusively increase involvement. Due to 
the redistribution of information via relevance and valence, also distance can be 
increased. (The same mechanism may apply to negative features that partly increase 
involvement). 
2   Simulation Model 
To simulate the dynamics of involvement-distance trade-offs and their influence on 
satisfaction, the theoretical model by Hoorn [8] (2008) was taken as a basis and was 
implemented in the LEADSTO modeling environment [2]. This environment enables 
the modeler to represent the most elementary steps of a process in terms of direct 
temporal dependencies, and features a dedicated simulation tool. In this section, we 
describe how we represented the basic mechanisms of the model in LEADSTO2. First, a 
number of design decisions had to be made. In particular, we chose to treat what are 
actually factor levels as single features. We then represented the features of different 
agents (e.g., their goodness, realism, or beauty) by real numbers between 0 and 1. In 
addition, the satisfaction an agent had in a particular situation was represented by a real 
number between 0 and 1. To model the impact of (the perception of) the different 
?????????????????????????????????????(e.g., [8]) proposed to use fuzzy set theory. The idea 
of fuzzy set theory is that features have membership functions for various sets, which 
determine to what degree they are member of these sets. Within LEADSTO, this 
principle can easily be simulated by using regression equations, but only to the extent 
that we used factor levels for features. The process of extracting factor levels from 
features would require a more elaborated model, which is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
                                                          
1 In the remainder of this paper, we only address the simple case of n=2. 
2 For details about the model, see part A of the appendix. 
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Domain 
We created a virtual environment that was inhabited by a number of virtual agents. 
These agents are fans of soccer teams and express this by wearing club clothes of their 
favorite team. When these agents meet, to a certain degree they are involved with and at 
a distance towards each other. These tendencies are based on features of the agents, 
according to the formulas described in this section. Table 1 shows certain variables that 
were used in these formulas. 
Table 1: Variable names and meanings 
Variable Meaning Range 
Perceived(<Feature>, A1, 
A2) 
????????????????????of a certain feature of Agent2 
[0, 1] 
Designed(<Feature>, A2) 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Agent2 
[0, 1] 
Bias(A1, A2, <Feature>) Bias that Agent1 has about a certain feature of Agent2 [0, 2] 
Skill(A1, <Language>) Skill of Agent1 in a certain language [0, 1] 
ExpectedSkill(A1, A2, 
language)
Skill Agent1 expects Agent2 to have in a certain 
language 
[0, 1] 
factor1?factor2 
Regression weight factor2 has for another factor1 for a 
certain agent 
[0, 1] 
inv-dist 
Variable that is used to calculate the involvement-
distance trade-off 
[0, 1] 
Satisfaction(A1, A2) Indicates to what extent Agent1 is satisfied withAgent2 [0, 1] 
Aesthetics 
????? ?????? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ?designed ?????????? ?? ??????? ????? ??? ?? ?????? ???? ?????????
expects to raise in the user, or in another agent, based on general principles of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
/ ugliness from all other agents. This designed value has a data-driven influence on how 
agents perceive the beauty of another agent. The variable bias represents the concept-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
bias may increase or decreas?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??????? ?????? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????? ????? ??? ???????????? ??? ???? ??????????
formulas, given in mathematical format.  
 
Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Beautiful) * Designed(Beautiful, A2) 
Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Ugly) * Designed(Ugly, A2) 
 
When two agents meet for the first time, they will assign a perceived value in the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Bias in 
the range [0, 2] is multiplied with the designed value for the feature in the range [0, 1]. 
If agent A1 has a bias of 1 for, for instance, the beauty of agent A2, then A1 does not 
under- or overestimate the beauty of A2. If the bias is bigger than 1, then A1 is 
relatively positive about the beauty of agent A2. When the resulting value for the 
perceived feature is bigger than 1, it is set to 1, to prevent the formula from going out of 
range. 
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Ethics 
In line with soccer tradition, good guys are those who are fan of the club, and bad guys 
are fan of the opponent. Agents recognize good and bad guys by the club clothes they 
are wearing. E. g., if agent A1 is a fan of the soccer club Ajax, and agent A2 wears club 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
??? ???? ?????? ??????? ???????????????? ????????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ?? ????? ??????????? ???
represented by: 
 
Perceived(Good, A1, A2) = Satisfaction(A2, Club) 
Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) = 1 ? Satisfaction(A2, Club) 
 
These formulas say that when two agents meet for the first time, they will perceive a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is exactly the same value as the level of satisfaction the agent attaches to the club of 
which the other agent is a fan. The perceived badness is 1 minus the level of 
satisfaction. If an agent wears neutral clothes, the values of good and bad are assigned 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
0.3 for both good and bad in the simulations in this paper). 
Epistemics 
The first time agents meet, each agent perceives the epistemics (or realism) of itself and 
other agents, the same way it perceives the aesthetics of itself and other agents: 
 
Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2,Realistic) * Designed(Realistic, A2) 
Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Unrealistic) * Designed(Unrealistic, A2) 
Affordances 
In the simulation model, the languages Urdu, English, and Dutch are used as the 
affordances to have a conversation about soccer. Each agent has a certain skill level for 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ding to the expectations 
they have about the possibilities to communicate with the other agent, according to the 
following formulas (where the sum over all languages is taken):  
 
Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) = (ExpectedSkill(A1, A2, language) * Skill(A1, language)) 
Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) = 
  1 - (ExpectedSkill(A1, A2, language) * Skill(A1, language)) 
 
????? ???? ??????? ?????? ????? ??????? ?? ?????? ??? ????? ???????? ???????????? ????? ????
obstacle) in the range [0, 1], using the presuppositions they have about the language 
skills of the other agent, which is based on outer appearance. E.g., when Agent A2 has a 
dark skin, in the simulation, Agent A1 will think Agent A2 has good skills in Urdu, 
average skills in English, and bad skills in Dutch. Because of this, the value of aid is 
calculated by taking the sum of the language skills of Agent A1 multiplied by the 
language skills A1 expects A2 to have. These expectations of Agent A1 about the 
language skills of Agent A2 are normalized, and are based on skin color (although 
politically incorrect, this was convenient for simulation purposes). The perceived value 
for obstacle was 1 minus the calculated value for aid.  
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Similarity 
For an agent to perceive its similarity with another agent, it needs to perceive the 
features of the self. Agents perceive their own features the same way they perceive the 
aesthetics and epistemics of other agents. Only this time, the bias is the bias in self-
perception, instead of in the perception of another agent. 
 
Perceived(Feature, A1, A1) = Bias(A1, A1, Feature) * Designed(Feature, A1) 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
its own features (good, bad, beautiful, ugly, realistic and unrealistic) and its perception 
of the features of the other agent (where the sum over ranges over these six features): 
 
Similarity(A1, A2) = 
  1- ( sim?feature * abs(Perceived(Feature, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Feature, A1, A1) )) 
Dissimilarity(A1, A2) = 
ds?feature * abs(Perceived(Feature, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Feature, A1, A1) ))  
To calculate the dissimilarity between two agents, the differences between the 
perceived values for its own features, and those perceived for the other agent are taken. 
is 
calculated in a similar manner, but with different weights, and 1 was subtracted by the 
sum of all differences. 
Relevance, Valence, Involvement and Distance 
The formulas in this paragraph were designed using generalized linear models [12, 13]. 
Hoorn (2008) shows that the calculated dependent variable (e.g., relevance) is fed by a 
number of contributing variables. Each contributing variable has a certain main effect 
on the dependent variable. The size of this main effect is represented by a (regression) 
weight ? the same way as for calculating similarity. When two variables interact, the 
interaction effect on the dependent variable is calculated by multiplying the product of 
the values of these two variables with a certain regression weight, which accounts for 
the interaction effect on the dependent variable. When the interaction is over-additive, 
the weight will be positive, and when it is under-additive, the weight will be negative. 
The formula for the calculation of a variable A that is dependent on the variables B, 
C, and D, of which C and D interact, would be: A = B*B + C*C + D*D + CD*C*D. In this 
formula, B, C, and D are the (regression) weights for the main effect of variables B, C, 
and D respectively, and CD is the (regression) weight for the interaction effect of C and 
D. 
Due to space limitations, the formulas for relevance, valence, involvement and 
distance are not given completely, but all the effects on the variables are summarized in 
Table 2.  
The formulas are then constructed using the algorithm described above. For 
theoretical reasons, each variable in Table 2 is in the actual formula split up in two 
unipolar variables (ethics is split up into good and bad, valence is split up into positive 
valence and negative valence, engagement is split up into involvement and distance, 
etc.).   
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Table 2: Effects of features on relevance, valence, involvement and distance. 
Effects on: Main effects Interaction effects 
Relevance Ethics 
Aesthetics 
Epistemics 
Affordances 
Ethics x Affordances 
Ethics x Aesthetics x Epistemics 
Valence Ethics 
Aesthetics 
Epistemics 
Affordances 
Ethics x Affordances 
Ethics x Aesthetics x Epistemics 
Engagement Similarity 
Relevance 
Valence 
Relevance x Valence 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
has been abbreviated ??????????? 
 
Relevance(A1, A2) = 
rel?good * Perc(Good, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad * Perc(Bad, A1, A2) + 
rel?bea * Perc(Beautiful, A1, A2) +  
rel?ugly * Perc(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
rel?real * Perc(Realistic, A1, A2) +  
rel?unr * Perc(Unrealistic, A1, A2) +  
rel?aid * Perc(Aid,. A1, A2) +  
rel?obst * Perc(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-aid * Perc(Good, A1, A2) * Perc(Aid, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-obst * Perc(Good, A1, A2) * Perc(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-obst * Perc(Bad, A1, A2) * Perc(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-aid * Perc(Bad, A1, A2) * Perc(Aid, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-bea-real * Perc(Good, A1, A2)* Perc(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perc(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-bea-unr * Perc(Good, A1, A2)* Perc(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perc(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-ugly-real * Perc(Good, A1, A2)* Perc(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perc(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-ugly-unr * Perc(Good, A1, A2)* Perc(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perc(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-bea-real * Perc(Bad, A1, A2)* Perc(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perc(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-bea-unr * Perc(Bad, A1, A2)* Perc(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perc(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-ugly-real * Perc(Bad, A1, A2)* Perc(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perc(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-ugly-unr * Perc(Bad, A1, A2)* Perc(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perc(Unrealistic, A1, A2) 
Satisfaction 
Within our model, satisfaction is a certain appreciation the agents attach to the possible 
decisions they can make (about situation selection). They use their expected satisfaction 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????them. Satisfaction is calculated 
by a trade-off between involvement and distance: 
 
Satisfaction(A1, A2) = inv-dist * max(Involvement(A1, A2), Distance(A1, A2)) +  
    (1 - inv-dist) * ((Involvement(A1, A2), Distance(A1, A2)) / n) 
 
When there is relatively more involvement, this will lead to a relatively more positive 
type of approach towards the other agent. Note that a lot of distance also can lead to a 
????? ?????????????? ??????????? ?? ??????? ???? ?? ????????? ????????? ??????? ??? ???? ???????
??????????? 
The trade-off is calculated using a variant of the fuzzy_AND-operator  (e.g., [17, 
18]). In the simulation experiments, two variants of this formula tested H1. In the min 
version, a part  was taken of the minimum of involvement and distance, and a part (1 - 
20
) was taken of the mean of involvement and distance, as originally proposed by 
Werners. In the max version, instead of a part of the minimum, a part of the 
maximum of involvement and distance was taken. In this paper, the value for  is always 
set to 0.5. 
3   Simulation Results 
To test our hypothesis, the simulation model introduced in the previous section was 
used to perform a number of experiments under different parameter settings. In each 
experiment, three agents were involved, named Harry, Barry, and Gary. The results of 
these experiments are described below. Due to space limitations, not all parameter 
settings are shown in this paper3.  
 
Baseline Condition. To start, an initial experiment was performed, to test whether the 
model behaves as expected, and as a control condition for the remaining experiments. In 
this condition, all the agents had a white skin, and wore Ajax clothes. For the chosen 
regression weights, see part B of the appendix [1] (to give one example, pv?good = 0.3, 
which means the regression weight of good on positive valence is 0.3). Because all 
language skills for each agent were set to 0, which means they had no language skills at 
all, they expected not to be able to communicate with each other, which resulted in 
assigning 1 to obstacle, and 0 to aid for each other. With the formula for calculating 
good and bad?? ??????????? ???????? ??????????????? ????? ???????? ?????????????? ???????????
attached to Ajax were all set to 0.5, which resulted in all agents assigning 0.5 to each 
???????? ?????????? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ????????? ???? ????????????? ??? ????? ?????? ?????
Feyenoord and all Designed(<Feature>) parameters for the agents were set to 0. All bias 
parameters were set to the neutral value of 1 for each agent. For all agents these 
parameter settings led to an involvement of 0.11, a distance of 0.25, and a level of 
satisfaction with each other of 0.21. These values are identical, because all agents are 
identical. This situation functions as a baseline for the following experiments. 
Next, in order to test whether our system could simulate counter-intuitive empirical 
results (H1) concerning the influence of features on involvement and distance, we 
experimented with changing the values of aesthetics and epistemics, see Experiment 1 
and 2. 
 
Experiment 1: Aesthetics ? beautiful vs. ugly. In this experiment, the parameter 
settings were the same as in the baseline condition, except that in this experiment, Barry 
?????????????? ????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????????????????????? ??????????????
involvement towards Barry (0.11?0.18) increased. Surprisingly, also his distance 
towards Barry (0.25??????? ??????????? ?????????? ????? ???????? ????????????
(0.11?0.14) and distance (0.25?0.37) towards Gary increased as well. It is clear that 
increasing the value for beautiful adds relatively more to involvement, and increasing 
the value for ugly adds relatively more to distance. As beautiful is a positive feature, 
which would intuitively be expected to only increase involvement, and ugly is a 
negative feature, which would intuitively be expected to only increase distance, this 
corresponds with H1.  
 
                                                          
3 For a detailed description of parameter settings, see appendix, part B. 
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Experiment 2: Epistemics ? realistic vs. unrealistic. In this experiment, the parameter 
settings were the same as in the baseline condition, except that in this experiment, Barry 
was realistic (realistic = 1), and Gary was unrealistic (unrealistic = 1). Because of this, 
???????? ??????ement towards Barry (0.11?0.14) increased. Surprisingly, also his 
distance towards Barry (0.25??????? ??????????? ?????????? ????? ???????? ????????????
(0.11?0.14) and distance (0.25?0.31) towards Gary increased as well. As a result of 
the chosen regression weights, these effects were much smaller than the effects of 
adding beautiful and ugly. Adding to realistic adds relatively more to involvement, and 
adding unrealistic adds relatively more to distance, although this is much less clear than 
the difference between adding beautiful and ugly. Because realistic is a positive feature, 
which traditionally is expected to only increase involvement, and unrealistic is a 
negative feature, which in conventional theories would only increase distance, this result 
confirms H1. 
 
Additional Experiments 
In addition to the above experiments, we experimented with changing the values of 
ethics and affordances????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of this, experimenting with 
these variables was not suitable for testing H1, since it would never be clear whether the 
changes in involvement and distance are caused by the increase in good, or by the 
decrease of bad, etc. Nevertheless, a number of experiments were performed with these 
variables, which confirmed that the behavior of that part of the model globally 
corresponds to the theoretical model (e.g., [8]) 4. 
4   Discussion 
In this paper, the theoretical model for involvement-distance trade-offs by [8] has been 
translated into a simulation model in the LEADSTO language [2]. Two main results 
were established. First, the model turned out to be adequate for simulating the dynamics 
of involvement-distance trade-offs and their influence on satisfaction. To model the 
trade-offs, the (   ????? ???????? ??? ????????? [17] fuzzy_AND operator seemed to 
provide more plausible results than the (   min) version, since in ambiguous cases 
(where an agent experiences a more or less equal amount of involvement and distance 
simultaneously), it results in a relatively lower value for satisfaction than the   (   min) 
version. This is explained by the fact that the (   max) version favors options in which 
involvement and distance differ much from each other. For example, it favors situations 
with I=0.2 and D=0.8 over situations with I=D=0.5), whereas for the (   min) version 
this is the other way around. Second, and perhaps more surprisingly, it was found that 
positive features can increase the level of distance, and that negative features can 
increase involvement. This is explained by the fact that the factor levels do not directly 
influence involvement and distance, but only indirectly via the factors of similarity, 
relevance and valence. Although this finding may be counterintuitive, it corresponds to 
empirical evidence by [14, 16].  
As mentioned above, our model was able to exhibit an increase in distance when the 
only change to the inputs of the model was an increase in a "positive" parameter. This 
                                                          
4 See part C of the appendix. 
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success may seem arguable because the model is so complicated that almost any result 
is "possible." It might have been wiser to identify the simplest model that could exhibit 
this behavior, so as to identify the necessary/sufficient components that explain this 
phenomenon. 
However true as this may seem theoretically, from an empirical point of view the 
model's complexity is warranted by years of experimentation (e.g., [10, 15]). More 
important than complexity yet is the fact that the model excludes phenomena as well. 
Based on empirical evidence (ibid.), the model asserts that no more than 10 factors are 
needed to describe the full of human-robot interaction. These studies (ibid.) also show 
that realism is subordinate to ethical considerations, that no effects are established but 
through the mediation of relevance and valence, etc. 
Yet, however nicely these empirical data were established, the theory as such still 
suffered from internal inconsistencies and logical blind spots. This is exactly what we 
repaired in the current paper. As such, simulations cannot count as a test on ecological 
validity but we did show that we can simulate empirical results in a logically consistent 
way. In other words, model verification led to theory improvement. 
To do so, we had to create a large number of different bias parameters that were set 
individually and parameters for setting the other individual characteristics, again 
underscoring the presumed over-complexity of the model. For one thing, the values of 
these parameters need to be settled empirically and because we could not do so right 
away, we set them to zero and one - to neutral that is - thereby reducing complexity 
again. But what we do have now, by making explicit hidden assumptions and creating 
internal consistency, is a framework to simulate the more complex affective behaviors 
and have a solid theoretical basis to do further empirical testing. 
In future research, the model will be used to test other, more refined hypotheses. For 
example, it may be explored whether the use of bipolar variables instead of two unipolar 
variables (e.g., ethics instead of good and bad) provides different results. In addition, 
the process of extracting factor levels from features may be modeled in more detail, 
possibly taking more explicit goals of the robot into account. Another direction for 
future work is to combine the model with an existing computational model for emotion 
regulation [3]. Whereas the current model focuses on the elicitation of emotion, that 
model addresses the regulation of emotion. We expect that both models will smoothly 
fit together, since the satisfaction that is generated as output of the involvement-distance 
trade-off can almost directly be used as input to affective situation selection. In that 
case, current satisfaction is checked for a certain threshold and if it is too low, the robot 
will evaluate its expected satisfaction in alternative situations. Finally, in a later stage of 
the project, the model will be validated against empirical data of human affective trade-
off processes. As soon as the model has been validated positively, we will start 
exploring the possibilities to apply it to real humans instead of agents, i.e., to develop a 
robot that can communicate affectively with humans. 
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Appendix A: The complete formulas for Relevance, Valence and Engagement 
To increase readability, the names of the beta weights use the following acronyms: 
Variable Acronym 
Good good 
Bad bad 
Beautiful bea 
Ugly ugly 
Realistic real 
Unrealistic unr 
Aid aid 
Obstacle obst 
Similarity sim 
Dissimilarity ds 
Relevance rel 
Irrelevance irr 
Positive Valence pv 
Negative Valence nv 
Involvement inv 
Distance dis 
 
In these formulas, rel?good   is the  regression weight of good on relevance, rel?good-bea-real  is 
the regression weight of the interaction of good*bad*realistic on relevance, etc. 
 
Relevance(A1, A2) = 
rel?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) + 
rel?bea * Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) +  
rel?ugly * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
rel?real * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) +  
rel?unr * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) +  
rel?aid * Perceived(Aid,. A1, A2) +  
rel?obst * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-aid * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) * Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-obst * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-obst * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-aid * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) * Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-bea-real * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-bea-unr * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-ugly-real * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?good-ugly-unr * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-bea-real * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-bea-unr * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-ugly-real * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad-ugly-unr * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) 
 
Irrelevance(A1, A2) = 
irr ?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
iirr?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) + 
irr?bea * Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) +  
irr?ugly * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
irr?real * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) +  
irr?unr * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) +  
irr?aid * Perceived(Aid,. A1, A2) +  
irr?obst * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
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irr?good-aid * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) * Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) + 
irr?good-obst * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
irr?bad-obst * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
irr?bad-aid * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) * Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) + 
irr?good-bea-real * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
irr?good-bea-unr * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
irr?good-ugly-real * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
irr?good-ugly-unr * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
irr?bad-bea-real * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
irr?bad-bea-unr * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
irr?bad-ugly-real * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
irr?bad-ugly-unr * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2 
 
Positive_Valence(A1, A2) = 
pv?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
pv?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) + 
pv?bea * Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) +  
pv?ugly * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
pv?real * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) +  
pv?unr * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) +  
pv?aid * Perceived (Aid, A1, A2) +  
pv?obst * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
pv?good-aid * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) * Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) + 
pv?good-obst * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
pv?bad-obst * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
pv?bad-aid * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) * Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) + 
pv?good-bea-real * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
pv?good-bea-unr * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
pv?good-ugly-real * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
pv?good-ugly-unr * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
pv?bad-bea-real * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
pv?bad-bea-unr * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
pv?bad-ugly-real * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
pv?bad-ugly-unr * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) 
 
Negative_Valence(A1, A2) = 
nv?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
nv?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) + 
nv?bea * Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) +  
nv?ugly * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
nv?real * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) +  
nv?unr * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) +  
nv?aid * Perceived (Aid, A1, A2) +  
nv?obst * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
nv?good-aid * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) * Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) + 
nv?good-obst * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
nv?bad-obst * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) * Perceived(Obstacle, A1, A2) + 
nv?bad-aid * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) * Perceived(Aid, A1, A2) + 
nv?good-bea-real * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
nv?good-bea-unr * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
nv?good-ugly-real * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
nv?good-ugly-unr * Perceived(Good, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
nv?bad-bea-real * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
nv?bad-bea-unr * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
nv?bad-ugly-real * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) + 
nv?bad-ugly-unr * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)* Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2 
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Involvement(A1, A2) = 
inv?sim * Similarity (A1, A2) + 
inv?ds * Dissimilarity (A1, A2) + 
inv?rel * Relevance (A1, A2) +
inv?irr * Irrelevance (A1, A2) + 
inv?pv * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv?nv * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv?rel-pv * Relevance (A1, A2) * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv?rel-nv * Relevance (A1, A2) * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv?irr-pv * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv?irr-nv * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) 
 
Distance(A1, A2) = 
dis?sim * Similarity (A1, A2) + 
dis?ds * Dissimilarity (A1, A2) + 
dis?rel * Relevance (A1, A2) + 
dis?irr * Irrelevance (A1, A2) + 
dis?pv * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
dis?nv * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) + 
dis?rel-pv * Relevance (A1, A2) * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
dis?rel-pv * Relevance (A1, A2) * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) + 
dis?rel-pv * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
dis?irr-nv * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Neg_Valence (A1, A2)
28 
Appendix B: Parameter settings in the experiments 
 
This appendix contains all parameter settings for the experiments in the paper. These 
are the parameter settings of the baseline experiment. The variables that are changed in 
other experiments are mentioned in the paper. 
 
Table 1: All values for the regression weights 
Weight of X  on Y Value 
Good  Similarity 0.30 
Bad  Similarity 0.20 
Beautiful  Similarity 0.20 
Ugly  Similarity 0.10 
Realistic  Similarity 0.10 
Unrealistic  Similarity 0.10 
Good  Dissimilarity 0.20. 
Bad  Dissimilarity 0.30 
Beautiful  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Ugly  Dissimilarity 0.20 
Realistic  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Unrealistic  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Good  Relevance 0.05 
Bad  Relevance 0.05 
Beautiful  Relevance 0.08 
Ugly  Relevance 0.07 
Realistic  Relevance 0.05 
Unrealistic  Relevance 0.05 
Aid Relevance 0.05 
Obstacle Relevance 0.05 
Good * Aid Relevance 0.05 
Good * Obstacle Relevance 0.08 
Bad * Aid Relevance 0.08 
Bad * Obstacle Relevance 0.07 
Good * Beautiful * Realistic Relevance 0.03 
Good * Beautiful * Unrealistic Relevance 0.03 
Good * Ugly * Realistic Relevance 0.03 
Good * Ugly * Unrealistic Relevance 0.03 
Bad * Beautiful * Realistic Relevance 0.04 
Bad * Beautiful * Unrealistic Relevance 0.03 
Bad * Ugly * Realistic Relevance 0.03 
Bad * Ugly * Unrealistic Relevance 0.03 
Good  Irrelevance 0.05 
Bad  Irrelevance 0.05 
Beautiful  Irrelevance 0.08 
Ugly  Irrelevance 0.07 
Realistic  Irrelevance 0.05 
Unrealistic  Irrelevance 0.05 
Aid Irrelevance 0.05 
Obstacle Irrelevance 0.05 
Good * Aid Irrelevance 0.07 
Good * Obstacle Irrelevance 0.08 
Bad * Aid Irrelevance 0.08 
Bad * Obstacle Irrelevance 0.07 
Good * Beautiful * Realistic Irrelevance 0.03 
Good * Beautiful * Unrealistic Irrelevance 0.03 
Good * Ugly * Realistic Irrelevance 0.03 
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Good * Ugly * Unrealistic Irrelevance 0.03 
Bad * Beautiful * Realistic Irrelevance 0.04 
Bad * Beautiful * Unrealistic Irrelevance 0.03 
Bad * Ugly * Realistic Irrelevance 0.03 
Bad * Ugly * Unrealistic Irrelevance 0.03 
Good  Positive Valence 0.30 
Bad  Positive Valence 0 
Beautiful  Positive Valence 0.15 
Ugly  Positive Valence 0 
Realistic  Positive Valence 0.03 
Unrealistic  Positive Valence 0.02 
Aid Positive Valence 0.30 
Obstacle Positive Valence 0 
Good * Aid Positive Valence 0.30 
Good * Obstacle Positive Valence -0.10 
Bad * Aid Positive Valence -0.20 
Bad * Obstacle Positive Valence 0 
Good * Beautiful * Realistic Positive Valence 0.10 
Good * Beautiful * Unrealistic Positive Valence 0.05 
Good * Ugly * Realistic Positive Valence 0.10 
Good * Ugly * Unrealistic Positive Valence 0.05 
Bad * Beautiful * Realistic Positive Valence -0.10 
Bad * Beautiful * Unrealistic Positive Valence -0.05 
Bad * Ugly * Realistic Positive Valence 0.03 
Bad * Ugly * Unrealistic Positive Valence 0.02 
Good  Negative Valence 0.10 
Bad  Negative Valence 0.25 
Beautiful  Negative Valence 0.05 
Ugly  Negative Valence 0.15 
Realistic  Negative Valence 0.03 
Unrealistic  Negative Valence 0.07 
Aid Negative Valence 0 
Obstacle Negative Valence 0.35 
Good * Aid Negative Valence -0.05 
Good * Obstacle Negative Valence -0.10 
Bad * Aid Negative Valence -0.15 
Bad * Obstacle Negative Valence 0.30 
Good * Beautiful * Realistic Negative Valence 0.10 
Good * Beautiful * Unrealistic Negative Valence 0.05 
Good * Ugly * Realistic Negative Valence -0.10 
Good * Ugly * Unrealistic Negative Valence -0.15 
Bad * Beautiful * Realistic Negative Valence 0.15 
Bad * Beautiful * Unrealistic Negative Valence 0.10 
Bad * Ugly * Realistic Negative Valence -0.15 
Similarity Involvement  0.15 
Dissimilarity Involvement 0.05 
Relevance  Involvement 0.35 
Irrelevance  Involvement -0.1 
Positive Valence Involvement 0.2 
Negative Valence Involvement 0.05 
Relevance * Positive Valence Involvement 0.35 
Relevance * Negative Valence Involvement 0 
Irrelevance * Positive Valence Involvement 0.05 
Irrelevance * Negative Valence Involvement -0.1 
Similarity Distance 0.05 
Dissimilarity Distance 0.15 
Relevance   Distance 0.35 
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Irrelevance  Distance -0.1 
Positive Valence Distance 0 
Negative Valence Distance 0.25 
Relevance * Positive Valence Distance 0 
Relevance * Negative Valence Distance 0.4 
Irrelevance * Positive Valence Distance -0.1 
Irrelevance * Negative Valence Distance 0 
 
Table 2: Levels of satisfaction the agents attach to soccer clubs 
Satisfaction of With Value 
Harry Ajax 0.5 
Harry Feyenoord 0 
Barry Ajax 0.5 
Barry Feyenoord 0 
Gary Ajax 0.5 
Gary Feyenoord 0 
 
Table 3: The goodness and badness agents attach to other agents wearing neutral clothes 
Agent Clothes Feature Value 
Harry Neutral clothes Good 0.3 
Harry Neutral clothes Bad 0.3 
Barry Neutral clothes Good 0.3 
Barry Neutral clothes Bad 0.3 
Gary Neutral clothes Good 0.3 
Gary Neutral clothes Bad 0.3 
 
Table 4: Designed values for the features of each agent 
Agent Feature Value 
Harry Beautiful 0 
Harry Ugly 0 
Harry Good 0 
Harry Bad 0 
Harry Realistic 0 
Harry Unrealistic 0 
Barry Beautiful 0 
Barry Ugly 0 
Barry Good 0 
Barry Bad 0 
Barry Realistic 0 
Barry Unrealistic 0 
Gary Beautiful 0 
Gary Ugly 0 
Gary Good 0 
Gary Bad 0 
Gary Realistic 0 
Gary Unrealistic 0 
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Table 5: Biases the agents have in perceiving features of their selves and others 
Bias of Agent For perceiving Of Agent Value 
Harry Beautiful Harry 1 
Harry Beautiful Barry 1 
Harry Beautiful Gary 1 
Harry Ugly Harry 1 
Harry Ugly Barry 1 
Harry Ugly Gary 1 
Harry Realistic Harry 1 
Harry Realistic Barry 1 
Harry Realistic Gary 1 
Harry Unrealistic Harry 1 
Harry Unrealistic Barry 1 
Harry Unrealistic Gary 1 
Harry Good Harry 1 
Harry Good Barry 1 
Harry Good Gary 1 
Harry Bad Harry 1 
Harry Bad Barry 1 
Harry Bad Gary 1 
Barry Beautiful Harry 1 
Barry Beautiful Barry 1 
Barry Beautiful Gary 1 
Barry Ugly Harry 1 
Barry Ugly Barry 1 
Barry Ugly Gary 1 
Barry Realistic Harry 1 
Barry Realistic Barry 1 
Barry Realistic Gary 1 
Barry Unrealistic Harry 1 
Barry Unrealistic Barry 1 
Barry Unrealistic Gary 1 
Barry Good Harry 1 
Barry Good Barry 1 
Barry Good Gary 1 
Barry Bad Harry 1 
Barry Bad Barry 1 
Barry Bad Gary 1 
Gary Beautiful Harry 1 
Gary Beautiful Barry 1 
Gary Beautiful Gary 1 
Gary Ugly Harry 1 
Gary Ugly Barry 1 
Gary Ugly Gary 1 
Gary Realistic Harry 1 
Gary Realistic Barry 1 
Gary Realistic Gary 1 
Gary Unrealistic Harry 1 
Gary Unrealistic Barry 1 
Gary Unrealistic Gary 1 
Gary Good Harry 1 
Gary Good Barry 1 
Gary Good Gary 1 
Gary Bad Harry 1 
Gary Bad Barry 1 
Gary Bad Gary 1 
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Table 6: The clothes the agents are wearing 
Agent Wears clothes of 
Harry Ajax 
Barry Ajax 
Gary Ajax 
 
Table 7: The skin colors of the agents 
Agent Has skin color 
Harry White 
Barry White 
Gary White 
 
Table 8: The language skills of the agents 
Agent Language Skill 
Harry Dutch 0 
Harry English 0 
Harry Urdu 0 
Barry Dutch 0 
Barry English 0 
Barry Urdu 0 
Barry Dutch 0 
Barry English 0 
Barry Urdu 0 
 
Table 9: The language skills the agents expect other agents to have, given  
???????????????????????????? 
Agent Skin color other agent Language Expected skill 
Harry White Dutch 0.67 
Harry White English 0.33 
Harry White Urdu 0 
Harry Dark Dutch 0 
Harry Dark English 0.33 
Harry Dark Urdu 0.67 
Barry White Dutch 0.67 
Barry White English 0.33 
Barry White Urdu 0 
Barry Dark Dutch 0 
Barry Dark English 0.33 
Barry Dark Urdu 0.67 
Gary White Dutch 0.67 
Gary White English 0.33 
Gary White Urdu 0 
Gary Dark Dutch 0 
Gary Dark English 0.33 
Gary Dark Urdu 0.67 
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Appendix C: Additional Experiments 
 
Experiment 5: Ethics ? ???????????????????????? 
 
In this experiment, all the variables were the same as the baseline experiment, except 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Because all the agents wore Ajax clothes, Barry thought that the other agents were 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
was reflected by an increase in involvement (0.11 ? 0.15), and a decrease in distance 
(0.25 ? 0.14) from Barry to the other agents. Gar???? ???????????? ???????? ???? ??????
agents decreased from 0.11 to 0.08, and his distance towards the other agents increased 
from 0.25 to 0.35. These results are as would be expected from the literature.  
 
Experiment 6: Affordances ? aid vs. Obstacle 
 
In this experiment, the parameter settings were the same as in the baseline experiment, 
except that in this experiment, Harry had great language skills in Dutch (skillDutch = 1) 
as well as in English (skillEnglish = 1). Because of this, he expected he would be able 
to communicate with the other agents, which is reflected by an increase in perceived 
aid, and a decrease in perceived obstacle of the other agents. As a result, his 
involvement towards the other agents increased strongly (0.11?0.24), and his distance 
towards the other agents decreased tremendously (0.25?0.03. As a result of the chosen 
regression weights in the model, these effects were much bigger than the effects of 
adding good and bad. These results are as would be expected from the literature. 
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Abstract. To create a robot with a mind of its own, we ex-tended a formalized 
version of a model that explains affect-driven interaction with mechanisms for 
goal-directed behavior. We ran simulation experiments with intelligent software 
agents and found that agents preferred affect-driven decision options to rational 
decision options in situations where choices for low expected utility are irrational. 
This behavior counters current models in decision making, which generally have a 
hedonic bias and always select the option with the highest expected utility.  
1   Introduction 
We wish to develop a robot that can interact with humans in an emotionally natural 
way. Previous research in the virtual agent domain showed that mimicking human users 
affects human involvement with the agent [11][12]. In this paper, we want to simulate 
goal-driven rational decision making in contrast to affective decision making. As a first 
step in the ambition to confront a human user with a 3D robot, the simulations reported 
here experimented with agents judging other agents for utility and engagement. 
An important view from emotion psychology is that emotions are goal-driven. The 
emotional system scans the environment for relevant stimuli that are either potentially 
beneficial or harmful for the concerns, motives, and goals of the individual ([5], p. 494, 
p. 463). From the perspective of broaden-and-build theory, positive emotions are 
vehicles for individual growth a??? ??????? ????????????? ??? ????????? ????????? ?????????
and social resources, positive emotions transform people for the better, giving them 
better lives in the future ([4], p. 224). Previous re-search showed that human beings 
usually make unconscious rather than conscious decisions [1]. 
In mimicking human behavior, we created agents that can perceive each other as a 
personal friend as well as a means to an end [11]. With regard to being a personal 
friend, the Interactive model of Perceiving and Experiencing Fictional Characters (I-
PEFiC) served as a starting point [10]. Within this frame-work, an Agent A can 
calculate the trade-off between how involved it is with another agent (e.g., Agent B is 
beautiful) and what keeps the agent at a distance (e.g., Agent B mistreats me) [2]. The 
involvement-distance trade-off is the result of evaluating the features of an agent on 
several dimensions. In addition, use intentions are calculated that prompt the agent to 
undertake action in favor or against another agent. 
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These actions are based on goals, which play a role in the judgment formation of the 
agent about the other agent. We devised eight (23) possible types of judgments an agent 
can have about how the features of another agent afford the achievement of different 
goal-states or not (Table 1) (cf. [8]). A judgment consists of a belief about the other 
agent plus a measure of agreement. Each constituent in the judgment evokes a positive 
(p) or negative (n) covert response. 
During the weighing (Table 1), mixed emotions occur. Because affordances have 
predictive power for engagement [11], all the n-responses that occur during weighing 
feed into distance; all the p-responses into involvement. The action tendencies that are 
connected to positive or negative valence will feed into the intentions of Agent A, 
????????????? ???? ??????? ??? ?????? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ????????????? ???? ?????? ??????
threshold, Agent A shows overt behavior (e.g., to converse with the other agent, to kick 
or hug it). Features of Agent B, then, are means to afford the goals of Agent A. Through 
weighing, this leads to a measure of valence toward that means, propelling action 
tendencies to approach, avoid, attack, change, or do nothing with the means. 
Table 1. Agent A (robot) judges Agent B (user), resulting in valencies that precede action 
tendencies 
Judg
ment 
Means 
 (Agent B) 
Affords Goal Agreement1 Weighing Valence 
to means3 
? Intelligence p facilitates p ????????? efficiency p 
Agree            p p = (p · p) · p = (p) · p = p 
Disagree2   n p = (p · p) · n = (p) · n = n 
? Intelligence p inhibits n ????????? efficiency p 
Agree            p p = (n · p) · p = (n) · p = n 
Disagree     n p = (n · p) · n = (n) · n = p 
? Intelligence p facilitates p Agent A inefficiency n 
Agree            p p = (p · n) · p = (n) · p = n 
Disagree     n p = (p · n) · n = (n) · n = p 
? Intelligence p inhibits n Agent A inefficiency n 
Agree            p p = (n · n) · p = (p) · p = p 
Disagree     n p = (n · n) · n = (p) · n = n 
? Unintelligence n facilitates p Agent ??? efficiency p 
Agree            p n = (p · p) · p = (p) · p = p 
Disagree     n n = (p · p) · n = (p) · n = n 
? Unintelligence n inhibits n Agent ??? efficiency p 
Agree            p n = (n · p) · p = (n) · p = n 
Disagree     n n = (n · p) · n = (n) · n = p 
? Unintelligence n facilitates p Agent A inefficiency n 
Agree            p n = (p · n) · p = (n) · p = n 
Disagree     n n = (p · n) · n = (n) · n = p 
? Unintelligence n inhibits n Agent A inefficiency n 
Agree            p n = (n · n) · p = (p) · p = p 
Disagree     n n = (n · n) · n = (p) · n = n 
1 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
2 Gray cells indicate an unconventional, counter-intuitive, belief that urges to adapt conventional theory 
3 If valence is positive, an action tendency to approach the means (here, Agent B) occurs. If valence is 
?????????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ????????? ??? ??????????????? ??? ??????? ????????? ??? ??????? ???????? ???????? ???
change the means occurs (e.g., Agent A starts to educate Agent B) 
 
Based on Table 1, we formulated the general hypothesis H1: 
 
H1: Agents equipped with our model can make affect-driven decisions that are 
rationally sub-optimal in situations where choices for high expected utility would be 
predicted. 
 
We will test this hypothesis by performing simulation experiments on the formalized 
model, under various parameter settings. 
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2   Implementation 
I-PEFiC is a model (Figure 1) that is empirically well validated [10, 11, 12]. The I-
PEFiC model has three phases: encoding, comparison, and response [12]. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????vel of ethics (good 
or bad) aesthetics (beautiful or ugly), and epistemics (realistic or unrealistic). During the 
encoding, moreover, the user evaluates in how far the agent system has affordances 
(aids or obstacles), which make the agent useful as a computer tool or not. 
In the comparison phase, the features are judged for similarity (similar or dissimilar) 
??????? ??? ??? ???? ????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ??? ????????? ??? ????? ?????? ?????????? ???
irrelevant) and valence to goals (positive or negative outcome expectancies). The 
measures in the encode phase - moderated by the factors in the comparison phase - 
determine the responses, that is, the levels of involvement with and distance towards the 
embodied agent. Moreover, the intention to use the agent as a tool indicates actual use 
and together with involvement and distance, this determines the overall satisfaction of 
the user with the agent; in our case of Agent A with Agent B. 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical Representation of I-PEFiC 
In the previous formalization of the I-PEFiC model [2], the value for affordances was 
based on the expected possibilities to communicate with another agent. This is a 
simplification, as perceived affordances should relate to goals [11]. 
In this study, we extended the formalized I-PEFiC model [2] with goal-directed, 
rational behavior and implemented this in the LEADSTO modeling environment [3]. In 
the perception model that Agent A (the robot) now has about Agent B (the user), 
affordances of B are connected to goals of A as described in Table 1. For a full 
description of the formalization, see [13]. 
In our model, Agent A has goal-states it wants to achieve: desired goal-states. It also 
has goal-states it wants to avoid: undesired goal-states. The agent attaches a certain 
value for valence [-1, 1] and relevance [0, 1] to goal-states. If a goal-state is desired, it 
will have a positive valence. If a goal-state is undesired, it will have a negative valence. 
If one goal-state is more relevant for the agent than another, the relevance of that one 
goal-state is higher. By multiplying valence with relevance, the level of ambition for a 
goal-state is calculated. 
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Within the system, agents perceive features of each other. These features can afford 
an agent to perform a certain action, which affects achieving a certain goal. In other 
words, these features are means to an end (Table 1). These perceived affordances are 
not necessarily the same as the affordances meant by the designer. For instance, the 
designer can design a chair to sit on (designed affordances) but an agent could also use 
this chair to beat up another agent (perceived affordances) [11]. 
The agents in the system can compare their perceived affordances of other agents to 
the goal-states they want to achieve or avoid. While doing this, they can reason about 
the outcome expectancies of using the other agent for a certain action (e.g., speech acts, 
kicking, or hugging). For example, if an agent has the desired goal-state to be inside a 
house, it could believe that the action to open the door of that house could be an action 
that facilitates this goal. 
In humans, such outcome expectancies lead to certain quick and mostly 
subconsciously generated action tendencies. In our agents, as in humans, action 
tendencies influence the experienced involvement and distance towards the other agent. 
2.1.   Calculating Expected Utilities 
In the system, the agents can perform actions to reach their goals. The system contains a 
library of goal-states, and each agent has a level of ambition for each goal-state, 
represented by a real value between [-1, 1], where a negative value means that the goal-
state is undesired and a positive value means that the goal-state is desired. A bigger 
value means the goal-state is more important for the agent. 
The agents can perform actions to reach their goals. The system contains a library of 
actions from which they can choose. The agent has a belief about each action that it will 
inhibit or facilitate a certain goal-state. Its estimation of the facilitation of the goal-state 
by the action is represented by a real value between [-1, 1], -1 being full inhibition, 1 
being full facilitation. The following formulas are used to calculate the expected utilities 
of actions. 
 
ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent, Goal) =  
Belief(facilitates(Action, Agent, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal) 
 
ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent) = ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent, Goal)) 
 
Given the level of ambition for a goal-state and the believed facilitation of a goal-
state by an action towards another agent, the agent calculates the expected utility of 
performing that action towards that agent regarding that goal by multiplying the 
believed facilitation of the goal-state with the level of ambition for the goal-state.  
Because an action usually affects several goal-states that might be conflicting, the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ed 
by summing all expected utilities regarding all goal-states in the system that are related 
to the action. 
Because an agent usually performs only one action at a time with respect to another 
agent, the intentions to use Agent B are calculated by taking the maximum expected 
utility of all actions Agent A can perform with respect to Agent B. Agents that facilitate 
desired or inhibit undesired goal-states raise positive use intentions with Agent A, and 
vice versa. 
 
UseIntentions(Agent,Ag_B)=max(ExpectedUtility(Agent,Action,Ag_B)) 
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2.2.   Effects on involvement and distance 
In the action library, the type of each action is specified. Actions can be specified as (1) 
Positive approach, (2) Negative approach, (3) Change, or (4) Avoid.  
The heuristic to calculate the expected utilities of actions, as described in the 
previous paragraphs, is also used to generate action tendencies. So if an agent has a high 
expected utility for a certain action, it will also generate a strong action tendency for 
that specific action.  
The generated action tendencies are used to calculate the effect of the affordances of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
effect, a weighed sum of all the action tendencies is taken, as can be seen in the 
formulas below. In these formulas, the ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
on involvement and distance. 
 
Effect of Affordances on Involvement = I?NA*ATneg_appr + I?PA*ATpos_appr + I?CH*ATchange +      
I?AV*ATavoid 
 
Effect of Affordances on Distance    = D?NA*ATneg_appr + D?PA*ATpos_appr + D?CH*ATchange + 
D?AV*ATavoid 
Table 2. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Weight Value Weight Value 
I?PA 
0.75 D?PA -0.75 
I?NA 0.25 D?NA 0.75 
I?CH 0.50 D?CH 0.50 
I?AV -0.50 D?AV 0.50 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the generated action tendencies classified as negative 
????????? ????????? ???? ???????? ???????????? ?? ??????? ???? ????????? ????????? ?? ????? ??? ????
agent feels the tendency to negatively approach the user or another agent, this will 
slightly increase its involvement with that agent, as involvement represents a tendency 
to approach [10], but simultaneously will increase its distance toward the user or agent, 
as negative approach implies quite some distance. The effects of affordances on 
involvement and distance are computed as described in [13]. 
2.3. Making a decision 
All possible actions in the system are related to other agents. In the decision process, the 
agent first selects another agent to perform the action on. To do this, for all possible 
agents it meets, the agent calculates the expected satisfaction (Figure 1) of interacting 
with that agent, using the following formulas: 
 
Involvement-Distance-Tradeoff = *max(I, D) + (1- )*(I+D)/2 
Expected_Satisfaction(Agent, AgentB) = ES?IDT*IDT + ES?UI*UI 
 
The expected satisfaction is calculated by trading involvement (I) for distance (D) as 
described in [2], and taking a weighed mean of the involvement-distance trade-off 
(IDT) and the use intentions (UI). Thus, the agent bases its choice who to interact with 
on the rationally generated use intentions, as well as on the more affectively generated 
trade-off between involvement and distance. The agent chooses to approach the one 
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agent that promises the highest expected satisfaction during interaction.  
Once the agent has selected another agent to interact with, it decides which action to 
take. For each possible action, it calculates the expected satisfaction, following the 
rules: 
 
Expected Satisfaction Positive Approach =  
ESPA?I * I + ESPA?D * (1-D) + ESPA?EU *  EUact 
 
Expected Satisfaction Negative Approach =  
ESNA?I * (1-I) + ESNA?D * D + ESNA?EU * EUact 
 
Expected Satisfaction Change =  
ESCH?I * I + ESCH?D * D + ESCH?EU * EUact 
 
Expected Satisfaction Avoid =  
ESAV?I * (1-I) + ESAV?D * D + ESAV?EU * EUact 
 
The expected satisfaction of doing a specific action with a certain agent is calculated 
??? ??????? ?? ???????? ???? ??? ???? ???????? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ???? ???? ?????????
utility of the particular action. These weights are taken as tabulated in Table 3, but they 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for negative approach, whereas another agent does not hesitate to use violence. If the 
agent has a high level of involvement with and a low level of distance towards another 
agent, it will approach the agent positively. If the agent has a low level of involvement 
and a high level of distance, it approaches the agent negatively or avoids it. If the agent 
evokes a high level of involvement as well as a considerable level of distance, the agent 
is most likely to try to change the other agent, for example, by teaching it. The agent 
will select the action with the highest expected satisfaction and perform it. 
??? ??????????????? ????????????????????????????????? and analyzed, this model could be 
used to let agents or robots interact with each other or with users in a meaningful way, 
based not only on rationality, but also on affective tendencies. 
Table 3. Values for weights of involvement, distance, and expected utility on the expected 
satisfaction of performing a type of action 
Weight Value Weight Value 
ESPA?I  0.4 ESCH?I  0.4 
ESPA?D  0.4 ESCH?D  0.3 
ESPA?EU  0.2 ESCH?EU  0.3 
ESNA?I 
0.4 ESAV?I  0.5 
ESNA?D  0.4 ESAV ?D  0.3 
ESNA?EU  0.2 ESAV ?EU  0.2 
3   Simulation Results 
To test our hypothesis H1, the simulation model introduced in the previous section was 
used to per-form a number of experiments under different parameter settings. In each 
experiment, three agents (Harry, Barry, and Gary) followed a (fictitious) anger 
management therapy. In this setting, an infinite number of actions can be inserted in the 
system. For clarity, however, we inserted only one instance of an action for each action 
type. The action related with positive approach was to comfort the other agent, whereas 
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the action for negative approach was to hit the other agent. Criticizing another agent 
was the action associated with change, and the action for avoiding the agent was to 
simply move away from it. The results of the experiments are described below. 
 
Baseline Condition.  
For starters, an initial experiment was performed that served as a control condition for 
the remaining experiments. In this condition, the designed features for beautiful and 
ugly (aesthetics), good and bad (ethics), and realistic and unrealistic (epistemics) were 
set to 0 (see Figure 1). All beliefs of the agents about actions facilitating goal-states as 
well as the ambition levels for those goal-states were set to 0. As can be seen in Table 4, 
this parameter setting led all agents to have a level of involvement of 0.12 and a level of 
distance 0.1 towards each other. Because the agents did not have any goals or beliefs 
about goals, the expected utilities of all possible actions were 0, and therefore their use 
intentions towards each other were also 0. Because all agents were exactly the same and 
had very low involvement, distance, and use intentions with respect to each other, they 
all had the same low (0.09) expected satisfaction of interacting with each other. The 
expected satisfaction of the actions to perform towards the other agents was 0.39 for 
fighting, 0.41 for comforting, 0.47 for avoiding, and 0.08 for criticizing. This resulted in 
all agents avoiding each other, as they had the highest expected satisfaction for 
performing this action. 
Table 4. Simulation results of the baseline condition and the meaning of all abbreviations in the 
tables in this paper 
 All Other Agents  Meaning of Abbreviations 
A
ll 
A
ge
nt
s I= 0.12  
D =  0.1 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
ES of  PA = 0.41 
ES of NA = 0.39 
ES of CH = 0.08 
ES of AV = 0.47 
    I = Involvement 
D = Distance 
UI = Use Intentions 
ES = Expected Satisfaction 
PA = Positive Approach 
NA = Negative Approach 
CH = Change 
AV = Avoid 
 
Experiment 1: The effect of having a goal 
We performed an experiment to test the effect of having a goal (i.e., making one 
decision option rationally a better choice) on the decision process of an agent. In this 
experiment, the parameter settings are the same as in the baseline condition, except that 
now Harry had a strong ambition for the goal to reduce his anger (level of ambition with 
value = 1) and believed he could do this by fighting with Gary (belief with value=1). 
Because of this, Harry had an expected utility of 1 for fighting Gary, and generated an 
action tendency of 1 for this action, which caused Harry to have use intentions of 1 for 
Gary. The generated action tendency to fight Gary had a small increasing effect on his 
involvement with (0.12 ? 0.17) and a bigger increasing effect on his distance (0.1 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(0.39?0.63), while there were only minor changes in the expected satisfaction of the 
other possible actions. Although Harry did not feel very involved with or at a distance 
towards Gary, he primarily rationally chose to fight Gary to reach his goal of reducing 
his own anger.  
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Table 5. Simulation results of Experiment 1 
 Barry Gary 
H
ar
ry
 I = 0.12 
D = 0.10 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.09 
I = 0.17 
D = 0.25 
UI = 1 
ES = 0.38 
ES PA = 0.37 
ES NA = 0.63 
ES CH = 0.14 
ES AV = 0.49 
 
Experiment 2: The effect of being involved 
We performed an experiment to test the effect of being involved with another agent 
(i.e., making certain decision options affectively a better choice) on the decision process 
of an agent. In this experiment, compared to the baseline, Gary was designed to be a 
beautiful, good, and realistic character (the designed values for these three parameters 
are set to 1). Owing to this, the other agents had a much higher involvement with 
(0.12?0.49) and a somewhat lower distance (0.10?0.07) towards Gary. The expected 
levels of satisfaction of the actions for the other agents to perform to Gary were 
influenced by these changes in involvement and distance towards him. It had a 
facilitating effect on the expected satisfaction of comforting Gary (0.41?0.60) and 
criticizing him (0.08?0.20). It had an inhibiting effect on fighting Gary (0.39?0.20) 
and avoiding him (0.47?0.25). This resulted in Harry and Barry comforting Gary 
instead of avoiding him. 
Table 6. Simulation results of Experiment 2 
 Harry / Barry   Gary 
G
ar
y 
I = 0.07 
D = 0.15 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.10 
ES PA = 0.37 
ES NA = 0.43 
ES CH = 0.07 
ES AV = 0.51 
 
H
ar
ry
 / 
B
ar
ry
 I = 0.49 
D = 0 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.29 
ES PA = 0.60 
ES NA = 0.20 
ES CH = 0.20 
ES AV = 0.25 
 
Experiment 3: Having a goal and being involved 
We performed an experiment to test what happens if affect conflicts with rationality. In 
Experiment 1, Harry wanted to reduce his anger and thought he could do this by 
releasing his anger and fight Gary. In experiment 3, however, Gary was designed to be 
beautiful, good, and realistic (the designed values for these three parameters are set to 
1), which made Harry very involved (0.17?0.54) with Gary and less distant 
(0.25?0.15). This decreased his expected satisfaction of fighting (0.63?0.44) and 
avoiding (0.49?0.27) Gary and increased his expected satisfaction of comforting 
(0.37?0.56) and criticizing (0.14?0.26) him. 
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Table 7. Simulation results of Experiment 3 
 Gary   Gary 
H
ar
ry
 
I = 0.49 
D = 0 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.29 
ES PA = 0.60 
ES NA = 0.20 
ES CH = 0.20 
ES AV = 0.25 
 
B
ar
ry
 
I = 0.54 
D = 0.15 
UI = 1 
ES = 0.55 
ES of  PA = 0.56 
ES of NA = 0.44 
ES of CH = 0.26 
ES of AV = 0.27 
 
 Harry / Barry 
G
ar
y 
  I = 0.07 
D = 0.15 
UI = 0 
ES = 0.10 
ES PA = 0.37 
ES NA = 0.43 
ES CH = 0.07 
ES AV = 0.51 
Because Harry was too involved with Gary and had too little distance to fight him, he 
chose to comfort him instead, although he did not believe this would help him achieve 
his goal of anger reduction. The expected utility for Harry to fight Barry was 1, whereas 
all other expected utilities were 0, so that rationally Harry should choose to fight Barry. 
However, due to other factors, Harry was involved with Barry, which caused him to 
make an affective decision and comfort Barry. These experiments confirm H1.   
Experiment 1 showed that agents equipped with our model can make rational decisions. 
Experiment 2 showed that changes in affect can make a difference, although the optimal 
rational decision may be selected. Experiment 3 showed, however, that changes in 
affect can also make the agents select affect-driven decision options, which are 
rationally sub-optimal, in a situation where older models would predict choices for high 
utility expectations. 
4   Discussion 
We extended the computational I-PEFiC model [2] with goal-directed judgment 
formation [8] and overt actions to enable software agents to combine rational with 
affective processing.  
Models of decision-making usually assume the process to be rational, which would 
exclude the possibility of emotions playing a role other than disturbing the process [7]. 
However, humans often make irrational decisions. A good example for this is the 
Ultimatum game [9], for which behavioral research showed that low offers (20% of 
total amount) have a 50% chance of being rejected. Participants reported that low offers 
were unfair, so that out of anger, they selected the irrational option [7].  
Existing models of decision making, such as [6], usually have a hedonic bias, and 
generally try to find the action with the highest expected utility. Certain decision 
theoretic models take emotions into account but in those models, emotions merely 
confirm good rational decisions ? emotional states as modes of decision making [6]. 
However, these models cannot explain irrational behavior, where actions with a 
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(relatively) low expected utility are chosen. Our balancing model takes the expected 
utility as well as involvement-distance trade-offs into account. This way, situations in 
which emotions overwhelm rationality can be explained and simulated. 
In future research, we will confront our formalization with empirical data of human 
affective trade-off processes. As soon as the model is validated and adapted, we will 
start exploring the possibilities to build a robot that can interact with real humans. We 
hope to develop a robot that can communicate affectively with humans in a more natural 
way, that is, with a mind of its own, in pursuit of its own goals. 
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Appendix A: Formulas used in the model 
 
To increase readability, the names of the beta weights use the following acronyms: 
 
Variable Acronym 
Good good 
Bad bad 
Beautiful bea 
Ugly ugly 
Realistic real 
Unrealistic unr 
Aid aid 
Obstacle obst 
Similarity sim 
Dissimilarity ds 
Relevance rel 
Irrelevance irr 
Positive Valence pv 
Negative Valence nv 
Involvement inv 
Distance dis 
 
Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Beautiful) * Designed(Beautiful, A2) 
Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Ugly) * Designed(Ugly, A2) 
 
Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2,Realistic) * Designed(Realistic, A2) 
Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Unrealistic) * Designed(Unrealistic, A2) 
 
Perceived(Good, A1, A2) = Appearance(A2) 
Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) = 1 ? Appearance(A2) 
 
Similarity(A1, A2) = 
1- ( 
sim?good * abs(Perceived(Good, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Good, A1, A1) ) +  
sim?bad * abs(Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Bad, A1, A1) ) + 
sim?bea * abs(Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A1) ) +  
sim?ugly * abs(Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Ugly, A1, A1) ) + 
sim?real * abs(Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Realistic, A1, A1) ) +  
sim?unr * abs(Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A1) ) 
Variable Meaning Range 
abs(X) The absolute value of variable or formula X - 
max(X, Y) The minimum value of variables or formulas X and Y - 
A-->I Effect of affordances on involvement  
A-->D Effect of affordances on Distance  
Perceived(<Feature>, A1, A2) New value Agent1 perceives of a certain feature of 
Agent2 
[0, 1] 
Designed(<Feature>, A2) ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Agent2 
[0, 1] 
Bias(A1, A2, feature) Bias that Agent1 has of Agent2 regarding a certain 
feature 
[0, 2] 
   
Inv_Dist_trade_off Outcome of involvement distance trade off [0, 1] 
factor Variable that determines outcome of trade off for a 
certain factor 
[0, 1] 
factor?factor (personal) regression weight a factor has for another 
factor for a certain agent 
[0, 1] 
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Dissimilarity(A1, A2) =  
ds?good * abs(Perceived(Good, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Good, A1, A1) ) +  
ds?bad * abs(Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Bad, A1, A1) ) + 
ds?bea * abs(Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A1) ) +  
ds?ugly * abs(Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Ugly, A1, A1) ) + 
ds?real * abs(Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Realistic, A1, A1) ) +  
ds?unr * abs(Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A1) ) 
 
Relevance(A1, A2) = 
rell?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)  
 
Irrelevance(A1, A2) = 1 ? ( 
irr?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
irr?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) ) 
 
Positive_Valence(A1, A2) = 
pv?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
pv?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)  
 
Negative_Valence(A1, A2) = 
nv?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
nv?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)  
 
Involvement(A1, A2) = 
inv?bea * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv?ugly * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv?real * Perceived (Realistic, A1, A2) + 
inv?unr * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
inv ?pv * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv ?nv * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv ?ps * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?ns * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?pd * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?nd * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?pb * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?nb * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?pu * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv ?nu * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv ?rel * Relevance (A1, A2) + 
inv ?irr * Irrelevance (A1, A2) + 
inv ?rs * Relevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?is * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?rd * Relevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?id * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?rb * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?ib * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?ru * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv ?iu * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) 
inv ?aff *A-->I(A1, A2) 
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Distance(A1, A2) = 
dis?bea * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?ugly * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?real * Perceived (Realistic, A1, A2) + 
dis ?unr * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
dis ?pv * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
dis ?nv * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) + 
dis ?ps * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?ns * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?pd * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?nd * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?pb * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?nb * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?pu * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?nu * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?rel * Relevance (A1, A2) + 
dis ?irr * Irrelevance (A1, A2) + 
dis ?rs * Relevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?is * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?rd * Relevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?id * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?rb * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?ib * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?ru * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?iu * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) 
 dis ?aff * A-->D(A1, A2) 
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Appendix B: Parameter settings in the experiments 
 
This appendix contains all parameter settings for the experiments in the paper. These 
are the parameter settings of the baseline condition. The variables that are changed in 
other experiments are mentioned in the paper. 
Table 1: All values for the regression weights 
Weight of  X  on Y Value 
Good  Similarity 0.30 
Bad  Similarity 0.20 
Beautiful  Similarity 0.20 
Ugly  Similarity 0.10 
Realistic  Similarity 0.10 
Unrealistic  Similarity 0.10 
Good  Dissimilarity 0.20. 
Bad  Dissimilarity 0.30 
Beautiful  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Ugly  Dissimilarity 0.20 
Realistic  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Unrealistic  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Good  Relevance 0.70 
Bad  Relevance 0.30 
Good  Irrelevance -070 
Bad  Irrelevance -030 
Good  Positive Valence 1.50 
Bad  Positive Valence -0.50 
Good  Negative Valence -0.50 
Bad  Negative Valence 1.50 
Beautiful  Involvement 0.15 
Ugly  Involvement 0.05 
Realistic  Involvement 0.10 
Unrealistic  Involvement 0.05 
Positive Valence Involvement 0.20 
Negative Valence Involvement -0.15 
Positive Valence * similarity Involvement 0.10 
Negative Valence * similarity Involvement 0.05 
Positive Valence * dissimilarity Involvement -0.10 
Negative Valence * dissimilarity Involvement 0.05 
Positive Valence * beautiful Involvement 0.10 
Negative Valence * beautiful Involvement 0.05 
Positive Valence * ugly Involvement 0.30 
Negative Valence * ugly Involvement -0.15 
Relevance  Involvement 0.10 
Irrelevance  Involvement -0.10 
Relevance * similarity Involvement 0.10 
Irrelevance * similarity Involvement 0.02 
Relevance * dissimilarity Involvement 0.05 
Irrelevance * dissimilarity Involvement -0.05 
Relevance * beautiful Involvement 0.15 
Irrelevance * beautiful Involvement 0.03 
Relevance * ugly Involvement 0.02 
Irrelevance * ugly Involvement -0.05 
A-->I Involvement 0.20 
Beautiful  distance -0.15 
Ugly  distance 0.20 
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Realistic  distance 0.05 
Unrealistic  distance 0.10 
Positive Valence distance -0.25 
Negative Valence distance 0.50 
Positive Valence * similarity distance -0.10 
Negative Valence * similarity distance 0.05 
Positive Valence * dissimilarity distance 0.07 
Negative Valence * dissimilarity distance 0.03 
Positive Valence * beautiful distance -0.05 
Negative Valence * beautiful distance 0.10 
Positive Valence * ugly distance 0.05 
Negative Valence * ugly distance 0.15 
Relevance  distance -0.15 
Irrelevance  distance 0.15 
Relevance * similarity distance -0.07 
Irrelevance * similarity distance -0.03 
Relevance * dissimilarity distance 0.10 
Irrelevance * dissimilarity distance 0.05 
Relevance * beautiful distance -0.10 
Irrelevance * beautiful distance -0.05 
Relevance * ugly distance 0.10 
Irrelevance * ugly distance 0.05 
A-->D distance 0.20 
 
Table 2: Appearances of the agents 
Appearance of agent  Value 
Harry 0.5 
Barry 0.5 
Gary 0.5 
 
Table 3: Designed values for the features of each agent 
Agent Feature Value 
Harry Beautiful 0 
Harry Ugly 0 
Harry Good 0 
Harry Bad 0 
Harry Realistic 0 
Harry Unrealistic 0 
Barry Beautiful 0 
Barry Ugly 0 
Barry Good 0 
Barry Bad 0 
Barry Realistic 0 
Barry Unrealistic 0 
Gary Beautiful 0 
Gary Ugly 0 
Gary Good 0 
Gary Bad 0 
Gary Realistic 0 
Gary Unrealistic 0 
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Table 4: Biases the agents have in perceiving features of their selves and others 
Bias of Agent For perceiving Of Agent Value 
Harry Beautiful Harry 1 
Harry Beautiful Barry 1 
Harry Beautiful Gary 1 
Harry Ugly Harry 1 
Harry Ugly Barry 1 
Harry Ugly Gary 1 
Harry Realistic Harry 1 
Harry Realistic Barry 1 
Harry Realistic Gary 1 
Harry Unrealistic Harry 1 
Harry Unrealistic Barry 1 
Harry Unrealistic Gary 1 
Harry Good Harry 1 
Harry Good Barry 1 
Harry Good Gary 1 
Harry Bad Harry 1 
Harry Bad Barry 1 
Harry Bad Gary 1 
Barry Beautiful Harry 1 
Barry Beautiful Barry 1 
Barry Beautiful Gary 1 
Barry Ugly Harry 1 
Barry Ugly Barry 1 
Barry Ugly Gary 1 
Barry Realistic Harry 1 
Barry Realistic Barry 1 
Barry Realistic Gary 1 
Barry Unrealistic Harry 1 
Barry Unrealistic Barry 1 
Barry Unrealistic Gary 1 
Barry Good Harry 1 
Barry Good Barry 1 
Barry Good Gary 1 
Barry Bad Harry 1 
Barry Bad Barry 1 
Barry Bad Gary 1 
Gary Beautiful Harry 1 
Gary Beautiful Barry 1 
Gary Beautiful Gary 1 
Gary Ugly Harry 1 
Gary Ugly Barry 1 
Gary Ugly Gary 1 
Gary Realistic Harry 1 
Gary Realistic Barry 1 
Gary Realistic Gary 1 
Gary Unrealistic Harry 1 
Gary Unrealistic Barry 1 
Gary Unrealistic Gary 1 
Gary Good Harry 1 
Gary Good Barry 1 
Gary Good Gary 1 
Gary Bad Harry 1 
Gary Bad Barry 1 
Gary Bad Gary 1 
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Appendix C: Other simulation experiments. 
 
Baseline: 
In the baseline, all the designed features for beautiful, ugly, good, bad, realistic and 
unrealistic were set to 0. All beliefs of the agents about actions facilitating goals, and 
the ambition levels for those goals were also set 0. 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of comfort =1 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = avoid 
Barry Involvement = 0.12 
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = avoid 
 Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of p actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.12 
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = avoid 
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
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Experiment U1: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition:  
belief (Harry, facilitate (comfort, Barry, reduce_anger_self, 1)) 
has_ambition(harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.27 
Distance = -0.05 
Use Intentions = 1 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.352 
EU of comfort =1 
A-->I=0.75 
A-->D=-0.75 
ES of  PA = 0.728 
ES of NA = 0.272 
ES of CH = 0.093 
ES of AV = 0.35 
Performed action = 
comfort 
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
 
Barry Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = avoid 
 Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of p actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = avoid 
Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
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Experiment U2: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition:  
belief (Harry, facilitate (comfort, Barry, reduce_anger_self,  -1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = -0.03 
Distance = 0.25 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.144 
EU of comfort =-1 
A-->I=-0.75 
A-->D=0.75 
ES of  PA = 0.088 
ES of NA = 0.512 
ES of CH = 0.063 
ES of AV = 0.59 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
 
Barry Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
 Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of p actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
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Experiment U3: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition:  
belief (Harry, facilitate (fight, Barry, reduce_anger_self,  1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.17 
Distance = 0.25 
Use Intentions = 1 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.384 
EU of fight =1 
A-->I=0.25 
A-->D=0.75 
ES of  PA = 0.368 
ES of NA = 0.632 
ES of CH = 0.143 
ES of AV = 0.49 
Performed action = fight 
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
 
Barry Involvement = 0.12 
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
 Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of p actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.12 
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
 
Chapter 3| Appendix                                                                                                  57 
 
Experiment U4: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition:  
belief (Harry, facilitate (fight, Barry, reduce_anger_self,  -1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.07 
Distance = -0.05 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.032 
EU of fight =-1 
A-->I= -0.25 
A-->D= -0.75 
 
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Barry Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
 Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of p actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.12 
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
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Experiment U5: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition:  
belief (Harry, facilitate (criticize, Barry, reduce_anger_self,  1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.22 
Distance = 0.2 
Use Intentions = 1 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.372 
EU of critisize =1 
A-->I=0.5 
A-->D=0.5 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.448 
ES of AV = 0.45 
Performed action = 
avoid  
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
 
Barry Involvement = 0.12 
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
 Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
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Experiment U6: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition:  
belief (Harry, facilitate (criticize, Barry, reduce_anger_self,  -1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.02 
Distance = 0 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.012 
EU of critisize =-1 
A-->I= -0. 5 
A-->D= -0. 5 
 
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Barry Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
 Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of p actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
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Experiment U7: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition:  
belief (Harry, facilitate (avoid, Barry, reduce_anger_self,  1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.02 
Distance = 0.2 
Use Intentions = 1 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.324 
EU of avoid =1 
A-->I=-0.5 
A-->D= 0.5 
ES of  PA = 0.328 
ES of NA = 0.472 
ES of CH = 0.068 
ES of AV = 0.75 
Performed action = 
avoid  
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
 
Barry Involvement = 0.12 
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
 Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
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Experiment U8: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition:  
belief (Harry, facilitate (avoid, Barry, reduce_anger_self,  -1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.22 
Distance = 0 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.132 
EU of avoid =-1 
A-->I= 0.5 
A-->D= -0.5 
ES of  PA = 0.488 
ES of NA = 0.312 
ES of CH = 0.088 
ES of AV = 0.19 
Performed action = 
comfort  
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
 
Barry Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
 Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of actions = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Involvement = 0.12  
Distance =  0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
A-->I=0 
A-->D=0 
ES of  PA = 0.408 
ES of NA = 0.392 
ES of CH = 0.078 
ES of AV = 0.47 
Performed action = 
avoid 
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Experiment F1: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition: 
designed(Harry, beautiful, 1) 
designed(Harry, good, 1) 
designed(Harry, realistic, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.0745 
Distance = 0.1475 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.1034 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.3708 
ES of NA = 0.4292 
ES of CH = 0.07405 
ES of AV = 0.507 
Performed action = avoid 
Involvement = 0.0745 
Distance = 01475 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.1034 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.3708 
ES of NA = 0.4292 
ES of CH = 0.07405 
ES of AV = 0.507 
Performed action = avoid 
Barry Involvement = 0.4895 
Distance = -0.0025 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.2932 
EU of action = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.5968 
ES of NA = 0.2032 
ES of CH = 0.19505 
ES of AV = 0.2545 
Performed action = 
comfort 
 Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
 
Gary Involvement = 0.4895 
Distance = -0.0025 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.2932 
EU of action = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.5986 
ES of NA = 0.2032 
ES of CH = 0.19505 
ES of AV = 0.2545 
Performed action = 
comfort 
Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of all actions = 
Performed action = 
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Experiment F2: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition: 
designed(Gary, ugly, 1) 
designed(Gary, bad, 1) 
designed(Gary, unrealistic, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
 
Involvement = 0.1105 
Distance = 0.6275 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.3986 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.1932 
ES of NA = 0.6068 
ES of CH = 0.23245 
ES of AV = 0.633 
Performed action = avoid 
Barry Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
 
 Involvement = 0.1105 
Distance = 0.6275 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.3986 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.1932 
ES of NA = 0.6068 
ES of CH = 0.23245 
ES of AV = 0.633 
Performed action = avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.0855 
Distance = 0.1525 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.1086 
EU of action = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.3732 
ES of NA = 0.4268 
ES of CH = 0.07995 
ES of AV = 0.503 
Performed action = 
avoid 
Involvement = 0.0855 
Distance = 0.1525 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.1086 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.3732 
ES of NA = 0.4268 
ES of CH = 0.07995 
ES of AV = 0.503 
Performed action = 
avoid 
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Experiment F3: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition: 
designed(Harry, beautiful, 1)  designed(Harry, good, 1) 
designed(Harry, realistic, 1)  designed(Gary, ugly, 1) 
designed(Gary, bad, 1)  designed(Gary, unrealistic, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.0745 
Distance = 0.1475 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.1034 
EU of all actions = 0 
 
Involvement = 0.0650 
Distance = 0.675 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.4180 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.156 
ES of NA = 0.644 
ES of CH = 0.2285 
ES of AV = 0.67 
Performed action = avoid 
Barry Involvement = 0.4895 
Distance = -0.0025 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.2932 
EU of action = 0 
 
 Involvement = 0.1105 
Distance = 0.6275 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.3986 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.1932 
ES of NA = 0.6068 
ES of CH = 0.23245 
ES of AV = 0.633 
Performed action = avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.4550 
Distance = 0.0500 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.2830 
EU of action = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.562 
ES of NA = 0.238 
ES of CH = 0.197 
ES of AV = 0.2875 
Performed action = 
comfort 
Involvement = 0.0855 
Distance = 0.1525 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.1086 
EU of all actions = 0 
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Experiment F4: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition: 
designed(Gary, beautiful, 1)  designed(Gary, good, 1) 
designed(Gary, realistic, 1)  designed(Gary, ugly, 1) 
designed(Gary, bad, 1)   designed(Gary, unrealistic, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
 
Involvement = 0.48 
Distance = 0.525 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.411 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.382 
ES of NA = 0.418 
ES of CH = 0.3495 
ES of AV = 0.4175 
Performed action = fight 
Barry Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
 
 Involvement = 0.48 
Distance = 0.525 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.411 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.382 
ES of NA = 0.418 
ES of CH = 0.3495 
ES of AV = 0.4175 
Performed action = fight 
Gary Involvement = 0.04 
Distance = 0.2 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.128 
EU of action = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.336 
ES of NA = 0.464 
ES of CH = 0.076 
ES of AV = 0.54 
Performed action = avoid 
Involvement = 0.04 
Distance = 0.2 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.128 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.336 
ES of NA = 0.464 
ES of CH = 0.076 
ES of AV = 0.54 
Performed action = avoid 
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Experiment C1: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition: 
designed(Gary, beautiful, 1)  designed(Gary, good, 1) 
designed(Gary, realistic, 1)  designed(Gary, ugly, 1) 
designed(Gary, bad, 1)   designed(Gary, unrealistic, 1) 
belief (Harry, facilitate (criticize, Gary, reduce_anger_self,  1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
 
A-->I = 0.5 
A-->D = 0.5 
Involvement = 0.58 
Distance = 0.625 
Use Intentions = 1 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.691 
EU of criticize = 1 
ES of  PA = 0.382 
ES of NA = 0.418 
ES of CH = 0.7195 
ES of AV = 0.3975 
Performed action = 
criticize 
Barry Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
 
 Involvement = 0.48 
Distance = 0.525 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.411 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.382 
ES of NA = 0.418 
ES of CH = 0.3495 
ES of AV = 0.4175 
Performed action = fight 
Gary Involvement = 0.04 
Distance = 0.2 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.128 
EU of action = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.336 
ES of NA = 0.464 
ES of CH = 0.076 
ES of AV = 0.54 
Performed action = avoid 
Involvement = 0.04 
Distance = 0.2 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.128 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.336 
ES of NA = 0.464 
ES of CH = 0.076 
ES of AV = 0.54 
Performed action = avoid 
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Experiment C2: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition: 
designed(Gary, ugly, 1)   designed(Gary, bad, 1) 
designed(Gary, unrealistic, 1)  
belief (Harry, facilitate (comfort, Gary, reduce_anger_self,  1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
 
A-->I = 0.75 
A-->D = -0.75 
Involvement = 0.1105 
Distance = 0.4775 
Use Intentions = 1 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.5386 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.5132 
ES of NA = 0.4868 
ES of CH = 0.24745 
ES of AV = 0.513 
Performed action = 
comfort 
Barry Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
 
 Involvement = 0.1105 
Distance = 0.6275 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.3986 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.1932 
ES of NA = 0.6068 
ES of CH = 0.23245 
ES of AV = 0.633 
Performed action = avoid 
Gary Involvement = 0.0855 
Distance = 0.1525 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.1086 
EU of action = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.3732 
ES of NA = 0.4268 
ES of CH = 0.07995 
ES of AV = 0.503 
Performed action = avoid 
Involvement = 0.0855 
Distance = 0.1525 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.1086 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.3732 
ES of NA = 0.4268 
ES of CH = 0.07995 
ES of AV = 0.503 
Performed action = avoid 
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Experiment C3: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition: 
designed(Gary, beautiful, 1)  designed(Gary, good, 1) 
designed(Gary, realistic, 1)   
belief (Harry, facilitate (fight, Gary, reduce_anger_self,  1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
 
A-->I = 0.25 
A-->Dt = 0.75 
Involvement = 0.5395 
Distance = 0.1475 
Use Intentions = 1 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.553 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.5568 
ES of NA = 0.4432 
ES of CH = 0.26005 
ES of AV = 0.2745 
Performed action = 
Comfort 
Barry Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
 
 Involvement = 0.4895 
Distance = -0.0025 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.293 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.5986 
ES of NA = 0.2032 
ES of CH = 0.19505 
ES of AV = 0.2545 
Performed action = 
Comfort 
Gary Involvement = 0.07 
Distance = 0.1475 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.103 
EU of action = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.3708 
ES of NA = 0.4292 
ES of CH = 0.07405 
ES of AV = 0.507 
Performed action = 
Avoid 
Involvement = 0.0745 
Distance = 0.1475 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.103 
EU of action = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.3708 
ES of NA = 0.4292 
ES of CH = 0.07405 
ES of AV = 0.507 
Performed action = Avoid 
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Experiment C4: 
Changed variables compared to baseline condition: 
designed(Gary, beautiful, 1)  designed(Gary, good, 1) 
designed(Gary, realistic, 1)  designed(Gary, ugly, 1) 
designed(Gary, bad, 1)   designed(Gary, unrealistic, 1) 
belief (Harry, facilitate (avoid, Gary, reduce_anger_self,  1)) 
has_ambition(Harry, reduce_anger_self, 1) 
 
 Harry Barry Gary 
Harry  Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of all actions = 0 
 
A-->I = -0.5 
A-->D = 0.5 
Involvement = 0.38 
Distance = 0.625 
Use Intentions = 1 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.651 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.302 
ES of NA = 0.498 
ES of CH = 0.3395 
ES of AV = 0.6975 
Performed action = 
Avoid 
Barry Involvement = 0.12 
Distance = 0.1 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.092 
EU of action = 0 
 
 Involvement = 0.48 
Distance = 0.525 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.411 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.382 
ES of NA = 0.418 
ES of CH = 0.3495 
ES of AV = 0.4175 
Performed action = 
Fight 
Gary Involvement = 0.04 
Distance = 0.2 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.128 
EU of action = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.336 
ES of NA = 0.464 
ES of CH = 0.076 
ES of AV = 0.54 
Performed action = 
Avoid 
Involvement = 0.04 
Distance = 0.2 
Use Intentions = 0 
Expected Satisfaction = 
0.128 
EU of all actions = 0 
ES of  PA = 0.336 
ES of NA = 0.464 
ES of CH = 0.076 
ES of AV = 0.54 
Performed action = Avoid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II  MODELING INVOLVEMENT  
BETWEEN AGENTS  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
Affective Agents Perceiving Each  
O??????????????? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter appeared as Pontier, M., and Siddiqui, G.F., Affective Agents Perceiving 
????? ???????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ????????? ?? ????
(eds.), Proceedings of the 23rd European Conference on Modeling and Simulation, 
ECMS'2009. European Council for Modeling and Simulation, 2009, pp. 194-202. 
 
  ????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? 
Matthijs Pontier1,2  and Ghazanfar F. Siddiqui1,2 
1VU University, Department of Artificial Intelligence 
De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
{mpr210, ghazanfa}@few.vu.nl 
2VU University, Center for Advanced Media Research Amsterdam 
Buitenveldertselaan 3, 1082 VA Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Abstract. In this paper, an extension of a formalized model of affective decision 
making is presented, based on the informally described I-PEFiC model. This 
extension manages that the actions agents undertake have an effect on other 
agents. The agents change their perceptions and beliefs about other agents if 
actions are taken. Further, the anger level of the agents is simulated. Simulation 
experiments show that the actions of agents can change the beliefs and the 
perceptions of another agent so much that the other agent changes its mind and 
chooses to perform another action than it was currently doing.  
Keywords : Agent-Based Modeling, Affective Decision-Making, Perception. 
1   Introduction 
From the last decade, a lot of research has been dedicated to developing Intelligent 
Virtual Agents (IVAs) with more realistic graphical representations. However, these 
agents often do not show very realistic human-like emotional behavior. For example, 
many IVAs can show emotions by the means of facial expressions or the tone in their 
voice, but most of them still struggle to show the right emotions at the right moment 
(e.g., emotion regulation [16]) and moods [5]). Let alone actually understanding and 
reacting empathically to the emotional state of other agents, or human users. Previous 
research has shown that closely mimicking humans is important for an agent to increase 
human involvement in a virtual environment (e.g., [20]). 
???????????????????? ??? ?????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????? [10]. The emotional system 
examines the surroundings for related stimuli that are either beneficial or harmful for 
the concerns, motives, and goals of the individual [10]. According to broaden-and-build 
theory, positive emotions are vehicles for individual growth and social connections: by 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the better, giving them better lives in the future [9]. Previous research also showed that 
human beings usually make unconscious rather than conscious decisions [3]. 
We created agents for imitating human behavior, who can recognize each other as a 
personal friend as well as means to an end. The Interactive model of Perceiving and 
Experiencing Fictional Characters (I-PEFiC), which is based on the theory of Frijda 
[10], was taken as a foundation with regard to recognizing each other as a personal 
friend [19]. Within this model an agent A can compute the trade-off between how 
involved it is with another agent (e. g., Agent B is good) and what keeps the agent at a 
distance (e. g., Agent B is bad) [6]. This involvement-distance trade-off is the outcome 
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of assessing the features of an agent on several dimensions. Use intentions are 
calculated additionally that prompt the agent to carry out actions towards another agent. 
These actions are based on goals, which play a role in the judgment formation of the 
agent about the other agent, but also more affective influences are taken into account. 
The previous decision making model [15] only describes the affective decision making 
process itself. Simulation experiments with this model showed that in situations where 
this can be considered human-like, agents make affective decisions rather than decisions 
that would be the best rational decision (i. e., the decision option with the highest 
expected utility). However, it did not explain the effects of the performed actions on the 
???????? ????????????? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ??????? ???????? ???? ??? ???????? ???? ??????
changed beliefs and perceptions influenced the following decision making processes. 
In this paper we improved the affective decision making model [15], so that the 
agents update their beliefs and perceptions of the ethics and affordances of other agents 
when actions are being performed. Further, the effects of these actions on the emotions 
of the agents are simulated. These changes on their turn influence the decision making 
process in the agents. This enables the agents to change their mind and decide to change 
the action they want to perform. The simulation experiments described in this paper will 
????? ????? ????? ??? ???????? ???? ???????? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????? ????????ons, and 
emotions and how this affects their decision making. 
2   Modeling Approach 
Modeling the various aspects involved in affective decision making in an integrated 
manner poses some challenges. On the one hand, qualitative aspects have to be 
addressed, such as performing an action. On the other hand, quantitative aspects have to 
be addressed, such as levels of anger. The modeling approach based on the modeling 
language LEADSTO [7] fulfils these needs. It integrates qualitative, logical aspects 
such as used in approaches based on temporal logic (e. g., [4]) with quantitative, 
numerical aspects such as used in Dynamical Systems Theory (e. g., [2], [17]). 
In LEADSTO, direct temporal dependencies between state properties in two 
successive states are modeled by executable dynamic properties defined as follows. Let 
a and b be state properties of the ????? ???????????????? ?????????? ??????? ?? ???????? ??? ???
atom or the negation of an atom), and e, f, g, h non-negative real numbers. Then in the 
leads to language a e, f, g, h b, means: 
 
If state property a holds for a certain time interval with duration g, then after some 
delay (between e and f) state property b will hold for a certain time interval of 
length h. 
Here, atomic state properties can have a qualitative, logical format, such as an 
expression desire(d), expressing that desire d occurs, or a quantitative, numerical format 
such as has_value(x, v) expressing that variable x has value v. 
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2   Implementation 
I-PEFiC is a model (Figure 1) that is empirically well validated (e.g., [19], [20], [21]). 
The I-PEFiC model has three phases: encoding, comparison, and response [21]. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
bad), aesthetics (beautiful or ugly), and epistemics (realistic or unrealistic). During the 
encoding, moreover, the user evaluates in how far the agent system has affordances 
(aids or obstacles), which make the agent useful as a computer tool or not. 
In the comparison phase, the features are judged for similarity (similar or dissimilar) 
??????? ?? ??? ???? ????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ??? ????????? ??? ????? ?????? ?????????? ???
irrelevant) and valence to goals (positive or negative outcome expectancies). The 
measures in the encode phase - moderated by the factors in the comparison phase - 
determine the responses, that is, the levels of involvement with and distance towards the 
embodied agent. Moreover, the intention to use the agent as a tool indicates actual use 
and together with involvement and distance, this determines the overall satisfaction of 
the user with the agent; in our case of Agent A with Agent B. The I-PEFiC model has 
been formalized in [6]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical Representation of I-PEFiC 
 
The model presented in this paper is an extension of a model of affective decision 
making [15] based on a formalization of the I-PEFiC model [6] in the LEADSTO 
environment [7]. In this decision making model, decisions are made based on rational as 
well as affective processing. In the model an agent has desired and undesired goal-
states. The agent perceives affordances of the other agents by means of beliefs that the 
agents facilitate or inhibit reaching certain goal-states. These perceived affordances of 
other agents are compared to the goal-states it wants to achieve or avoid. While doing 
this, it can reason about the outcome expectancies of using the other agent for a certain 
action (e. g., comforting, fighting, or criticizing). In humans, such outcome expectancies 
lead to certain quick and mostly subconsciously generated action tendencies. In our 
agents, as in humans, action tendencies influence the experienced involvement and 
distance towards the other agent. The involvement and distance towards another agent 
are combined with the use intentions of that agent and the expected utilities of the 
possible actions to calculate the expected levels of satisfaction of these actions. These 
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expected levels of satisfaction are compared to reach a final decision that is based on 
rationality as well as affective influences. 
We created a library of actions the agents can perform. In this action library, the type 
of each action is specified. Actions can be specified as  
 
(1) Positive approach  
(2) Negative approach  
(3) Change    
(4) Avoid  
  
In this paper, the action library consists of one action for each type. Comfort is an action 
of the type positive approach, fight is an action of the type negative approach, criticize 
is an action of the type change, and avoid obviously is an action of the type avoid.  If an 
agent tries to perform an action of type 1, 2, or 3 towards another agent, while the other 
agent is avoiding the agent, it will not succeed in performing this action. If an agent 
performs an action towards another agent, this affects the agent that is the object of the 
action, as well as the agent that is performing the action itself. The formulas and values 
not described in this paper can be found in [24]. 
  
Adjusting the perceived ethics 
If an agent performs an action towards another agent, the agent that is the object of the 
action can change its perception of the goodness and badness of the agent performing 
the action. For example, if an agent fights another agent, the agent that is the object of 
this action will probably decrease its perception of the goodness of the fighting agent, 
and increase its perception of the badness of the fighting agent. To establish this change 
in perception, the bias (in the range [0, 2]) changes according to the actions that are 
being performed. A bias > 1 means overestimation, and a bias < 1 means 
underestimation. To calculate the effect of an action on the bias for perceiving the 
goodness of the agent performing the action, we have developed the following formula: 
 
new_bias(good) = pgood * old_bias(good) +  
(1-pgood) * v(agent, action, good) 
 
In this formula, new_bias(good) is the new value of the bias, old_bias(good) is the old 
value of the bias, and the persistency factor pgood is the proportion of the old bias that is 
taken into account to determine the new bias for perceiving goodness of the agent that is 
performing the action. In this paper, for clarity in the simulation experiments this 
persistency factor is set to 0.85 for all agents, but this could just as easy be personalized 
per agent. The new contribution to the bias is v(agent, action, good), a value that an agent 
attaches to the goodness of being the object of the performed action. In practice this 
means that if a certain action is performed towards an agent, the bias of good will move 
towards the value the agent attaches to being the object of that action. In this paper, all 
the agents attach the same, arbitrarily chosen values to being the object of actions, but 
also this could easily be personalized per agent. As the biases are in the range [0, 2], 
these values are also in the range [0, 2]. The values can be found in Table 1. 
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Table 1. The Values of Goodness the Agents Attach to Being the Object of an Action 
Action Value 
Comfort 1.5 
Fight 0.5 
Criticize 1.25 
Avoid 0.75 
The actions for calculating the effect of an action on the bias for perceiving badness 
are calculated in a similar way as the effect on the bias for perceiving goodness. The 
only difference is that the values used in this formula are the values the agents attach to 
the badness of being the object to the performed action. These values can be found in 
Table 2. 
 
new_bias(bad) =  
   pbad * old_bias(bad) + (1- pbad) * vagent, action, bad 
Table 2. The Values of Badness the Agents Attach to Being the Object of an Action 
Action Value 
Comfort 0.5 
Fight 1.5 
Criticize 1.25 
Avoid 1.25 
 
Adjusting the perceived affordances 
If an agent performs an action towards another agent, the agent that is the object of the 
action can also change its beliefs about the affordances of the agent performing the 
action. Beliefs have a value in the domain [-1, 1]. A belief of 1 represents a strong belief 
that the statement the belief is about is true, and a belief of -1 represents a strong belief 
that it is not true. For example, if an agent fights another agent, the belief that avoiding 
the other agent helps to reduce your anger might increase. To calculate the effect of an 
action on beliefs about the agent performing the action, we have developed the 
following formulas: 
 
???????????????????? 
new_belief = old_belief + belief_adaptation *  beliefchange * ((1 - old_belief) / 2)   
 
if beliefchange < 0: 
new_belief = old_belief + belief_adaptation * beliefchange * ((1 + old_belief) / 2)  
 
In these formulas, new_belief is the new value of the belief, old_belief is the old value 
of the belief, and belief_adaptation is a variable, set at 0.1, that determines the speed with 
which the beliefs are changed when being the object of an action. The beliefchange is a 
variable in the range [-1, 1] that determines the change of a belief about the performing 
agent when an agent is performing an action, or is the object of an action performed by 
another agent. Multiplying with ((1 - old_belief) / 2) when beliefchange is positive, and with 
((1 + old_belief) / 2) when beliefchange is negative manages that the values of the beliefs 
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change less if they approach their boundaries, and prevents them from going out of the 
domain [-1, 1]. In this paper, the values for beliefchange are the same for all agents, but 
this could easily be personalized per agent. All beliefchange values can be found in Table 
3.  
In this table, in the columns the actions that are the cause of the belief change are 
shown. In the rows the affected beliefs are shown. These beliefs are about an action 
facilitating a certain goal. For example, if an agent A fights another agent B, agent A 
will change its belief that comforting agent B will help to reduce his own anger with a 
beliefchange value of -0.75, as can be seen in Table 3. 
Table 3. The beliefchange Values when Actions Are Performed 
Affected Belief Actions causing the belief change 
Action Goal Comfort Criticize Fight Avoid 
Comfort Self 0.2 -0.2 -0.75 -0.6 
Criticize Self -0.5 0.9 -0.5 0.6 
Fight Self -0.9 0.3 0.75 0.4 
Avoid Self -0.25 0.8 0.9 0.7 
Comfort Others 0.4 0.2 -0.5 -0.3 
Criticize Others -0.25 -0.25 0.25 -0.4 
Fight Others -0.8 -0.8 0.25 -0.7 
Avoid Others -0.35 -0.6 0.75 0.8 
 
Adjusting the emotions of the agents 
The actions that an agent performs, and the actions that are performed to an agent, affect 
the emotions of that agent. The emotion simulated in this paper is the level of anger, but 
also other or even multiple emotions could be simulated in a similar manner. To 
calculate the effect of actions performed on the anger level, we have developed the 
following formula: 
 
new_anger = panger / n * old_anger +  
       (1- panger / n) * (changed_anger) / n 
 
In this formula, new_anger is the new anger level, and old_anger is the old anger level. 
The persistency factor panger is the proportion of the old anger level that is taken into 
account to determine the new anger level. In this paper, for clarity in the simulation 
experiments, this persistency factor is set to 0.95 for all agents, but this could easily be 
personalized per agent. The number of actions that is taken into account for calculating 
the new anger level is represented by n. The persistency factor is divided by n, so that 
there will be less persistency in the anger level if multiple actions are taken into 
account.  
The new contribution to the anger level is the mean of all the changed_anger variables 
that are attached to the actions taken into account. This changed_anger is a variable that 
indicates which value the anger level approaches given a certain action. In practice this 
means that if a certain action is performed towards an agent, the anger level will move 
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towards the value of the changed_anger attached to that action. For example, if an agent 
fights another agent, this will make its anger level approach 0.7, because if the anger 
level is very high, fighting another agent might help to release this anger, although it 
will never help to decrease it to a low anger level. On the other hand, if an agent has a 
low anger level, fighting another agent will probably increase the level of anger. 
In this paper, all the agents attach the same changed_anger values to actions, but it 
would be just as easy to let each agent have its own personal values. As the anger levels 
are in the range [0, 1], the changed_anger values are also in the range [0, 1]. The values 
used for this paper can be found in Table 4. 
Table 4. The changed_anger Values the Agents Attach to Specific Actions 
Action Value if subject Value if object 
Comfort 0.2 0.2 
Fight 0.7 0.9 
Criticize 0.2 0.6 
Avoid 0.3 0.7 
3   Simulation Experiments 
The simulation model introduced in the previous section was used to perform a number 
of experiments under different parameter settings. In the experiments, the three agents 
Harry, Barry, and Gary followed a (fictitious) anger management therapy. An infinite 
number of actions could be inserted in the system, but for clarity, nonetheless, for each 
action type we inserted only one instance of an action. The action to comfort another 
agent is a type of positive approach whereas the action for negative approach was to 
fight another agent. Criticizing another agent was the action associated with change, and 
the action for avoiding the agent was to simply move away from another agent. In the 
simulation experiments, a calculation step takes one timepoint and an action takes five 
timepoints. After these five timepoints the action taken can be reconsidered and 
changed. The results of the experiment are described below. Notice that in each graph in 
this paper, the scale on the y-axis can differ. 
We expected that the system can generate simulations in which actions lead to 
changes in perception in such a way, that agents change their mind and perform another 
action than they would have done before their perception was changed. 
 
Experiment 1: Baseline 
To start, an initial experiment was performed that served as a control condition for the 
rest of the experiments. In this experiment, the designed features for beautiful and ugly 
(aesthetics), good and bad (ethics), and realistic and unrealistic (epistemics) are all set to 
0.5 (see Figure 1). All biases for perceiving these features are set to the neutral value of 
1. The agents have no beliefs about other agents (all beliefs are set to 0), and the only 
ambition they have is to reduce their own anger with an ambition level of 0.5.  
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Figure 2. Simulation Results of Experiment 1 
In Figure 2, along the X-axis the timepoints are shown, and along the Y-axis several 
statements are shown. A dark blue bar means the statement holds at that timepoint, and 
a light blue bar means the statement is false at that timepoint. As can be seen in Figure 
2, these settings result in Barry and Harry avoiding Gary, and Harry avoiding Barry 
after timepoint 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. ????????????????????????????????????????????dness and Perceived Badness of Gary 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the agents who are being avoided increase their distance 
from 0.49 to 0.82, and decrease their involvement from 0.44 to 0.28 towards the 
avoiding agent. This happens because the perceived goodness of these agents decreases 
from 0.5 to 0.38 and badness increases from 0.5 to 0.62. Being avoided also causes 
changes in beliefs. 
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Figure 4. The Beliefs of Barry about Harry during Experiment 1. 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the agents who are being avoided start to think that 
avoiding, criticizing, or fighting the avoiding agent will help them to reduce their own 
anger, and that comforting the avoiding agent will inhibit their goal of reducing their 
own anger.  As initially the agents have no beliefs about each other, the agents have no 
intentions to use each other at the start of the simulation.  
 
 
Figure 5. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Because the agents that are being avoided start to have beliefs about the avoiding 
agents, their intentions to use that agent also increase from 0 to 0.46, as can be seen in 
Figure 5.  
Being avoided also changes the anger level. As can be seen in Figure 6, the anger 
level of Barry decreases from 0.60 to 0.50, and the anger level of Harry decreases only 
from 0.60 to 0.57 (notice the differences in scale on the y-??????????????? ?????? ??????
?????????? ????? ???????? ??? ??? ???????? ??? ????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??????? ??ger level 
reduces to 0.30, which is even more than that of Barry, because he is not being avoided 
by any agent. This shows that being avoided by multiple agents has a greater impact 
than being avoided by only one agent. 
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Figure 6. Anger Levels of the Agents in Experiment 1 
Experiment 2: Harry beliefs he should not avoid Barry  
We performed an experiment in which Harry has a strong belief (value = 1) that 
avoiding Barry will inhibit his goal of reducing his own anger. Harry also has a stronger 
ambition to reduce his own anger, with a value of 1 instead of 0.5. The remaining 
variables have the same values as in the baseline condition.  
 
 
Figure 7. Simulation Results of Experiment 2. 
Due to this, instead of avoiding Barry, Harry now tries to comfort Barry at time-point 
11, as can be seen in Figure 7. However, he does not succeed in comforting Barry, as 
Barry is avoiding Harry, just like in the baseline experiment.  This causes Harry to stop 
avoiding Barry at time point 16 and increases his anger level to from 0.53 to 0.70, as 
can be seen in Figure 8. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
0.27 in the five following time steps. In the mean time, Barry has observed that Harry 
tried to comfort him, which decreases his anger level from 0.60 to 0.25. It also changes 
his perceptions of the ethics of Harry. As can be seen in Figure 9, Barry starts to see 
Harry as a good guy, with a perceived goodness of 0.64 and a perceived badness of 
0.36.  
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Figure 8. Anger Levels of the Agents in Experiment 2 
 
 
Figure 9. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
Figure 10. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
????? ????? ????????? ?????????? ???????? ??????? ????? comforting Harry will help him to 
reduce his anger, while his beliefs that avoiding, criticizing or fighting Barry will help 
him to reduce his own anger are slightly reduced. 
These changes in beliefs and perceptions cause the involvement of Barry towards 
Harry to increase from 0.44 to 0.56 and the distance from Barry to Harry to decrease 
from 0.50 to 0.34, as can be seen in Figure 10. This causes him to start comforting 
Harry instead of avoiding him at timepoint 21.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. ????????????????????????e Ethics of Barry during Experiment 2 
????????? ??? ????????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ????????? ???? ???????????????? ????????
about him. The perception of his goodness has decreased from 0.50 to 0.39, and the 
perception of his badness has increased from 0.50 to 0.61, as can be seen in Figure 11.  
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Figure 12. ??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
    ??? ???? ??? ????? ??? ??????? ???? ????? ???????? ???????? ????? ?????????? ????????????? ????
especially avoiding Barry will help to reduce his own anger increase, whereas his belief 
that comforting Barry will help to reduce his own anger decreases. In the mean time, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
distance towards Gary, and has increased his beliefs that criticizing, fighting, or 
avoiding Harry will help him to reduce his own anger in a similar way as in experiment 
1. 
??? ???? ??? ????? ??? ??????? ???? ????? ?????????? ???????? ????????? ????????????? ???
performing an action towards Gary, namely avoiding him, and this expected satisfaction 
exceeds the expected satisfaction of performing an action towards Barry. This causes 
Harry to change his mind and start avoiding Gary at timepoint 26. In the meantime, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????decreases from 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Also the distance from Harry to Barry decreases from 0.66 to 0.09 and his 
involvement increases from 0.37 to 0.67, as can be seen in Figure 14. This happens due 
to an increase in Barry??? ??????????? ??? ???????? ????????? ????? ????? ??? ????? ???? ??
decrease in perceived badness from 0.61 to 0.25, and because his increasing belief that 
comforting  Harry will help him to reduce his own anger, and fighting, criticizing or 
avoiding Harry will inhibit his goal to reduce his own anger. 
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Figure 13???????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
his Expected Satisfaction of Performing an Action towards Barry and Gary during Experiment 2 
 
 
Figure 14?????????????olvement and Distance towards Barry during Experiment 2 
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4   Discussion 
In this paper, we presented an extension of a formalized model of affective decision 
making [15], based on the informally described I-PEFiC model (e.g., [19], [20], [21]). 
This extension manages that the actions the agents undertake have an effect on the 
agents. The agents change their perceptions and beliefs about other agents if actions are 
taken. Further, the anger level of the agents is being simulated. Simulation experiments 
have been performed to show how the actions affect the agents. Experiment 1 showed 
that if multiple agents perform an action towards another agent, this has a bigger effect 
on its anger level than if only one agent would perform that action. Experiment 2 
showed that if an agent performs an action towards another agent, this can change the 
beliefs and the perceptions of the other agents so much that the other agent changes its 
mind and chooses to perform another action than it was currently doing, leading to a 
completely different situation than in experiment 1, confirming our expectations as 
mentioned in section 4. These results are as would have been expected from the theory 
(e.g., [14], [19], [20]).  
In this paper, the simulation experiments are performed in the domain of anger 
management therapy. The only simulated emotion is anger, and for each type of action 
there is only one possible action to perform. However, this model could be used for any 
type of domain, with other, or multiple emotions simulated at the same time. Also as 
many actions as desired could be added to the action library. This way, the model could 
be used to perform simulations involving decision-making, emotions, and changing 
perceptions for any domain. 
Of course, a lot of additions could still be made to our model. For instance, the 
persistency factors for changing the beliefs and perceptions of other agents could be 
made dependent on the period of time the agents know each other (or on the number of 
interactions).  
Existing models of decision-making usually assume this process to be rational, which 
would exclude the possibility of emotions playing a role other than disturbing the 
process [13]. However, humans often make irrational decisions. A good example for 
this is the Ultimatum game [18], for which behavioral research showed that low offers 
(20% of total amount) have a 50% chance of being rejected. Participants reported that 
they found low offers unfair, and therefore out of anger they selected the irrational 
option [13].  
Models of decision making usually have a hedonic bias, and generally try to find the 
action with the highest expected utility. Some decision theoretic models, such as [11], 
take emotions into account, but in those models, emotions merely confirm good rational 
decisions ? emotional states as modes of decision making. However, these models 
cannot explain irrational behavior, where actions with a (relatively) low expected utility 
are chosen. Our balancing model takes the expected utility as well as involvement-
distance trade-offs into account. This way, situations in which emotions overwhelm 
rationality can be explained and simulated. 
There have been a number of approaches to model decision-making based on 
emotions in autonomous agents. However, none of these studies uses a detailed model 
of perception of others to explain how these affective influences in the decision making 
process are generated. Usually, these models somehow assume that emotions are there. 
For instance, [23] presents a model of emotion-based decision-making, which is an 
extension of a previous model (e.g., [22]). The model that is presented in this paper 
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assumes a perceptual system, but how this perceptual system actually works is not 
considered in the paper. 
Ahn & Picard [1] present a computational framework of affective-cognitive learning 
and decision making for affective agents. This model integrates affect and cognition, 
?????? ?????????? ???????? ????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ???? ?????????? ???????? ????? ????
??????????????? serve as motivations for learning and decision making. In this model 
emotions are generated based on these rewards, but perceiving others in the world is left 
out of consideration. 
In future research, we plan to combine the model with an existing computational 
model for emotion regulation [8]. Whereas the current model focuses on the elicitation 
of emotion, that model addresses the regulation of emotion. Further, we intend to 
explore where these models and the EMA model [12] complement each other, and use 
this to further refine the models. 
Finally, in a later stage of the project, we will confront our formalization with 
empirical data of human affective trade-off processes. As soon as the model is validated 
and adapted, we will start exploring the possibilities to build a robot that can interact 
with real humans. We hope to develop a robot that can communicate affectively with 
humans in a more natural way, that is, with a mind of its own, in pursuit of its own 
goals, and acting emotionally intelligent. 
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Appendix A: Formulas used in the model                                                                           
 
Variable Meaning Range 
abs(X) The absolute value of variable or formula X  
max(X, Y) The minimum value of variables or formulas X and 
Y 
 
A?I Effect of affordances on involvement  
A?D Effect of affordances on Distance  
Perceived(<Feature>, A1, A2) New value Agent1 perceives of a certain feature of 
Agent2 
[0, 1] 
Designed(<Feature>, A2) ?????? ????????? ??? ????? ?????????? ??? ?? ????????
feature of Agent2 
[0, 1] 
Bias(A1, A2, feature) Bias that Agent1 has of Agent2 regarding a certain 
feature 
[0, 2] 
Inv_Dist_trade_off Outcome of involvement distance trade off [0, 1] 
factor Variable that determines outcome of trade off for a 
certain factor 
[0, 1] 
factor?factor (personal) regression weight a factor has for 
another factor for a certain agent 
[0, 1] 
 
To increase readability, the names of the beta weights use the following acronyms: 
 
Variable Acronym Variable Acronym 
Good good Similarity sim 
Bad bad Dissimilarity ds 
Beautiful bea Relevance rel 
Ugly ugly Irrelevance irr 
Realistic real Positive Valence pv 
Unrealistic unr Negative Valence nv 
Aid aid Involvement inv 
Obstacle obst Distance dis 
Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2)  = Bias(A1, A2, Beautiful) * Designed(Beautiful, A2) 
Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2)   = Bias(A1, A2, Ugly) * Designed(Ugly, A2) 
 
Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2)  = Bias(A1, A2,Realistic) * Designed(Realistic, A2) 
Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2)  = Bias(A1, A2, Unrealistic) * Designed(Unrealistic, A2) 
 
Perceived(Good, A1, A2)  = Bias(A1, A2,Good) * Designed(Good, A2) 
Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)   = Bias(A1, A2,Good) * Designed(Good, A2) 
 
ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent, Goal)  = Belief(facilitates(Action, Agent, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal) 
ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent)   = ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent, Goal)) 
 
AT(Action, Agent)  = ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent) 
 
A?I  = I?NA*ATneg_appr + I?PA*ATpos_appr + I?CH*ATchange + I?AV*ATavoid 
A?D  = D?NA*ATneg_appr + D?PA*ATpos_appr + D?CH*ATchange + D?AV*ATavoid 
 
Similarity(A1, A2) = 
1- ( 
sim?good * abs(Perceived(Good, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Good, A1, A1) ) +  
sim?bad * abs(Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Bad, A1, A1) ) + 
sim?bea * abs(Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A1) ) +  
sim?ugly * abs(Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Ugly, A1, A1) ) + 
sim?real * abs(Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Realistic, A1, A1) ) +  
sim?unr * abs(Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A1) )
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Dissimilarity(A1, A2) =  
ds?good * abs(Perceived(Good, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Good, A1, A1) ) +  
ds?bad * abs(Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Bad, A1, A1) ) + 
ds?bea * abs(Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A1) ) +  
ds?ugly * abs(Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Ugly, A1, A1) ) + 
ds?real * abs(Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Realistic, A1, A1) ) +  
ds?unr * abs(Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A1) ) 
 
Relevance(A1, A2) = 
rell?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + rel?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)  
 
Irrelevance(A1, A2) = 1 + ( 
irr?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + irr?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) ) 
 
Positive_Valence(A1, A2) = 0.5 + 
pv?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + pv?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)  
 
Negative_Valence(A1, A2) = 0.5 + 
nv?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + nv?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2)  
 
Involvement(A1, A2) = 0.25 + 
inv?bea * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv?ugly * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv?real * Perceived (Realistic, A1, A2) + 
inv?unr * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
inv ?pv * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv ?nv * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv ?ps * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?ns * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?pd * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?nd * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?pb * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?nb * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?pu * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv ?nu * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv ?rel * Relevance (A1, A2) + 
inv ?irr * Irrelevance (A1, A2) + 
inv ?rs * Relevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?is * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?rd * Relevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?id * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?rb * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?ib * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?ru * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv ?iu * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) 
inv ?aff *A?I(A1, A2) 
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Distance(A1, A2) = 
dis?bea * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?ugly * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?real * Perceived (Realistic, A1, A2) + 
dis ?unr * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
dis ?pv * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
dis ?nv * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) + 
dis ?ps * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?ns * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?pd * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?nd * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?pb * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?nb * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?pu * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?nu * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?rel * Relevance (A1, A2) + 
dis ?irr * Irrelevance (A1, A2) + 
dis ?rs * Relevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?is * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?rd * Relevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?id * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?rb * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?ib * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?ru * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?iu * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) 
 dis ?aff * A?D(A1, A2) 
 
 
UseIntentions(A1, A2) = max(ExpectedUtility(A1, Action, A2)) 
 
Involvement-Distance-Tradeoff = * max(I, D) + (1- ) * (I+D) / 2 
= 0.50
 
Expected_Satisfaction(A1, A2) = ES?IDT * IDT + ES?UI*UI 
 
Expected Satisfaction Positive Approach= ESPA?I * I + ESPA?D * (1-D)+ ESPA?EU *  EUact 
 
Expected Satisfaction Negative Approach = ESNA?I *(1-I) + ESNA?D * D+ ESNA?EU * EUact 
 
Expected Satisfaction Change   = ESCH?I * I + ESCH?D * D + ESCH?EU * EUact 
 
Expected Satisfaction Avoid  = ESAV?I * (1-I) + ESAV?D * D + ESAV?EU * EUact 
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Appendix B: Parameter settings in the experiments 
 
This appendix contains all parameter settings for the experiments in the paper. These 
are the parameter settings of the baseline condition. The variables that are changed in 
other experiments are mentioned in the paper. 
 
pgood = 0.85 
pbad    = 0.85 
panger = 0.95 
Table 1: Designed values for the features of each agent 
Agent Feature Value 
Harry Beautiful 0.5 
Harry Ugly 0.5 
Harry Good 0.5 
Harry Bad 0.5 
Harry Realistic 0.5 
Harry Unrealistic 0.5 
Barry Beautiful 0.5 
Barry Ugly 0.5 
Barry Good 0.5 
Barry Bad 0.5 
Barry Realistic 0.5 
Barry Unrealistic 0.5 
Gary Beautiful 0.5 
Gary Ugly 0.5 
Gary Good 0.5 
Gary Bad 0.5 
Gary Realistic 0.5 
Gary Unrealistic 0.5 
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Table 2: Biases the agents have in perceiving features of their selves and others 
Bias of Agent For perceiving Of Agent Value 
Harry Beautiful Harry 1 
Harry Beautiful Barry 1 
Harry Beautiful Gary 1 
Harry Ugly Harry 1 
Harry Ugly Barry 1 
Harry Ugly Gary 1 
Harry Realistic Harry 1 
Harry Realistic Barry 1 
Harry Realistic Gary 1 
Harry Unrealistic Harry 1 
Harry Unrealistic Barry 1 
Harry Unrealistic Gary 1 
Harry Good Harry 1 
Harry Good Barry 1 
Harry Good Gary 1 
Harry Bad Harry 1 
Harry Bad Barry 1 
Harry Bad Gary 1 
Barry Beautiful Harry 1 
Barry Beautiful Barry 1 
Barry Beautiful Gary 1 
Barry Ugly Harry 1 
Barry Ugly Barry 1 
Barry Ugly Gary 1 
Barry Realistic Harry 1 
Barry Realistic Barry 1 
Barry Realistic Gary 1 
Barry Unrealistic Harry 1 
Barry Unrealistic Barry 1 
Barry Unrealistic Gary 1 
Barry Good Harry 1 
Barry Good Barry 1 
Barry Good Gary 1 
Barry Bad Harry 1 
Barry Bad Barry 1 
Barry Bad Gary 1 
Gary Beautiful Harry 1 
Gary Beautiful Barry 1 
Gary Beautiful Gary 1 
Gary Ugly Harry 1 
Gary Ugly Barry 1 
Gary Ugly Gary 1 
Gary Realistic Harry 1 
Gary Realistic Barry 1 
Gary Realistic Gary 1 
Gary Unrealistic Harry 1 
Gary Unrealistic Barry 1 
Gary Unrealistic Gary 1 
Gary Good Harry 1 
Gary Good Barry 1 
Gary Good Gary 1 
Gary Bad Harry 1 
Gary Bad Barry 1 
Gary Bad Gary 1 
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Table 3: All values for the regression weights 
Weight of X  on Y Value 
Good  Similarity 0.30 
Bad  Similarity 0.20 
Beautiful  Similarity 0.20 
Ugly  Similarity 0.10 
Realistic  Similarity 0.10 
Unrealistic  Similarity 0.10 
Good  Dissimilarity 0.20. 
Bad  Dissimilarity 0.30 
Beautiful  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Ugly  Dissimilarity 0.20 
Realistic  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Unrealistic  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Good  Relevance 0.70 
Bad  Relevance 0.30 
Good  Irrelevance -0.70 
Bad  Irrelevance -0.30 
Good  Positive Valence 0.50 
Bad  Positive Valence -0.25 
Good  Negative Valence -0.25 
Bad  Negative Valence 0.50 
Beautiful  Involvement 0.15 
Ugly  Involvement 0.05 
Realistic  Involvement 0.10 
Unrealistic  Involvement 0.05 
Positive Valence Involvement 0.50 
Negative Valence Involvement -0.15 
Positive Valence * similarity Involvement 0.10 
Negative Valence * similarity Involvement -0.15 
Positive Valence * dissimilarity Involvement -0.10 
Negative Valence * dissimilarity Involvement 0.05 
Positive Valence * beautiful Involvement -0.05 
Negative Valence * beautiful Involvement -0.10 
Positive Valence * ugly Involvement 0.05 
Negative Valence * ugly Involvement -0.05 
Relevance  Involvement 0.15 
Irrelevance  Involvement -0.10 
Relevance * similarity Involvement 0.10 
Irrelevance * similarity Involvement 0.02 
Relevance * dissimilarity Involvement 0.03 
Irrelevance * dissimilarity Involvement -0.02 
Relevance * beautiful Involvement 0.10 
Irrelevance * beautiful Involvement 0.03 
Relevance * ugly Involvement 0.03 
Irrelevance * ugly Involvement 0.01 
A-->I Involvement 0.20 
Beautiful  Distance -0.15 
Ugly  Distance 0.20 
Realistic  Distance 0.05 
Unrealistic  Distance 0.10 
Positive Valence Distance -0.35 
Negative Valence Distance 0.50 
Positive Valence * similarity Distance -0.15 
Negative Valence * similarity Distance 0.20 
Positive Valence * dissimilarity Distance 0.07 
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Negative Valence * dissimilarity Distance -0.07 
Positive Valence * beautiful Distance 0.08 
Negative Valence * beautiful Distance 0.15 
Positive Valence * ugly Distance -0.05 
Negative Valence * ugly Distance -0.05 
Relevance  Distance 0.15 
Irrelevance  Distance -0.05 
Relevance * similarity Distance -0.10 
Irrelevance * similarity Distance -0.05 
Relevance * dissimilarity Distance 0.05 
Irrelevance * dissimilarity Distance 0.02 
Relevance * beautiful Distance -0.10 
Irrelevance * beautiful Distance -0.05 
Relevance * ugly Distance 0.10 
Irrelevance * ugly Distance 0.05 
A-->D Distance 0.20 
Inv_Dist_Tradeoff Expected Satisfaction 0.80 
UseIntentions Expected Satisfaction 0.20 
Table 4?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Weight Value Weight Value 
I?PA 
0.75 D?PA -0.75 
I?NA 0.25 D?NA 0.75 
I?CH 0.50 D?CH 0.50 
I?AV -0.50 D?AV 0.50 
Table 5: Values for weights of involvement, distance, and expected utility on the expected 
satisfaction of performing a type of action 
Weight Value Weight Value 
ESPA?I  0.4 ESCH?I  0.4 
ESPA?D  0.4 ESCH?D  0.3 
ESPA?EU  0.2 ESCH?EU  0.3 
ESNA?I 
0.4 ESAV?I  0.5 
ESNA?D  0.4 ESAV ?D  0.3 
ESNA?EU  0.2 ESAV ?EU  0.2 
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Abstract. In aiming for behavioral fidelity, artificial intelligence cannot and no 
longer ignores the formalization of human affect. Affect modeling plays a vital 
role in faithfully simulating human emotion and in emotionally-evocative 
technology that aims at being real. This paper offers a short expose about three 
models concerning the generation and regulation of affect: CoMERG, EMA and 
I-PEFiCADM, which each in their own right are successfully applied in the agent 
and robot domain. We argue that the three models partly overlap and where 
distinct, they complement one another. We provide an analysis of the theoretical 
concepts, and provide a blueprint of an integration, which should result in a more 
precise representation of affect simulation in virtual humans. 
Keywords: Affect modeling, Cognitive modeling, Virtual agents 
1   Introduction 
Over the last decade, a virtual explosion can be observed in the amount of novel 
computational models of affect. Nevertheless, current affect models in software agents 
are still simplifications compared to human affective complexity. Although many agents 
currently have the ability to show different emotions by means of facial expressions, it 
is quite difficult for them to show the right emotion at the right moment. In anticipation 
of richer interactions between user and agent, this paper explores the possibility to 
integrate a number of models that are sufficiently similar, while preserving their 
individual qualities. As a first step into that direction, we compared three models 
(CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM) of agent affect-generation and affect-regulation (or 
coping). 
We selected three models inspired by some of the most influential theories in the 
emotion domain to achieve more realistic affective behavior in agents. The theory of 
Emotion and Adaptation of Smith and Lazarus [12] was formalized by Gratch and 
Marsella [10] into EMA, a model to create agents that demonstrate and cope with 
(negative) affect. The emotion regulation theory of Gross [5] was used as inspiration by 
Bosse, Pontier, and Treur [2] to develop CoMERG (the Cognitive Model for Emotion 
102 
 
Regulation based on Gross), which simulates the various emotion regulation strategies 
described by Gross. The concern-driven theory of Frijda [4] was used by Hoorn, 
Pontier, and Siddiqui [6] to design I-PEFiCADM, a model for building robots that can 
trade rational for affective choices. We consider these theories because of their adequate 
mechanisms, simplicity and coherence. Together, they (Frijda, Smith & Lazarus, Gross) 
cover a large part of emotion theory. All three were inspired by an appraisal model of 
emotion, which makes them well suited for integration. In addition, these models are 
already implemented as computational models, which make it easier to integrate them. 
All three approaches point at important aspects of human affective behavior, but also 
miss out on something. CoMERG [2] and EMA [10] address the regulation of affective 
states, but EMA does not regulate positive affect. CoMERG, on the other hand, has no 
provisions for generating affect, and does not explicitly account for a causal 
interpretation of the world state. I-PEFiCADM [6] generates and balances affect but is 
mute about the different regulation mechanisms. Because the models are 
complementary to each other, it makes sense to integrate them.  
As a first step, the present contribution attempts to align and contrast different affect 
models as they were derived from the original emotion theories1. We will point out what 
deficiencies should be overcome to build a better artifact for human-agent interaction 
and to gain more insight into human affective processes. 
2   CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM  
2.1. CoMERG 
According to Gross [5], humans use strategies to influence the level of emotional 
response to a given type of emotion; for instance, to prevent a person from having a too 
high or low response level.  
??????????????? ??????????? ????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????????????????????
CoMERG. This model, which consists of a set of difference equations combined with 
logical rules, can be used to simulate the dynamics of the various emotion regulation 
strategies described by Gross. CoMERG was incorporated into agents in a virtual 
storytelling app????????? ????? ?????????? ??????? ???????? ??????? ?????????????? five 
different emotion regulation strategies, which can be applied at different points in the 
process of emotion generation: situation selection, situation modification, attentional 
deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. 
2.2. Emotion & Adaption (EMA) Model 
EMA is a computational model of the cognitive antecedents and consequences of 
emotions posited by appraisal theory, particularly as conceptualized by Smith and 
Lazarus [12]. A central tenet in cognitive appraisal theories is that appraisal and coping 
???????????????????????? interpretation of their relationship with the environment. This 
interpretation is constructed by cognitive processes, summarized by appraisal variables 
 
1 Note that the presented models embody a particular variant of an affect theory in that they have some unique 
properties that distinguish them from their original source. Many design choices underlying such models arise 
from the need to create a working computational system, a challenge the original theorists have never 
confronted.  
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and altered by coping responses. To capture this process in computational terms, EMA 
maintains an explicit symbolic representation of  the relationship between events and an 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ent 
the physical relationship between events and their consequences, and BDI frameworks 
to represent the epistemic factors that underlie human (particularly social) activities. 
 Appraisal processes characterize this representation in terms of individual appraisal 
judgments, extending traditional AI concerns with utility and probability:   
 Desirability: what is the utility (positive or negative) of the event  
 Likelihood: how probable is the outcome of the event. 
 Causal attribution: who deserves credit/blame.  
 Controllability: can the outcome be altered by actions of the agent. 
 Changeability: can the outcome change on its own. 
Patterns of appraisal elicit emotional displays, but they also initiate coping processes 
??? ????????? ?????????????????????? ????????? ??? ????generated emotion. Coping strategies 
work in the reverse direction of appraisal, identifying plans, beliefs, desires or intentions 
to maintain or alter in order to reduce negative emotional appraisals:  
 Planning: form an intention to perform some act  
 Seek instrumental support: ask someone that controls outcome for help. 
 Procrastination: wait for an external event to change the current circumstances. 
 Denial: lower the perceived likelihood of an undesirable outcome. 
 Mental disengagement: lower utility of desired state. 
 Shift blame: shift responsibility for an action toward some other agent. 
Strategies give input to the cognitive processes that actually execute these directives. 
For example, planful coping generates an intention to act, leading a planning system 
associated with EMA to generate and execute a valid plan to accomplish this act. 
Alternatively, coping strategies ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
re-assess who is to blame. 
EMA is a fully implemented model and has been applied to a number of systems that 
must simulate realistic human emotional responses. Several empirical studies have 
demonstra?????????????????????????????????????????????9].  
 
2.3. I-PEFiCADM 
Originally, the empirically validated framework for Perceiving and Experiencing 
?????????? ??????????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ?????????? ??? ???????????? ?????????
and movie characters [7]. Later versions were applied to the embodied-agent domain 
and supplemented with user interaction possibilities, resulting into the Interactive 
PEFiC model. I-PEFiC was then used to model affective behavior of robots as a module 
for Affective Decision Making was added to simulate irrational robot behavior, hence I-
PEFiCADM [7]. 
The groundwork of I-PEFiCADM is formed by the cognitive process triplet of an 
encoding, a comparison, and a response phase. During encoding, the robot perceives the 
user and the situation the user is in. T?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
on four dimensions as a description of what someone is like or does. The robot 
attributes a level of ethics to the user, that is, the rob??????????????????????????????????????
character is good or bad. Aesthetics is a level of beauty or ugliness that the robot 
perceives in the user. Epistemics is a measure for the realistic or unrealistic 
representations that the user conveys about him or herself. During the encoding, 
104 
 
moreover, the robot looks at the user in terms of affordances. Certain aspects of the user 
may count as helpful or as an obstacle.  
In the comparison ??????? ???? ??????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ???? relevance to robot 
goals (relevant or irrelevant) and valence to goals (positive or negative outcome 
expectancies). ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
afford the facilitation of a desired robot goal. This instigates positive outcome 
expectancy. The comparison between the features of robot and user establishes a level 
of similarity (similar or dissimilar). The measures in the encode phase - mediated by 
relevance and valence in the comparison phase and moderated by similarity - determine 
????????????responses. 
In the response phase, the robot establishes the levels of involvement with and 
distance towards the user. Involvement and distance are two tendencies that occur in 
parallel and compensate one another [14]. In addition, the robot calculates a value for 
the so called use intentions, the willingness to employ the user again as a tool to achieve 
robot goals. Together with involvement and distance, the use intentions determine the 
overall satisfaction of the robot with its user. 
Based on this level of satisfaction, the robot may decide to continue or stop the 
interaction and turn to another user. In the Affective Decision Making module [7], the 
robot makes a decision on the more rationally generated use intentions in unison with 
the more affectively generated involvement-distance trade-off. The action that promises 
the highest expected satisfaction during interaction is selected. 
3   Triple Comparison 
Fig. 1 depicts the similarities and differences between CoMERG, EMA, and I-
PEFiCADM. Although explicitly mentioned in I-PEFiCADM alone, it is not hard to apply 
the encode-compare-respond phases to CoMERG and EMA. In the next sections, we 
offer a comparison of models, using Fig. 1 as our reference point. 
 
3.1. Encode 
According to CoMERG, people can select different situations, or modify the situation 
they are currently in, to regulate their emotions. In CoMERG the evaluation of how 
??????????????????????????? ??, is assumed to be given. In EMA, situations are appraised 
using the utility of state predicates about the situation and a causal interpretation of this 
situation. The agents can cope with these situations to change the person-environment-
relationship, either by motivating changes to the interpretation of this relationship or by 
motivating actions that change the environment. I-PEFiCADM regards the user, agent, or 
character as part of a situation and that situation primes the features that are selected and 
how they are perceived. 
Features in CoMERG are called aspects. According to CoMERG, a person can focus 
on one or another aspect (feature) of the world to regulate his or her emotions. In EMA, 
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????those features considered in the subjectively 
construed situation. State predicates are statements about features of the environment 
which can be true or false. In I-PEFiCADM, features receive a certain weight according to 
frequency of occurrence, salience, or familiarity. Weights can change because of 
attentional shifts or situation changes. 
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The appraisal domains of I-PEFiC focus on characters. There is a host of evidence 
that for the judgment of fictional characters [7] and embodied agents [14], users classify 
features as good or bad, beautiful or ugly, realistic or unrealistic, and as aids or 
obstacles. According to EMA, on the other hand, agents perceive the world according to 
a causal interpretation of past and ongoing world events, including plans and intentions 
of self and others and past actions. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM 
 
3.2. Compare 
CoMERG refers to the appraisal process ??? ?cognitive ??????????? ?????????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????by 
attaching a different cognitive meaning to a situation. One type of cognitive change, 
reappraisal, means that an individual cognitively re-evaluates a potentially emotion-
eliciting situation in terms that decrease its emotional impact [5]. In the view advocated 
by I-PEFiCADM, personal meaning is attached to a feature through relevance and 
valence. In a particular (imagined) situation, an object or feature may potentially benefit 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ([4] cf. 
primary appraisal in [8]). 
In EMA, this meaning is acquired through an appraisal process which is modeled in 
much detail. In this process, multiple appraisal frames are generated to allow for taking 
different perspectives. These appraisal frames are generated using many appraisal 
variables, which are taken from the theory of Smith & Lazarus, who call them the 
appraisal components, and Roseman, who calls them appraisal dimensions. Most of 
these appraisal variables could be mapped to relevance and valence used in I-
PEFiCADM. According to EMA, relevance measures the significance of an event for the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ?????????. An event outcome is only deemed significant in EMA if it 
facilitates or inhibits a state predicate with non-zero utility. Valence is not explicitly 
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?????????? ??? ???? ????????? ?????????? ???? ??????????????? ???? ??? ????????? ??? ????
instantiations of it.  
Utility is a measure of the relative satisfaction from (or desirability of) environmental 
features. EMA represents preferences over environmental features as numeric utility 
over the truth-value of state predicates. Utilities may be either intrinsic (meaning that 
the agent assigns intrinsic worth to this environmental feature) or extrinsic (meaning 
that they inherit worth through their probabilistic contribution to an intrinsically 
valuable state feature). Utility, then, may be viewed as positive or negative outcome 
expectations about features in the current situation and is expressed in current state 
??????????????????????????????????????? 
Desirability covers both a notion of intrinsic pleasantness and goal congruence (in 
?????????? typology), as well as a measure of importance or relevance. It captures the 
?????????? ???????? ??? ??? ?????? ????? ??????? ??? ??? ???????? ????????????? ??? ?????? ???
??????????? ????? ????? ???????? ????????????? ??? ??? ???????????? ?? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ??????
attributes positive utility or if it inhibits a state with negative utility. Like utility, 
desirability may be viewed as positive or negative outcome expectations but this time 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
The explicit division in current and future states is what I-PEFiCADM is missing, as 
well as the possibility to change perspectives. EMA and I-PEFiCADM resemble each 
other in that causal interpretation of ongoing world events in terms of beliefs, desires, 
plans, and intentions in EMA is comprised in the beliefs, goals, and concerns that are 
checked for relevance and valence in I-PEFiCADM. However, EMA uses a number of 
variables, called appraisal frames, to cover the appraisal process, whereas in I-
PEFiCADM, these appraisal frames appear to pertain to the more general concepts of 
relevance and valence. For example, urgency would be a clear-cut specification of 
relevance (cf. [4]) and ego involvement could be seen as a part of valence. However, 
EMA also uses some variables (such as causal attribution and coping potential) which 
are more related to the environment and less to the character, and which are somewhat 
broader than relevance and valence. 
 
3.3. Respond 
Fig. 1 exemplifies that in EMA, relevance of an event as well as utility and desirability 
(current / future valence) of features are mapped via an appraisal frame onto emotion 
instances of a particular category and intensity. These are called affective states. This 
may be seen as a covert response to the situation ? an internal affective state that does 
not yet nor necessarily translate into overt actions. In I-PEFiCADM, affective states as 
such are not the focus but rather the involvement-distance trade-off, which is seen as the 
central process of engagement.  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? and distance (Fig. 1, 
curved arrows). On this view, emotions emerge during the trade-off. For example, if a 
girl is asked for a date by a boy she loves, her involvement with him may be 
accompanied by happiness. When the boy looks at other girls on this date, the girl may 
still be involved with the boy but this time she feels challenged.  
The involvement-distance trade-off could also count as the concretization of the 
emotion response tendencies that CoMERG hinges on. In CoMERG, these tendencies 
result in several responses: experiential, behavioral, and physiological. EMA and I-
PEFiCADM are restricted to the experiential and behavioral domain. In EMA, affective 
states lead to coping behavior. For example, if your car makes strange noises, you might 
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adopt emotion-focused coping (e.g., wishful thinking: tell yourself it is not that 
important and will probably stop by itself) which will inform the next decision; or you 
might adopt problem-focused coping to take a specific overt action to address the threat 
(e.g., have your car checked at the garage). In I-PEFiCADM, the combination of 
involvement, distance, and use intentions predicate the level of satisfaction 
(experiential), which feeds into affective decision making. This results into overt 
responses (behavior) such as kissing, kicking, or walking away. 
CoMERG describes five emotion regulation strategies (see Sec. 2.1). Following 
Gross, CoMERG predicts that strategies that are performed earlier in the process of 
emotion generation are more effective to regulate on???? ?????????? ???? ????????? ??
more specific model which focuses (in much detail) on coping. Situation selection and 
situation modification are implemented in EMA via problem-focused coping strategies 
(i.e., take-action) and avoidance. Attentional deployment ???????????? ??? ??????
strategies of seek/suppress information. Cogni????? ??????? ???????????? ??? ??????
various emotion-directed strategies. EMA does not model suppression. I-PEFiCADM 
focuses on situation selection. Another difference is that CoMERG and I-PEFiCADM 
allow the regulation of affect by increasing, maintaining, or decreasing the positive or 
negative response, whereas EMA focuses on decreasing negative affect alone. In EMA, 
being overenthusiastic is left uncontrolled, whereas in CoMERG and I-PEFiCADM, 
positive affect can be down-regulated or compensated for. As a result, one can state that 
coping in EMA is one of the instantiations of emotion regulation in CoMERG. 
For EMA, there must be an explicit causal connection between coping strategies and 
the emotions they are regulating whereas for CoMERG that is not a prerequisite. In 
CoMERG, people perform strategies to change their level of emotion, which are simply 
modeled via difference equations. EMA gives a more detailed and formal description of 
how emotion regulation works. For example, reappraisal as a general emotion 
regulation strategy in CoMERG is in EMA described in terms of a change in causal 
interpretation. 
4   Integration 
In our attempt to integrate the above models, we will adhere to the naming convention 
??? ??????????? ??????????? ?????????? ????? ???? ?????? ??????????? ??? ?? ???????????????????????
EMA and I-PEFiCADM use that concept and it is interchangeable with ?aspects? in 
CoMERG. Only I-PEFiCADM explicitly mentions the appraisal domains that are 
important in perceiving features. Therefore, the agent will use ethics, affordances, 
aesthetics, and epistemics as the main domains through which features are funneled into 
the appraisal process. 
CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM all assume or elaborate an appraisal process. 
??????? ??? ?????? ????????? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ?????????? ???? ??????? ??? ????????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-PEFiCADM. In EMA 
and I-PEFiCADM, relevance and valence play an active role, but EMA models the 
different manifestations rather than the general concepts. In unison, we will use the term 
relevance to indicate importance or meaning to (dynamic) personal goals, concerns, 
beliefs, intentions, plans, etc. and valence as (current) utility or (future) desirability of 
features in a situation. This may instantiate in the form of, for example, urgency as an 
aspect of relevance and likelihood or unexpectedness as an aspect of valence. 
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On the response side, EMA focuses on mood and emotions whereas I-PEFiCADM 
emphasizes the more general trends of involvement, distance, and use intentions. Yet, 
????? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ????????? ????????? ????
moods may evolve from involvement-distance trade-offs and both the specific (e.g., 
happy emotions) and general experiential response (e.g., involvement) may be liable to 
regulation strategies.  
CoMERG provides the most profound distinctions with respect to the type of 
responses (experiential, behavioral, and physiological) and the number of regulation 
strategies. However, in no way are these distinctions at odds with EMA or I-PEFiCADM. 
Coping is best worked out by EMA and situation selection by I-PEFiCADM, 
encompassing a module for affective decision making that on the basis of expected 
satisfaction chooses from several domain actions.  
 Fig. 2 shows a blueprint for the integration of CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM 
into a framework for computerized affect generation and regulation. On the far left of 
the figure, we see a virtual agent. She can perform attentional deployment to weigh the 
features of her interaction partners. The agent develops state predicates about others in a 
certain context. Features receive indices for different appraisal domains. The observed 
other acquires personal meaning or significance for the agent because she compares 
their features with her personal goals, beliefs, and concerns. This establishes the 
relevance and valence of others to her goals and concerns. While relevance determines 
the intensity of affect, valence governs its direction. The agent can also look at others 
through the eyes of another agent.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Proposed integration of the three models 
When the (initial) appraisal process is completed, the agent is ready to affectively 
respond. Relevance, current and future valence form an appraisal frame that feeds into 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ing a conversation) and 
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that helps her to trade friendship (involvement) for keeping her cool (distance). Inside, 
??????????????? ????????????? ???????? ?????????ambiguous) emotions. On a physiological 
level, she may be aroused (e.g., increased heart-rate). All this is not visible to others yet; 
they are covert responses.  
During affective decision making, the agent selects the option that promises the 
highest expected satisfaction. This may be accompanied by physiological reactions such 
as blushing and trembling. Response modulation may influence the affective decision 
making. The performed action leads to a new situation. 
5   Conclusion 
Various researchers from different fields have proposed formal models that describe the 
processes related to emotion elicitation and regulation (e.g., [2, 3, 7, 10]). For this 
reason, it is impossible to provide a complete comparison of existing models within one 
paper. Instead, the approach taken in this article was to select three of the more 
influential models, which share that they can be used to enhance believability of virtual 
characters: CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM. The theories by which they were 
inspired cover most psychological literature in affect-related processes, including the 
works of Frijda [4], Lazarus [8], and Gross [5]. 
In this article, we have argued that each of the three approaches has its specific focus. 
For example, CoMERG covers a wide variety of emotion regulation strategies, whereas 
I-PEFiCADM provides an elaborated mechanism for encoding of different appraisal 
domains, which have empirically shown to be crucial in human-robot interaction. EMA 
on its turn contains very sophisticated mechanisms for both appraisal and coping, which 
have already proved their value in various applications. Because several of these 
features are complementary to each other, this paper explores the possibilities to 
integrate them into one combined model of affect for virtual humans. For a first attempt 
to implement this integrated model, see [11]. As a next step, it is planned to perform 
systematic user-tests in order to assess whether our integration indeed results in more 
human-like affective behavior than the three sub-models do separately.  
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Abstract. Affect modeling plays a vital role in faithfully simulating human 
emotion and in emotionally-evocative technology. Current affect models are still 
strong simplifications compared to human affective complexity. To establish 
richer agent interaction, we integrated three affect-related models: CoMERG, I-
PEFiCADM and EMA. These models partly overlap, and where distinct, they 
complement one another. The integrated model called Silicon Coppélia was 
implemented and simulation experiments were performed to test the behavior of 
the model. These experiments show that the model can simulate richer agent 
behaviors than any of the models could have done alone. 
1   Introduction 
Compared to human affective complexity, contemporary emotion models of software 
agents are quite simple. In anticipation of more productive interactions between user 
and agent, this paper presents an integration of three models that are sufficiently alike, 
while maintaining their individual qualities. We used three models (CoMERG, EMA, 
and I-PEFiCADM) of agent affect-generation and affect-regulation that in our view are 
suitable for integration purposes. 
To accomplish less simplistic affective behavior in agents, we took three models 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
[8] theory of emotion was formalized by Gratch and Marsella [7] into EMA, a model to 
create agents that exhibit and cope with (negative) affect. Bosse, Pontier, and Treur [2] 
used the emotion regulation theory of Gross [5] to develop CoMERG. This model can 
simulate different emotion regulation strategies explained by Gross. Hoorn, Pontier, and 
Siddiqui [6] used the concern-driven theory of Frijda [4] to build I-PEFiCADM, a 
model for building agents that can trade rational for affective choices. These theories 
are fit for integration due to their adequate mechanisms, simplicity and coherence. 
Collectively, their foundation (Frijda, Smith & Lazarus, Gross) covers a large part of 
emotion theory. Because all three were inspired by the appraisal model of emotion, they 
smoothly fit together. As indicated earlier [1], all three approaches point at important 
aspects of human affective behavior and all three approaches miss out on something. 
CoMERG [2] and EMA [7], address the regulation of affective states, but EMA does 
not regulate positive affect, and it cannot be used to simulate irrational choices where 
appropriate. CoMERG, on the other hand, has no provisions for generating affect, and 
does not explicitly account for a causal interpretation of the world state. I-PEFiCADM 
[6] generates and balances affect but is mute about the different regulation mechanisms.  
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Because the models are complementary to each other, it makes sense to integrate 
them. Because EMA, compared to the other models, is more complex and domain-
specific, we simplified this model, thereby preserving its core principles. By combining 
and integrating these models into Silicon Coppélia, this integrated model should be able 
to simulate richer agent behavior than any of them can do alone. We will test whether 
this really is the case by performing simulation experiments on Silicon Coppélia under 
various parameter settings. 
2   Implementation  
This chapter will describe the implementation of Silicon Coppélia. Figure 1 shows 
Silicon Coppélia in graphical format. Due to space limitations, not all the formulas in 
the model will be described, but we will mainly focus on the new formulas in the model 
compared to the implementation of the affective decision making model I-PEFiCADM 
[6]. According to I-PEFiCADM, an agent perceives another agent in terms of ethics 
(good/bad), aesthetics (beautiful/ugly), affordances (aid/obstacle) and realism (cf. [9]). 
 
 
Figure 1: Silicon Coppélia is the integration of CoMERG, EMA, and I-PEFiCADM 
Together with similarity and expected utility this leads via relevance and valence to 
feelings of involvement and distance, and the more rational use intentions, which are 
combined into an expected satisfaction for each action. The complete Silicon Coppélia 
including all the formulas can be found in [10]. 
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2.1. Appraisal frame 
Agents are appraised via an appraisal frame. This appraisal frame includes a number of 
appraisal variables, such as beliefs and expected utilities. 
The believed likelihood that a goal-state will be accomplished in the range [-1, 1] is 
calculated by looking at which sub-goals have already been reached. In the system, 
agents have beliefs about whether states in the world are true in the range [0, 1]. The 
agents also have beliefs about states facilitating or inhibiting other states in the world in 
the range [-1, 1] where -1 means an agent believes a state strongly inhibits another state, 
and 1 means a state strongly facilitates another state. The likelihood of a goal-state is 
calculated by taking all states into account which are believed to influence the chances 
of reaching the goal-state. All the beliefs about the states being true are multiplied with 
the beliefs about the states facilitating or inhibiting the goal-state. The following 
algorithm is performed to the resulting values. Because other algorithms used in this 
system have a similar form, we will call it algorithm A: 
 
1. Sort the values in two lists: [0?1] and [0?-1] 
2. Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list. Continue 
until the list is finished. Do this for both the negative and the positive list. 
3. Outcome = weighed mean of the outcomes of both lists, with weights (#pos / #tot) for the list 
of positive values, and (#neg / #tot) for the list of negative values. 
This way, if, for example, multiple sub-goals that facilitate the goal-state have been 
accomplished, each sub-goal that is achieved increases the perceived likelihood of 
reaching the goal-state. However, the more sub-goals have been reached, the less impact 
each sub-goal has on the perceived likelihood of achieving the goal-state.  
In the system, agents have beliefs that actions facilitate world-states in the domain 
[-1, 1] where -1 means an action strongly inhibits a world-state, and 1 means an action 
strongly facilitates a world-state. If an agent observes an action being performed, and it 
believes that this action facilitates a certain world-state, it changes its beliefs that the 
agent performing the action is responsible for reaching that world-state according 
to the following formulas. Because other formulas used in the system have a similar 
form, we will call them formulas of the form F. Due to space limitations, only one 
formula of this type is completely shown in the paper. The other formulas of this form 
can be found in [10]. 
 
IF    obs(A1, A2, performs, action) 
AND   belief(action, facilitates, goal-state) > 0 
? belief(A2, responsible, goal-state) =  old_belief  + mfbel_resp * belief(action, facilitates, goal-
state)*(1 ? old_belief) 
 
In formulas of the form F, mf<variable> is a modification factor that determines how 
quickly the variable is updated. This modification factor is multiplied with the impact 
value, in this case belief(action, facilitates, goal-state). Multiplying with limiter (1-old_belief) 
???????? ???? ???????? ????? ???? ??? ???? ??? ??????? ???????????? ????? ??? ??? ???????? ???????
approaches an extreme value, it will be harder to push it further to the extreme, and 
easier to get it back to a less extreme value.  
Agents have beliefs about the praiseworthiness of other agents in the domain [-1, 
1] where -1 is very blameworthy and 1 is very praiseworthy. If an agent has a goal and 
it believes that the goal should already have been reached while it has not, it blames or 
praises the agents who it believes are responsible for (not) reaching the goal according 
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to formula F with as impact value belief(A1, A2, responsible, goal-state) * ambition_level(goal-
state). This way, if the belief about responsibility and ambition level are both positive or 
negative, A1 will increase its perceived praiseworthiness of A2. If a goal-state is 
reached, the agent praises or blames the agents that are believed to be responsible for 
this in a similar manner.  
Expected utilities are calculated the same way as in [6]. If an agent has multiple 
expected utilities of a feature or an action with regard to several goals, a general 
expected utility is calculated by taking all goals into account which are believed to be 
influenced by the feature or action. All the expected utilities of the feature or action 
with respect to a goal are given to algorithm A, which calculates the general expected 
utility. The general expected utilities of actions generate action tendencies in the agent 
with the same value. 
Compared to [6], now the actions have a continuous level of positivity and negativity 
in approach, instead of being classified as a certain type. This allows for differentiating 
between, for example, changing in a positive way (supportive critique) and changing in 
a negative way (running down on someone). To calculate general positivity and 
general negativity in the action tendencies, all action tendencies are multiplied with 
the positivity of the action and the negativity of the action in two separate lists. 
Algorithm A is performed to both these lists to calculate the general positivity and 
negativity of the action tendencies of the agent. Where in [6] the action tendencies of 
each class would have a direct effect on involvement and distance, in this paper the 
general positivity and negativity in action tendencies have an effect on involvement and 
distance via relevance and valence, as this has been refined in [9]. The use intentions 
of an agent towards another agent are calculated by performing algorithm A for all 
features of an agent and actions that can be performed to that agent. The expected 
satisfaction is calculated by trading involvement for distance, and taking a weighed 
mean of the involvement-distance tradeoff and the use intentions as described in [6].  
The agent with the highest expected satisfaction will be picked. Once an agent has been 
selected, the action to perform to that agent is picked using the following formula: 
 
ExpectedSatisfaction(A1, Action, A2) = weu * Action_Tendency +  
wpos * (1 - abs(positivity ? biasI * Involvement)) +  
wneg * (1 - abs(negativity ? biasD * Distance)) 
 
The agent will search for the action with the level of positivity that is closest to the 
level of (biased) involvement, the level of negativity closest to the level of (biased) 
distance, and the strongest action tendency. The importance of positivity, negativity and 
expected utility for selecting an action can be adjusted by changing the weight. Using 
biases in this process can be seen as a type of response modulation. 
2.2. Effects on Emotions 
Perceived state predicates and appraisal variables lead to emotions. Hope and fear are 
based on the believed likelihood that (un)desired world-states will take place. For all 
world-states with a believed likelihood, the following function is performed to calculate 
the hope for a goal. This function is similar to the function described in [3]. 
 
IF   f >= likelihood  
?  hope_for_goal = -0,25 * ( cos( 1/f * * likelihood(goal) ) -1,5) * ambition(goal) 
IF   f < likelihood  
? hope_for_goal  = -0.25 * (cos(1/(1-f)* *(1-likelihood(goal))))-1.5) * ambition(goal) 
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Here, f is a shaping parameter (in the domain [0, 1]) that can be used to manipulate 
the location of the top of the hope curve. The value of this parameter may differ per 
???????????? ???? ??????????? ??????????? ???? ???????????? ???? ???? ??? ???? ???????????????-
curve is always situated at the point where likelihood = f. In this paper, f is set at 0.5. 
Algorithm A is performed to the found values for hope_for_goal. Only here, instead of 
step 3, hope is the outcome of the list with positive values, and fear is the absolute 
outcome of the list of negative values. 
If a world-state becomes true or false, the levels of joy and distress are calculated by 
performing formula F with ambition_level(world-state) or a negation thereof as impact 
value. This way, a desired world-state becoming true will increase joy, and decrease 
distress, and an undesired does the opposite. This same rule is applied for world-states 
facilitating other world-states, with belief(state, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition_level(goal-
state), or a negation of this multiplication as impact value.  
If a world-?????? ???????? ?????? ???? ???????? ?????? ??? surprise will move towards the 
believed unlikelihood of this world-state happening, using the following formula: 
 
surprise = psurp * old_surprise + (1-psurp) * (1?likelihood) 
 
In this formula, psurp is a persistency factor, which determines the slowness of 
adjustment of surprise. If an agent believes that a goal-state should have been reached, 
but it has not been reached, this will increase its surprise according to formula F with 
likelihood(goal-state) as impact value. Because being surprised does not last forever, it is 
multiplied with a decay factor each timestep, which is set at 0.95 for all agents.  
To calculate the level of anger in the range [0, 1] from agents towards other agents, 
formula F is used with Belief(A2, responsible, goal-state) * Ambition_level(A1, goal-state) as 
impact value. This way, if an agent believes a desired goal-state should have been 
reached, but it has not, the agent will get more angry at the agents who are believed to 
be responsible for not reaching this goal-state, and less angry at the agents who are 
believed to have tried helping reaching the goal-state. If the goal-state was undesired, 
this is the other way around. Because people do not stay angry forever, it is multiplied 
with a decay factor each timestep. The general level of anger is calculated by 
performing algorithm A for all levels of anger from an agent to other agents. Because 
there is only a list of positive values, the general level of anger simply is the outcome of 
step 2. Guilt is calculated by taking the value of anger at self. 
All agents have a desired level of emotion for each type of emotion, similar as in [2]. 
This desired level will usually be high for positive emotions (joy, hope) and low for 
negative emotions (anger, guilt). The overall mood is calculated by the following 
formula: 
 
Mood = 1-( emotion * abs(Emotion ? desired(Emotion)) 
 
2.3. Emotion Regulation Strategies 
To regulate their emotions, agents can perform situation selection and situation 
modification by affectively selecting situations and sub-situations with the highest 
expected satisfaction. Attentional deployment can be performed to change the focus of 
attention. Agents have beliefs that certain features cause emotions.  If an agent has 
attention for a certain feature, and an emotion increases, it will increase its belief that 
that certain feature causes that particular emotion using formula F with (Emotion(t)?
Emotion(t-1)) * Attention(Feature) as impact value. In this formula, Emotion(t) is an 
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experienced level of emotion at a certain timepoint (e.g., the level of joy at timepoint 5).  
Using the belief that a feature Feat causes an emotion E, an agent can shift its attention 
Att as an emotion regulation strategy using the following formula: 
 
Att(Feat) = old_value ? belief(Feat, causes, E)*(E?desired(E))  
 
This formula manages that if an agent believes that a feature causes an emotion, it 
will increase attention to this feature if it wants to increase its level of this emotion, and 
decrease its attention if it wants to decrease the level of the emotion. Each timestep, the 
attention is also shifted based on the relevance of features. The relevance of features is 
calculated by taking the absolute value of the general expected utility of a feature using 
the following formula: 
 
Att(Feat) = patt * old_value + (1 - patt) * Relevance(Feat) 
 
In this formula, patt is a persistency factor, which determines the slowness of 
adjustment of attention. Each timestep, the sum of the levels of attention is normalized 
to 1.  
Cognitive change is implicitly performed by changing beliefs during the simulation 
as described earlier in this paper. These changes in belief indirectly influence the 
???????? ?????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ????????? ?he 
causal interpretation of past events, a form of emotion-focused coping. If an agent feels 
guilty for not reaching a desired goal-state (i.e., the level of guilt is above some 
threshold), either because the agent performed an action that inhibited it, or it did not 
perform an action that facilitated it, it can decrease its belief that the action had an 
influence on reaching the goal by multiplying it with a modification factor. 
3   Simulation Experiments 
To test the behavior of our model, we implemented the model in JavaScript and 
performed a number of simulation experiments under different parameter settings. Each 
experiment concerns a scenario involving a mother, a father and a daughter. There is a 
party, and the possible actions that were inserted in the system are: 1) going to the party, 
2) allowing another agent to go to the party, 3) allowing another agent to go to the party 
with some restrictions, and 4) forbidding another agent to go to the party. The possible 
world-states (which the agents can have as goals and/or sub-???????????? ?????????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are described below. Due to space limitations, not all the performed experiments are 
described in the paper. The remaining experiments and their simulation traces can be 
found in [10]. 
 
Baseline condition: 
 
To start, an initial experiment was performed that served as a control condition for the 
remaining experiments. In this condition, all parameters were set to 0, and the biases in 
perceiving features were set to the neutral value of 1. The complete parameter settings 
and results for the baseline condition and the experiments can be found in [10].  
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Experiment 1: Mother gets angry 
 
In this experiment, the mother observes that the father allows the daughter to go to the 
party. The mother wants her daughter to be safe and believes that allowing the daughter 
to go to the party strongly inhibits this goal. This belief leads to a negative expected 
utility for allowing her daughter to go to the party with respect to the goal of having her 
daughter safe, which leads to a negative action tendency for this action. Compared to 
the baseline experiment, this decreases her expected satisfaction of allowing her 
daughter to go to the party. Because the mother observes the father allowing their 
daughter to go to the party, and she believes that this inhibits the goal of their daughter 
being safe, she believes the father is responsible for their daughter not being safe. 
Because she wants her daughter to be safe, she thinks the father is blameworthy, and 
decreases her view on his ethics. The mother ends up being angry at the father. 
 
Experiment 2: Belief that states lead to other states 
 
In this experiment, the daughter wants her parents to be happy. She thinks that if she is 
safe and is having fun, this will make her parents feel happy. Due to some external 
events, at timepoint 1 the daughter is having fun, and at timepoint 2 the daughter is also 
being safe, which results in the parents being happy at timepoint 3. 
At timepoint 1, because she is having fun, the daughter believes that her parents 
might become happy. Because of this, she has hope for her parents becoming happy, 
which increases her general level of hope. Also, because the daughter is having fun, and 
none of the agents had any expectations that this would happen, their level of surprise 
increases, and the mood of all the agents is increased.  
At timepoint 2, because she is having fun and is safe, the daughter believes even 
stronger that her parents might become happy. Because of this higher likelihood, she is 
pretty confident that her parents will be happy, and therefore she is not hoping that 
much anymore as before. Also, because the daughter is safe, and none of the agents had 
any expectations that this would happen, their level of surprise increases even more, and 
their mood increases.  
At timepoint 3, the parents are even more surprised because they are being happy. 
The daughter, however, was already expecting her parents to become happy, so her 
level of surprise decreases. Because her parent being happy was a desired goal of the 
daughter, her level of joy and her mood also increase. 
  
Experiment 3: Affect overrides rationality 
 
In this experiment, the daughter is a good, beautiful, realistic agent. The father wants 
the daughter to be safe, and thinks forbidding her to go to the party will facilitate this 
goal. This leads the father to have a high expected utility for forbidding his daughter to 
go to the party, and a high action tendency for this action. Due to the changed designed 
features compared to the baseline condition, there are changes in perceived similarity, 
relevance and valence. This increases the distance, but especially the involvement of the 
father towards his daughter. Because of this, the father increases his involvement-
distance tradeoff towards his daughter. The expected satisfaction of forbidding his 
daughter to go to the party increases for the father because of the high expected utility 
of this action. However, due to the increase in involvement, the expected satisfaction of 
allowing his daughter to go to the party with restrictions increases even more. 
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Therefore, the father ends up allowing his daughter to go to the party with restrictions, 
where rationally he would have chosen to forbid his daughter to go to the party.  
4   Discussion 
In this paper we presented an implementation of an integration of CoMERG [2], I-
PEFiCADM [6], and a simplified version of EMA [7]. Compared to the model in [6], 
the agents have goal-related beliefs that lead to emotions. Also, some emotion 
regulation strategies were added to the system based on [3, 9]. 
Simulation experiments were performed to test the behavior of Silicon Coppélia. In 
experiment 1, the mother became angry at the father, because in her view, he performed 
an action (allowing their daughter to go to a party) that was in conflict with her goals 
(their daughter being safe). In experiment 2, several world-states becoming true led the 
daughter to having beliefs about the likelihood of other world-states becoming true. 
This caused her to experience hope, and later in the simulation joy when the expected 
and desired goal-state became true. Further, all the agents experienced surprise when 
world-states unexpectedly became true. In experiment 3, due to involvement with his 
daughter, the father made the affective decision to allow his daughter to go to the party, 
where rationally he would have forbidden his daughter to go to this party. These results 
are as would have been expected from the theory [4, 5, 8]. 
In previous studies, CoMERG and I-PEFiCADM alone [2, 6] were not able to 
simulate this kind of behavior. I-PEFiCADM and CoMERG are not able to simulate 
emotions based on beliefs about the responsibility of other agents and the likelihood of 
goal-states happening, as happens in experiment 1 and 2. EMA [7], on its turn, cannot 
be used to make irrational decisions where appropriate, as happens in experiment 3. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the simulation experiments show that Silicon Coppélia 
can simulate richer agent behavior than CoMERG, I-PEFiCADM or EMA can do alone. 
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Appendix A:  Formulas used in the model 
 
 
  
Variable Meaning Range 
abs(X) The absolute value of variable or formula X - 
max(X, Y) The maximum value of variables or formulas X 
and Y 
- 
Perceived(<Feature>, A1, A2) New value Agent1 perceives of a certain 
feature of Agent2 
[0, 1] 
Designed(<Feature>, A2) ?????? ????????? ??? ????? ?????????? ??? ?? ????????
feature of Agent2 
[0, 1] 
Bias(A1, A2, <Feature>) Bias that Agent1 has of Agent2 regarding a 
certain feature 
[0, 2] 
Biasinv bias for desired involvement to show in 
behavior 
[0, 2] 
Biasdis bias for desired Distance to show in behavior [0, 2] 
Similarity(A1, A2) Similarity of agent towards other agent [0, 1] 
Dissimilarity(A1, A2) Dissimilarity of agent towards other agent [0, 1] 
Relevance(A1, A2) Relevance of agent towards other agent [0, 1] 
Irrelevance(A1, A2) Irrelevance of agent towards other agent [0, 1] 
Pos_valence(A1, A2) Positive Valence of agent towards other agent [0, 1] 
Neg_valence(A1, A2) Negative Valence of agent towards other 
agent 
[0, 1]  
Involvement(A1, A2) Involvement of agent towards other agent [0, 1] 
Distance(A1, A2) Distance of agent towards other agent [0, 1] 
Inv_Dist_trade_off(A1, A2) Outcome of involvement distance trade off [0, 1] 
Use_intentions(A1, A2) Use_intentions of agent towards other agent [0, 1] 
inv_dist Weight used in calculating Involvement-
Distance Tradeoff 
[0, 1] 
factor?factor regression weight a perceived factor has for 
another perceived factor of an agent 
[-1, 1] 
ExpectedUtility(<Feature>, Agent, Goal) The expected utilities of features [-1, 1] 
ExpectedUtility(Action, Agent, Goal) The expected utilities of actions [-1, 1] 
GEU(Feature, Agent) The general expected utility of a feature  
GEU(Action, Agent The general expected utility of an action  
Facilitates(<Feature>, Agent, Goal) Belief that a feature of another agent facilitates 
a goal-state 
[-1, 1] 
Facilitates(Action, Agent, Goal) Belief that an action of another agent facilitates 
a goal-state 
[-1, 1] 
agent_bel_likelihood(Agent, Statel) Belief about the likelihood that something will 
happen 
[-1, 1] 
agent_bel_agent_responsible 
(Agent, Other_Agent, State) 
Belief that other agent is responsible for 
reaching a goal 
[-1, 1] 
agent_bel_agent_praiseworthy 
(Agent, Other_Agent ) 
Belief that other agent is praiseworthy [-1, 1] 
Action_Tendency  
(Agent, Action, Other_Agent ) 
Agents Action_Tendency for an action towards 
another agent 
[-1, 1] 
Positivity(Action) Level of positivity of an action [0, 1] 
Negativity(Action) Level of negativity of an action [0, 1] 
Expected_Satisfaction 
(Agent, Other_agent) 
Expected_Satisfaction of performing an action 
towards another agent 
[0, 1] 
Emotion(Agent, <Emotion>) Level of emotion of an agent [0, 1] 
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To increase readability, the names of the beta weights use the following acronyms: 
Variable Acronym Variable Acronym 
Good good Similarity sim 
Bad bad Dissimilarity ds 
Beautiful bea Relevance rel 
Ugly ugly Irrelevance irr 
Realistic real Positive Valence pv 
Unrealistic unr Negative Valence nv 
Aid aid Involvement inv 
Obstacle obst Distance dis 
 
Calculating perceived feature values: 
 
All formulas are in the form Perceived(<feature>, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, <feature>) * 
Designed(<feature>, A2): 
 
Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Beautiful) * Designed(Beautiful, A2) 
Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Ugly) * Designed(Ugly, A2) 
 
Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2,Realistic) * Designed(Realistic, A2) 
Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Unrealistic) * Designed(Unrealistic, A2) 
 
Perceived(Good, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2,Good) * Designed(Good, A2) 
Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Bad) * Designed(Bad, A2) 
 
Perceived(Intended_aid, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Intended_Aid) * Designed(Intended_Aid, A2) 
Perceived(Intended_obst, A1, A2) = Bias(A1, A2, Intended_Obst) * Designed(Intended_Obst, A2) 
 
Updating bias for perceiving ethics: 
 
IF  Belief(A1, goal-state, should_be_reached)= true 
AND  belief(A1, goal-state, false) 
THEN Bias(A1, A2, Good)=old_bias(A1, A2,Good) ? mf bias_ethics * old_bias(A1, A2, Good) 
 Bias(A1, A2, Bad)=old_bias(A1, A2, Bad) + mf bias_ethics * (2 - old_bias(A1, A2, Bad)) 
 
Calculating expected utilities of features and actions 
 
ExpectedUtility_feature(Feature, Agent, Goal) = Belief(facilitates(Feature, Agent, Goal)) * 
Ambition(Goal-state) 
ExpectedUtility_action(Action, Agent, Goal) = Belief(facilitates(Action, Agent, Goal)) * 
Ambition(Goal-state) 
 
Variable Meaning Range 
Desired <Emotion> Desired emotion of an agent [0, 1] 
Mood(Agent) Level of the mood of an agent [0, 1] 
F Fatalism used for calculating hope and fear [0, 1] 
Rel(Feature, Agent) Relevance of a feature of an agent [0, 1] 
Attention(Feature, Agent) Attention level for a feature of an agent [0, 1] 
mf<Factor> Modification factor that determines the speed of 
change when updating a factor 
[0, 1] 
p<Factor> Persistency factor for updating the value of a factor [0, 1] 
Decay<Factor> Decay factor for updating the value of a factor [0, 1] 
guilt_bc Belief update factor when performing cognitive 
change based on guilt 
[-1,1] 
Thresholdguilt Threshold of guilt for performing cognitive change [-1,1] 
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Calculating a General Expected Utility of a feature of an agent 
 
1. Sort all expected utilities of features in two lists: [0-->1] and [0-->-1] 
2. Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list. 
Continue until the list is finished. Do this for both the negative and the positive list. 
3. GEU(Feature, Agent) = weighed mean of the outcomes of both lists, with weights (#pos / 
#tot) for the list of positive values, and (#neg / #tot) for the list of negative values. 
 
Calculating a General Expected Utility of performing action towards an agent 
 
1. Sort all expected utilities of actions in two lists: [0-->1] and [0-->-1] 
2. Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list. 
Continue until the list is finished. Do this for both the negative and the positive list. 
3. GEU(Action, Agent) = weighed mean of the outcomes of both lists, with weights (#pos / 
#tot) for the list of positive values, and (#neg / #tot) for the list of negative values. 
 
Calculating Action_Tendencies: 
 
Action_Tendency(Action, Agent) = GEU(Action, Agent) 
 
Calculating the General Positivity and Negativity Action_Tendencies 
 
1a. Take all Action_Tendency(Action, Agent) * Positivity(Action) 
1b. Take all Action_Tendency(Action, Agent) * Negativity(Action) 
2. Sort all Action_Tendencies in two lists: [0-->1] and [0-->-1] 
3. Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list. Continue 
until the list is finished.     Do this for both the negative and the positive list. 
4a. GPAT(agent, other_agent) = weighed mean of the outcomes of the positive and the 
negative list of 1a, with weights (#pos / #tot) for the list of positive values, and (#neg / #tot) for 
the list of negative values  
4b. GNAT(agent, other_agent) = weighed mean of the outcomes of the positive and the 
negative list of 1b, with weights (#pos / #tot) for the list of positive values, and (#neg / #tot) for 
the list of negative values  
 
Calculating Similarity, Dissimilarity, Relevance, Irrelevance, Positive Valence and Negative 
Valence: 
 
Similarity(A1, A2) = 
1- ( 
sim?good * abs(Perceived(Good, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Good, A1, A1) ) +  
sim?bad * abs(Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Bad, A1, A1) ) + 
sim?bea * abs(Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A1) ) +  
sim?ugly * abs(Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Ugly, A1, A1) ) + 
sim?real * abs(Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Realistic, A1, A1) ) +  
sim?unr * abs(Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A1) ) 
Dissimilarity(A1, A2) =  
ds?good * abs(Perceived(Good, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Good, A1, A1) ) +  
ds?bad * abs(Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Bad, A1, A1) ) + 
ds?bea * abs(Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Beautiful, A1, A1) ) +  
ds?ugly * abs(Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Ugly, A1, A1) ) + 
ds?real * abs(Perceived(Realistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Realistic, A1, A1) ) +  
ds?unr * abs(Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) ? Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A1) ) 
 
Relevance(A1, A2) = 
rel?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
rel?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) + 
rel<--pos * (GATpos+1)/2 +  
rel<--neg * (GATneg+1)/2 
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Irrelevance(A1, A2) = 1 ? ( 
irr?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
irr?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) ) + 
irr<--pos * (GATpos+1)/2 +  
irr<--neg * (GATneg+1)/2 
 
Positive_Valence(A1, A2) = 
pv?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
pv?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) + 
pv<--pos * (GATpos+1)/2 +  
pv<--neg * (GATneg+1)/2 
 
Negative_Valence(A1, A2) = 
nv?good * Perceived(Good, A1, A2) + 
nv?bad * Perceived(Bad, A1, A2) + 
nv<--pos * (GATpos+1)/2 +  
nv<--neg * (GATneg+1)/2 
 
Calculating Involvement and Distance: 
 
Involvement(A1, A2) = 
inv?bea * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv?ugly * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv?real * Perceived (Realistic, A1, A2) + 
inv?unr * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
inv ?aid * Perceived(Intended_aid, A1, A2) + 
inv ?ob * Perceived(Intended_obst, A1, A2) + 
inv ?pv * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv ?nv * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) + 
inv ?ps * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?ns * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?pd * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?nd * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?pb * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?nb * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?pu * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv ?nu * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv ?rel * Relevance (A1, A2) + 
inv ?irr * Irrelevance (A1, A2) + 
inv ?rs * Relevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?is * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?rd * Relevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?id * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
inv ?rb * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?ib * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
inv ?ru * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
inv ?iu * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) 
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Distance(A1, A2) = 
dis?bea * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?ugly * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?real * Perceived (Realistic, A1, A2) + 
dis ?unr * Perceived(Unrealistic, A1, A2) + 
dis ?aid * Perceived(Intended_aid, A1, A2) + 
dis ?ob * Perceived(Intended_obst, A1, A2) + 
dis ?pv * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) + 
dis ?nv * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) +  
dis ?ps * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?ns * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?pd * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?nd * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?pb * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?nb * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?pu * Pos_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?nu * Neg_Valence (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?rel * Relevance (A1, A2) + 
dis ?irr * Irrelevance (A1, A2) + 
dis ?rs * Relevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?is * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Similarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?rd * Relevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?id * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Dissimilarity(A1, A2) + 
dis ?rb * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?ib * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived (Beautiful, A1, A2) + 
dis ?ru * Relevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) + 
dis ?iu * Irrelevance (A1, A2) * Perceived(Ugly, A1, A2) 
 
Calculating Use Intentions 
 
1. Sort all expected utilities about actions in two lists: [0-->1] and [0-->-1] 
2. Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list. 
Continue until the list is finished. Do this for both the negative and the positive list. 
3. Use_Intentions(Agent, Other_agent) = weighed mean of the outcomes of both lists, with 
weights (#pos / #tot) for the list of positive values, and (#neg / #tot) for the list of negative 
values. 
 
Calculating Involvement-Distance Tradeoff 
 
Involvement-Distance-Tradeoff(agent, other_agent) = ? * max(I, D) + (1 - ?) * (I + D) / 2 
 
Calculating Expected Satisfaction 
 
Expected_Satisfaction(Agent,Other_ Agent) =  wesidt * Involvement-Distance-Tradeoff(agent, 
other_agent) + 
wesui * Use_Intentions(Agent, Other_agent) 
 
Expected Satisfaction Action =  
wesaeu  * Action_Tendency +  
wesapos * (1 - abs(positivity ? bias_inv * Involvement(A1,A2))) +  
wesaneg * (1 - abs(negativity ? bias_distance * Distance(A1, A2))) 
 
If an agent observes something, it believs it is true 
 
IF  agent_obs_state(agent, state) == true) 
THEN agent_beliefs_state(agent, state) = 1;
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Calculating likelihood of goal-states will be accomplished: 
 
1. Sort the values in two lists: [0-->1] and [0-->-1] 
2. Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list. 
Continue until the list is finished. Do this for both the negative and the positive list. 
3. likelihood (goal-state) = weighed mean of the outcomes of both lists, with weights (#pos / 
#tot) for the list of positive values, and (#neg / #tot) for the list of negative values. 
 
Calculating beliefs that agents are responsible for reaching a goal: 
 
IF  Obs(A1, A2, performs, action) 
AND   belief(action, facilitates, goal-state) > 0 (Agent beliefs observed action facilitates goal-
state) 
THEN belief(A2, responsible, goal-state) =  old_belief  + mfbel_resp * belief(action, facilitates, goal-
state) * (1 ? old_belief) 
 
IF  Obs(A1, A2, performs, action) 
AND  belief(action, facilitates, goal-state) < 0 (Agent beliefs observed action will not facilitates 
goal-state) 
THEN Belief(A2, responsible, goal-state) =  old_belief  + mfbel_resp * belief(action, facilitates, goal-
state) * (1 + old_belief) 
 
Calculating beliefs about blameworthy and praiseworthy: 
 
IF World-state changes from false to true  
AND ambition (world-state) > 0 
THEN belief(A1, A2, praiseworthy, X)=old_belief(A1, A2, praiseworthy, X) + mf_blame * 
Belief(A2, responsible, goal-state)* ambition (goal-state) * (1- old_belief(A1, A2, 
praiseworthy, X)) 
 
IF World-state changes from false to true  
AND  ambition (world-state) < 0 
THEN  belief(A1, A2, praiseworthy, X)=old_belief(A1, A2, praiseworthy, X) + mf_blame * 
Belief(A2, responsible, goal-state)* ambition (goal-state) * (-1- old_belief(A1, A2, 
praiseworthy, X)) 
 
IF  Belief(agent, goal-state, should_be_reached)= true 
AND  world_state is false 
AND  ambition (world-state) > 0 
THEN belief(A1, A2, praiseworthy, X)=old_belief(A1, A2, praiseworthy, X) - mf_blame * 
Belief(A2, responsible, goal-state)* ambition (goal-state) * (-1- old_belief(A1, A2, 
praiseworthy, X)) 
 
IF  Belief(agent, goal-state, should_be_reached)= true 
AND  world_state is false 
AND  ambition (world-state) < 0 
THEN belief(A1, A2, praiseworthy, X)=old_belief(A1, A2, praiseworthy, X) - mf_blame * 
Belief(A2, responsible, goal-state)* ambition (goal-state) * (1- old_belief(A1, A2, 
praiseworthy, X)) 
 
Calculating Emotions: 
 
Calculating Levels for Hope and Fear: 
 
1. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
IF      F>=likelihood(goal-state)    
AND  (-0.25 * (cos( 1 / F * pi * likelihood(goal-state) ) -1.5) * ambition(goal-state) >= 0) 
THEN hope_for_goal  = -0,25*(cos(1/F *  * likelihood(goal-state)) ? 1.5) * 
ambition(goal-state) 
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IF      F>=likelihood(goal-state)    
AND  ( -0.25 * (cos( 1 / F * pi * likelihood (goal-state)) -1.5) * ambition(goal-state) < 0) 
THEN hope_for_goal  = -0,25*(cos(1/F *  * likelihood(goal-state)) ? 1.5) * 
ambition(goal-state) 
 
IF       F<likelihood(goal-state)  
AND  ( -0.25 * (cos( 1 / (1-F)* pi * (1-likelihood(goal-state)) ) -1.5) *  
ambition(goal-state) >= 0) 
THEN hope_for_goal  =-0.25*(cos(1/(1-F)* *(1-likelihood(goal-state)))-1.5)* 
ambition(goal-state) 
 
IF      F<likelihood(goal-state)  
AND  ( -0.25 *(cos( 1 / (1-F) *pi*(1-likelihood(goal-state)) ) -1.5) *  
ambition(goal-state)< 0) 
THEN hope_for_goal =-0.25*(cos(1/(1-F)* *(1-likelihood(goal-state)))-
1.5)*ambition(goal-state) 
 
2. ?????????????????????????????????????????-->1] and [0-->-1] 
3. Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list. Continue 
until the list is finished. Do this for both the negative and the positive list. 
4. Outcome positive list = Hope, abs(Outcome negative list) = Fear 
 
Calculating Joy and Distress: 
 
Based on reaching goals: 
IF World-state changes from false to true (joy and distress based on reaching goal-state) 
AND  ambition (world-state) > 0 
THEN Joy  = old_joy + mfjoy * ambition (world-state) * (1 ? old_joy) 
Distress = old_distress + mfdistress * ( -ambition (world_state) )* old_distress 
 
IF World-state changes from false to true (joy and distress based on reaching goal-state) 
AND  ambition (world-state) < 0 
THEN Joy  = old_joy + mfjoy * ambition (world-state) * old_joy 
Distress = old_distress + mfdistress *( -ambition (world_state)) * (1 - old_distress) 
 
IF World-state changes from true to false (joy and distress based on reaching goal-state) 
AND  ambition (world-state) > 0 
THEN Joy  = old_joy + mfjoy * -ambition (world_state) * old_joy 
Distress  = old_distress + mfdistress * ambition (world_state) * (1 - old_distress) 
 
IF World-state changes from true to false (joy and distress based on reaching goal-state) 
AND  ambition (world-state) < 0 
THEN joy  = old_joy + mfjoy * -ambition (world_state) * (1-old_joy) 
Distress = old_distress + mfdistress * ambition (world_state) * old_distress 
 
Based on reaching subgoals: 
A goal-state is the same as a world-state. A subgoal is a world-state that is a leads to a goal-state. To increase 
the readability of the formulas, the subgoal is called world-state, and the goal is called goal-state in the 
formulas below. 
 
IF World-state changes from false to true  
AND  ambition (world-state) > 0 
THEN Joy  = old_joy + mfjoy * bel(state, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition (goal-state) * (1-old_joy) 
Distress = old_distress + mfdistress * -bel(state, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition (goal-state) 
*  old_distress 
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IF World-state changes from false to true  
AND  ambition (world-state) < 0 
THEN Joy  = old_joy + mfjoy * bel(state, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition (goal-state) * (1-old_joy) 
 
Distress  = old_distress + mfdistress * -bel(state, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition (goal-
state) * old_distress 
 
IF World-state changes from true to false  
AND  ambition (world-state) > 0 
THEN Joy  = old_joy + mfjoy * -bel(state, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition (goal-state) * 
old_joy 
 
Distress = old_distress + mfdistress * bel(state, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition (goal-state)*  
(1 -   old_distress) 
 
IF World-state changes from true to false  
AND  ambition (world-state) < 0 
THEN Joy = old_joy + mfjoy * -bel(state, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition (goal-state) * (1-old_joy) 
 
Distress = old_distress + mfdistress * bel(state, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition (goal-state)* 
old_distress 
 
Calculating Level for Surprise: 
 
IF World-state changes from false to true 
THEN Surprise  = psuprise * old_surprise + (1 - psurprise) * (1 ? likelihood(goal-state)) 
 
If a goal-state becomes true, the level of surprise moves towards the believed unlikelihood of this goal-state 
happening: 
IF belief(agent, goal-state, false)   
AND   Belief(agent, goal-state, should_be_reached)= true 
THEN Surprise = old_surprise + mfsurprise * likelihood(goal-state) * (1 ? old_surprise) 
 
Calculating Levels of Anger and Guilt: 
 
IF  Belief(A1, goal-state, should_be_reached) = true 
AND  world-state is false 
THEN Anger_At(A1, A2) =  
old_anger_at + mfanger * (- Belief(A2, responsible, goal-state)) * Ambition(A1,  goal-state) *    
(1 - old_anger_at) 
 
Guilt(Agent) = Anger_At(A1, A1) 
 
Calculating general level of anger: 
 
1. Take all levels for anger_at, except for anger_at(A1, A1) 
2. ????????????????????????????? 
3. Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list. 
Continue until the list is finished.  
4. Anger is the outcome of step 3 
 
Aggregate emotions into overall mood: 
Mood = 1- ( 
hope *  abs(Hope ? desired(Hope) ) +  
fear *  abs(Fear ? desired(Fear) ) +  
joy *  abs(Joy ? desired(Joy) ) +  
distress *  abs(Distress ? desired(Distress) ) +  
surprise*  abs(Surprise ? desired(Surprise) ) +  
anger *  abs(Anger ? desired(Anger) ) +  
guilt *  abs(Guilt ? desired(Guilt) ) 
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Cognitive Change based on Guilt: 
If you feel guilty for not reaching a desired goal-state, either because you performed an action that inhibited it, 
or you did not perform an action that facilitated it, you can decrease your belief that the action had an 
influence on reaching the goal (this is cognitive change, a form of emotion-focused coping). 
 
If an agent blames itself (in general), and believes he performed an action that inhibits a desired Or 
facilitates an undesired goal-state, he will decrease the belief that the action influences the goal-
state: 
IF belief(A1, goal-state, false) 
AND  belief(A1, A1, praiseworthy, X) < thr_guilt 
AND  belief(A1, action, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition (goal-state) < 0 
AND  belief(A1, performed, action) = true 
THEN belief(A1, action, facilitates, goal-state) = mfguilt * old_belief (with mfguit at about 0.9) 
 
If an agent blames itself (in general), and believes he did not perform an action that inhibits a 
desired Or facilitates an undesired goal-state, he will decrease the belief that the action influences 
the goal-state: 
IF belief(A1, goal-state, false) 
AND  belief(A1, A1, praiseworthy, X) < thr_guilt 
AND  belief(A1, action, facilitates, goal-state) * ambition (goal-state) > 0 
AND  belief(A1, performed, action) = false 
THEN belief(A1, action, facilitates, goal-state) = mfguilt * old_belief (with mfguit at about 0.9) 
 
 
Calculating the Relevance of a feature of an agent: 
 
Rel (Feature, Agent) = abs( GEU(Feature, Agent) ) 
 
Attention changes according to Relevance feature: 
 
Attention(Feature, Agent) = pattention * old_value + (1 - pattention) * Rel(Feature, Agent) 
 
Updating beliefs that features cause emotions:  
 
Agents should have believes that certain features cause emotions.  Emotion(t) is an experienced level of 
emotion at a certain timepoint (so for instance, the level of joy at timepoint 5). If an agent has attention for a 
certain feature, and an emotion increases, it will increase its belief that that feature causes that emotion. 
mfbel_feat is a modification factor that represents the speed with which beliefs are updated. Dividing with ((1-
old_belief)/2) manages that the formula does not make the variable go out of range, and makes it harder to 
increase your belief if it is already very high. 
 
IF Attention(Feature) * ( Emotion(t) ? Emotion(t-1) ) >=0 
THEN Belief(Feature, causes, Emotion) = old_belief +  mfbel_feat * ( Emotion(t) ? Emotion(t-1) ) * 
Attention(Feature) * ((1 ? old_belief)/2) 
 
IF Attention(Feature) * ( Emotion(t) ? Emotion(t-1) ) <0 
THEN Belief(Feature, causes, Emotion) = old_belief +  mfbel_feat * ( Emotion(t) ? Emotion(t-1) ) * 
Attention(Feature) * ((1 + old_belief)/2) 
 
Attention level for features change according to experiences: 
 
Attention(Feature) = old_value ? Belief(Feature, causes, Emotion) * ( Emotion ? desired_Emotion)  
 
If you belief a feature causes an emotion, you will increase attention to this feature if you want to increase 
your level of emotion, and decrease attention if you want to decrease the level of emotion. 
 
Sum attention levels of an agent is normalized to 1 each round: 
 
Attention (Feature) = Attention (Feature) / (Attention(Feature)) 
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Appendix B: Parameter settings in the baseline experiment 
 
This appendix contains all parameter settings for the experiments in the paper. These are 
the parameter settings of the baseline condition. The variables that are changed in other 
experiments are mentioned in the paper. 
Table 1: All values for the regression weights 
Weight of X  on Y Value 
Good  Similarity 0.30 
Bad  Similarity 0.20 
Beautiful  Similarity 0.20 
Ugly  Similarity 0.10 
Realistic  Similarity 0.10 
Unrealistic  Similarity 0.10 
   
Good  Dissimilarity 0.20 
Bad  Dissimilarity 0.30 
Beautiful  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Ugly  Dissimilarity 0.20 
Realistic  Dissimilarity 0.10 
Unrealistic  Dissimilarity 0.10 
   
Good  Relevance 0.25 
Bad  Relevance 0.20 
Positivity  Relevance 0.30 
Negativity Relevance 0.25 
   
Good  Irrelevance 0.20 
Bad  Irrelevance 0.25 
Positivity Irrelevance 0.25 
Negativity Irrelevance 0.30 
   
Good  Positive Valence 0.40 
Bad  Positive Valence 0.02 
Positivity Positive Valence 0.55 
Negativity Positive Valence 0.03 
   
Good  Negative Valence 0.02 
Bad  Negative Valence 0.40 
Positivity Negative Valence 0.03 
Negativity Negative Valence 0.55 
   
Beautiful  Involvement 0.15 
Ugly  Involvement 0.05 
Realistic  Involvement 0.10 
Unrealistic  Involvement 0.05 
Aid  Involvement 0.15 
Obstacle  Involvement -0.10 
Positive Valence Involvement 0.55 
Negative Valence Involvement -0.15 
Positive Valence * similarity Involvement 0.12 
Negative Valence * similarity Involvement -0.15 
Positive Valence * dissimilarity Involvement -0.10 
Negative Valence * 
dissimilarity 
Involvement 0.05 
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Positive Valence * beautiful Involvement 0.07 
Negative Valence * beautiful Involvement -0.10 
Positive Valence * ugly Involvement 0.07 
Negative Valence * ugly Involvement -0.04 
Relevance  Involvement 0.15 
Irrelevance  Involvement -0.01 
Relevance * similarity Involvement 0.10 
Irrelevance * similarity Involvement 0.04 
Relevance * dissimilarity Involvement 0.03 
Irrelevance * dissimilarity Involvement -0.02 
Relevance * beautiful Involvement 0.10 
Irrelevance * beautiful Involvement 0.03 
Relevance * ugly Involvement 0.03 
Irrelevance * ugly Involvement 0.01 
   
Beautiful  Distance -0.05 
Ugly  Distance 0.15 
Realistic  Distance 0.05 
Unrealistic  Distance 0.10 
Aid  Distance -0.10 
Obstacle  Distance 0.25 
Positive Valence Distance -0.35 
Negative Valence Distance 0.40 
Positive Valence * similarity Distance -0.15 
Negative Valence * similarity Distance 0.20 
Positive Valence * dissimilarity Distance 0.08 
Negative Valence * 
dissimilarity 
Distance -0.05 
Positive Valence * beautiful Distance 0.08 
Negative Valence * beautiful Distance 0.22 
Positive Valence * ugly Distance -0.05 
Negative Valence * ugly Distance -0.04 
Relevance  Distance 0.15 
Irrelevance  Distance 0.05 
Relevance * similarity Distance -0.08 
Irrelevance * similarity Distance 0.05 
Relevance * dissimilarity Distance 0.05 
Irrelevance * dissimilarity Distance 0.02 
Relevance * beautiful Distance -0.08 
Irrelevance * beautiful Distance -0.05 
Relevance * ugly Distance 0.10 
Irrelevance * ugly Distance 0.05 
   
Inv-distance trade-off Expected satisfaction 0.8 
Use_intentions Expected satisfaction 0.2 
   
Expected Utility Expected satisfaction action 0.4 
Positivity action Expected satisfaction action 0.3 
Negativity action Expected satisfaction action 0.3 
   
hope Mood 0.15 
fear Mood 0.15
joy Mood  0.15 
distress Mood 0.15 
surprise Mood 0.10 
anger Mood 0.15 
guilt Mood 0.15 
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Table 2: Parameter settings used in the simulation experiments 
Variable name Description of Variable Value 
biasinv bias for desired involvement to show in behavior 1 
biasdis bias for desired distance to show in behavior 1 
mf_respbel Modification Factor for belief someone is responsible for 
something 
0.25 
mf_blame Modification Factor for belief someone is blameworthy / 
praiseworthy 
0.5 
F Fatalism (or pessimism) for calculating hope and fear 0.5 
mf_joy Modification factor for joy (speed with which joy is 
updated) 
0.25 
mf_distress Modification factor for distress (speed with which distress 
is updated) 
0.25 
p_surprise Persistency for surprise 0.7 
mf_surprise Modification factor of surprise 0.25 
decay_surprise Decay for surprise 0.95 
mf_anger Modification factor for anger 0.5 
decay_anger Decay for anger 0.95 
p_guilt Persistency for guilt 0.25 
decay_guilt Decay for guilt 0.95 
thr_guilt Threshold of guilt for performing cognitive change -0.8 
alpha_guilt_bc Belief update factor when performing cognitive change 
based on guilt 
0.8 
p_att Persistency for attention to feature 0.9 
mf_belief_emotion Modification factor for belief that feature causes emotion 0.25 
mf_bias_ethics Modification factor of bias on ethics 0.25 
inv_dist For involvement distance trade-off 0.5 
d_emotion Desired level of emotion of an agent 0.20 
Desired_hope Desired_emotion 0.80 
Desired_fear Desired_emotion 0.30 
Desired_joy Desired_emotion 0.90 
Desired_distress Desired_emotion 0.10 
Desired_surprise Desired_emotion 0.40 
Desired_anger Desired_emotion 0.10 
Desired_guilt Desired_emotion 0.10 
Table 3: Designed values for the features of each agent 
Agent Feature Value 
Mother Beautiful 0 
Mother Ugly 0 
Mother Good 0 
Mother Bad 0 
Mother Realistic 0 
Mother Unrealistic 0 
Father Beautiful 0 
Father Ugly 0 
Father Good 0 
Father Bad 0 
Father Realistic 0 
Father Unrealistic 0 
Daughter Beautiful 0 
Daughter Ugly 0 
Daughter Good 0
Daughter Bad 0 
Daughter Realistic 0 
Daughter Unrealistic 0 
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Table 4: Biases the agents have in perceiving features of their-selves and others 
Bias of Agent For perceiving Of Agent Value 
Mother Beautiful Mother 1 
Mother Beautiful Father 1 
Mother Beautiful Daughter 1 
Mother Ugly Mother 1 
Mother Ugly Father 1 
Mother Ugly Daughter 1 
Mother Realistic Mother 1 
Mother Realistic Father 1 
Mother Realistic Daughter 1 
Mother Unrealistic Mother 1 
Mother Unrealistic Father 1 
Mother Unrealistic Daughter 1 
Mother Good Mother 1 
Mother Good Father 1 
Mother Good Daughter 1 
Mother Bad Mother 1 
Mother Bad Father 1 
Mother Bad Daughter 1 
Mother Intended_Aid Mother 1 
Mother Intended_Aid Father 1 
Mother Intended_Aid Daughter 1 
Mother Intended_Obstacle Mother 1 
Mother Intended_Obstace Father 1 
Mother Intended_Obstacle Daughter 1 
    
Father Beautiful Mother 1 
Father Beautiful Father 1 
Father Beautiful Daughter 1 
Father Ugly Mother 1 
Father Ugly Father 1 
Father Ugly Daughter 1 
Father Realistic Mother 1 
Father Realistic Father 1 
Father Realistic Daughter 1 
Father Unrealistic Mother 1 
Father Unrealistic Father 1 
Father Unrealistic Daughter 1 
Father Good Mother 1 
Father Good Father 1 
Father Good Daughter 1 
Father Bad Mother 1 
Father Bad Father 1 
Father Bad Daughter 1 
Father Intended_Aid Mother 1 
Father Intended_Aid Father 1 
Father Intended_Aid Daughter 1 
Father Intended_Obstacle Mother 1 
Father Intended_Obstace Father 1 
Father Intended_Obstacle Daughter 1 
    
Daughter Beautiful Mother 1 
Daughter Beautiful Father 1 
Daughter Beautiful Daughter 1 
Daughter Ugly Mother 1 
Daughter Ugly Father 1 
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Daughter Ugly Daughter 1 
Daughter Realistic Mother 1 
Daughter Realistic Father 1 
Daughter Realistic Daughter 1 
Daughter Unrealistic Mother 1 
Daughter Unrealistic Father 1 
Daughter Unrealistic Daughter 1 
Daughter Good Mother 1 
Daughter Good Father 1 
Daughter Good Daughter 1 
Daughter Bad Mother 1 
Daughter Bad Father 1 
Daughter Bad Daughter 1 
Daughter Intended_Aid Mother 1 
Daughter Intended_Aid Father 1 
Daughter Intended_Aid Daughter 1 
Daughter Intended_Obstacle Mother 1 
Daughter Intended_Obstace Father 1 
Daughter Intended_Obstacle Daughter 1 
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Appendix C: Experiments 
 
Baseline Experiment: 
 
To start, an initial experiment was performed that served as a control condition for 
the remaining experiments. In this condition, all parameters were set to 0, and the biases 
in perceiving features were set to the neutral value of 1. The desired levels of emotion 
were set to 0.8 for hope, 0.3 for fear, 0.9 for joy, 0.1 for distress, 0.4 for surprise, 0.1 for 
anger and 0.1 for guilt for all agents. The positivity and negativity of actions were 
defined as can be seen in Table 1 for all agents: 
Table 1. Positivity and negativity of actions 
Action Positivity Negativity 
Allow to go to party 0.8 0.2 
Allow to go with restrictions 0.6 0.4 
Forbid to go to party 0.2 0.8 
Go to party 0.9 0.1 
 
The complete parameter settings for the baseline condition can be found in [12]. 
This led to all emotions, perceived feature values, beliefs, expected utilities, action 
tendencies and general positivity and negativity in the action tendencies being 0. 
Because all the agents were exactly the same, the perceived similarity was 1 and 
dissimilarity was 0 for all agents. For all agents, the perceived relevance was 0.28, 
irrelevance was 0.73, and positive valence as well as negative valence was 0.29. The 
perceived involvement was 0.20, and the perceived distance was 0.12, leading to an 
involvement-distance trade-off of 0.18. All use intentions were 0, together with the 
involvement-distance trade-off leading to an expected satisfaction of 0.24 for all agents. 
All expected satisfactions for going to the party with another agent were 0.38, while all 
the expected satisfactions for the other actions the agents could perform were 0.40. The 
resulting mood level for all the agents was 0.62. 
 
Experiment-1:  Mother gets angry 
 
Parameter settings: 
 
Statement Meaning 
agent_ambition(Mother, Daughter_is_safe) = 1 Mother wants her daughter to be safe 
belief(Mother, Allow_to_go_to_party, Daughter, 
facilitates, Daughter_is_safe) = -1 
Mother beliefs allowing her daughter to go 
to the party will strongly inhibit the goal of 
her daughter being safe 
agent_obs_action(Mother, Father, 
Allow_to_go_to_party, Daughter) = 1 
Mother observes the father allowing the 
daughter to go to the party at timestep 1 
agent_bel_should_be_reached(Mother, 
Daughter_is_safe) = true 
Mother beliefs her daughter should be safe 
starting from timestep 1 
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Results: 
In this experiment, the mother observes that the father allows the daughter to go to 
the party. The mother wants her daughter to be safe (ambition level set to 1) and 
believes that allowing the daughter to go to the party strongly inhibits this goal (belief 
set to -1). 
This belief leads to a negative expected utility for allowing her daughter to go to the 
party with respect to the goal of having her daughter safe, which leads to a negative 
action tendency of -0.5 for this action. This leads to the mother having negative use 
intentions towards her daughter with a level of -0.25. 
Compared to the baseline experiment, this decreases her expected satisfaction of 
performing an action towards her daughter from 0.20 to 0.18, and the expected 
satisfaction of allowing her daughter to go to the party decreases from 0.50 to 0.30. 
Because the mother observes the father allowing their daughter to go to the party, 
and she believes that this inhibits the goal of their daughter being safe, she believes the 
father is responsible for their daughter not being safe with a level of -0.25.  
Because she wants her daughter to be safe, she thinks the father is blameworthy with 
a level of -0.125, and increases her bias of perceiving the badness of the father to 1.25, 
and decreases the bias of perceiving the goodness of the father to 0.75. (However, 
because the designed values for goodness and badness were set to 0 for all agents, the 
perceived goodness and badness do not change in this experiment).  
She also gets angry at the father with a level of 0.238. Because of this, her general anger 
level is also increased, to a level of 0.119.  
 
Experiment-2:    Belief that states lead to other states 
 
Parameter settings: 
 
Statement Meaning 
agent_ambition(Daughter, Parents_are_happy) = 
1 
The daughter wants her parents to be 
happy 
agent_bel_s_facil_goal(Daughter, 
Daughter_has_fun, Parents_are_happy) = 1 
The daughter believes that if she has fun, 
this will make her parents happy 
agent_bel_s_facil_goal(Daughter, 
Daughter_is_safe, Parents_are_happy) = 1 
The daughter believes that if she is safe, 
this will make her parents happy 
 
Starting from timepoint 1, the daughter has fun 
Starting from timepoint 2, the daughter is safe 
Starting from timepoint 3, the parents are happy 
 
Results: 
In this experiment, the daughter wants her parents to be happy (ambition level set to 
1). She thinks that if she is safe and is having fun, this will make her parents feel happy 
(both states set to sub-goals of the state parents happy with value 1). 
Due to some external events, at timepoint 1 the daughter is having fun, and at 
timepoint 2 the daughter is also being safe, which results in the parents being happy at 
timepoint 3. 
At timepoint 1, because she is having fun, the daughter believes that her parents 
might become happy with a likelihood of 0.5. Because of this, she has hope for her 
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parents becoming happy with a value of 0.63, which leads to a general level of hope of 
0.31. Also, because the daughter is having fun, and none of the agents had any 
expectations that this would happen, their level of surprise increase to 0.29. This leads 
to an increase of mood to 0.64 for the parents, and to 0.69 for the daughter. 
At timepoint 2, because she is having fun and is safe, the daughter believes that her 
parents might become happy with a likelihood of 0.75. Because of this higher 
likelihood, she is pretty confident that her parents will be happy, and therefore she is not 
hoping that much anymore as before. Therefore, her hope for her parents becoming 
happy decreases to 0.38, and her general level of hope decreases to 0.19. 
Also, because the daughter is safe, and none of the agents had any expectations that 
this would happen, their level of surprise increases to 0.48. This leads to an increase of 
mood to 0.65 for the parents. Because the hope of the daughter has decreased, this 
slightly decreases her mood to 0.68. 
At timepoint 3, the parents are even more surprised with a level of 0.60 because they 
are being happy. The daughter, however, was already expecting their parents would 
become happy, so her level of surprise decreases to 0.39. Because her parents being 
happy was a desired goal of the daughter, her level of joy increases to 0.25. This 
increases her mood to a level of 0.72. 
 
Experiment-3:  Affect overrides rationality 
Parameter settings: 
 
Statement Meaning 
designed(Daughter, Good) = 1 The daughter is designed to be ethically 
good 
designed(Daughter, Beautiful) = 1 The daughter is designed to be beautiful 
designed(Daughter, Realistic) = 1 The daughter is designed to be realistic 
agent_ambition(Father, Daughter_is_safe) = 1 The father wants his daughter to be safe 
belief(Father, Forbid_to_go_to_party, Daughter, 
facilitates, Daughter_is_safe) = 1 
The father believes forbidding his daughter 
to go to the party will facilitate the goal of his 
daughter being safe 
Results: 
In this experiment, the daughter is a good, beautiful, realistic agent (features set to 
1). The father wants the daughter to be safe (ambition level set to 1), and thinks 
forbidding her to go to the party will facilitate this goal (belief set to 1). 
This leads the father to have an expected utility of 1 for forbidding his daughter to 
go to the party with respect to the goal of his daughter being safe, and an action 
tendency of 0.5 for this action. Because of this, the general positivity and negativity in 
his action tendencies are respectively 0.025 and 0.100. The father also has use intentions 
of 0.25 towards his daughter. 
Due to the changed designed features compared to the baseline condition, the 
perceived similarity and dissimilarity between the parents and the daughter are now 
both 0.40. The relevance and irrelevance of the daughter for the father change to 
respectively 0.54 and 0.51. Similarly, the positive valence and negative valence of the 
father towards the daughter change to respectively 0.55 and 0.52. 
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This leads the daughter to have a decreased involvement of 0.16 towards her 
parents. The involvement and distance of the father towards the daughter change to 0.62 
and 0.23 respectively. Because of this, the involvement-distance tradeoff of the daughter 
towards her parents decreases to 0.15, while the father increases his involvement-
distance tradeoff towards his daughter to 0.53. 
The expected satisfaction of the father for performing an action towards his daughter 
increases to 0.55. While the expected satisfaction for forbidding her daughter to go to 
the party decreases to 0.30 for the mother, the expected satisfaction of performing this 
action increases to 0.50 for the father because of the high expected utility of this action. 
However, due to the increase in involvement, the expected satisfaction of allowing his 
daughter to go to the party with restrictions increases even to 0.54. Therefore, the father 
ends up allowing his daughter to go to the party with restrictions, where rationally he 
would have chosen to forbid his daughter to go to the party, because that action had an 
expected utility of 1 for the father, while allowing the daughter to go to the party with 
restrictions had an expected utility of 0 for the father.  
 
Experiment-4: Parents disagree 
 
Parameter settings: 
 
Statement Meaning 
designed(Daughter, Beautiful) = 1 The daughter is designed to be beautiful 
agent_ambition(Mother, Daughter_has_fun) = 1 The mother wants her daughter to have 
fun 
agent_ambition(Mother, Daughter_is_safe) = 1 The mother wants her daughter to be 
safe 
agent_ambition(Father, Daughter_has_fun) = 1 The father wants her daughter to have 
fun 
agent_ambition(Father, Daughter_is_safe) = 1 The father wants her daughter to be safe 
belief(Mother, Beautiful, Daughter, facilitates, 
Daughter_is_safe) = -1 
The mother beliefs the beauty of her 
daughter inhibits the goal of her daughter 
being safe 
belief(Father, Beautiful, Daughter, facilitates, 
Daughter_has_fun) = 1 
The father beliefs the beauty of his 
daughter facilitates the goal of his 
daughter having fun 
belief(Mother, Allow_to_go_to_party, Daughter, 
facilitates, Daughter_is_safe) = -1 
The mother believes allowing her 
daughter to go to the party will inhibit the 
goal of her daughter being safe 
belief(Mother, Forbid_to_go_to_party, Daughter, 
facilitates, Daughter_is_safe) = 1 
The mother believes forbidding her 
daughter to go to the party will facilitate 
the goal of his daughter being safe 
belief(Father, Allow_to_go_to_party, Daughter, 
facilitates, Daughter_has_fun) = 1 
The father believes allowing his daughter 
to go to the party will facilitate the goal of 
his daughter having fun 
belief(Father, Forbid_to_go_to_party, Daughter, 
facilitates, Daughter_has_fun) = -1 
The father believes forbidding his 
daughter to go to the party will inhibit the 
goal of his daughter having fun 
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agent_bel_should_be_reached(Father, 
Daughter_has_fun) = true 
Father beliefs his daughter should be 
having fun starting from timestep 2 
 
Results: 
In this experiment, the daughter is designed to be a beautiful agent (designed value 
set to 1). Compared to the baseline experiment, this leads both the parents to increase 
their attention to the beauty of their daughter, with a value of 0.22, and therefore slightly 
decrease their attention to other features in the world. 
The parents want their daughter to have fun and to be safe (ambition level set to 1). 
The mother beliefs that her daughter being beautiful inhibits the goal of her daughter 
being safe (value set to -1), while the father beliefs this facilitates the goal of the 
daughter having fun (value set to 1). This leads the mother to perceive an expected 
utility of -1 for the beauty of her daughter regarding her daughter being safe, and a 
general expected utility of -0.5 for her beauty. The father, however, perceives an 
expected utility of 1 for the beauty of his daughter regarding the goal of his daughter 
having fun, and a general expected utility of 0.5 for her beauty. 
Further, the mother beliefs that allowing her daughter to go to the party inhibits the 
goal of her daughter being safe (value set to -1), and forbidding her to go to the party 
facilitates her daughter being safe. The father beliefs, however, that allowing his 
daughter to go to the party facilitates the goal of the daughter having fun (value set to 
1), and forbidding her to go to the party inhibits the goal of the daughter having fun 
(value set to -1).  
This leads the mother to have an expected utility of -1 for allowing the daughter to 
go to the party regarding her safety, and generates an action tendency of -0.5 for this 
action. She has an expected utility of 1 for forbidding her daughter to go to the party 
regarding her safety, and generates an action tendency of 0.5 for this action. For the 
father, however, this leads to an expected utility of 1 for allowing his daughter to go to 
the party regarding her having fun, and generates an action tendency of 0.5 for this 
action. It also generates an expected utility of -1 for forbidding his daughter to go to the 
party regarding his daughter having fu, and he generates an action tendency of -0.5 for 
this action. This leads both the parents to have a general positivity in action tendencies 
of 0.125, and a general negativity in action tendencies of -0.125. 
Because the parents perceive their daughter as beautiful and themselves not, 
compared to the baseline experiment, their perceived similarity with the daughter 
decreases to 0.80, and the perceived dissimilarity increases to 0.10. This is also 
increases their perceived positive valence of their daughter to 0.32, and decreases their 
perceived negative valence of their daughter to 0.26. This increases their involvement 
with their daughter to 0.41, and decreases their distance to 0.06. This leads both the 
parents to have an involvement-distance tradeoff of 0.33 towards their daughter. The 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? -0.17 and the father has a value of 0.17 
for these use intentions. This leads the mother to have an expected satisfaction of 0.34 
for interacting with her daughter, and for the father this expected satisfaction of 0.38. 
Compared to the baseline experiment, the mother decreases her expected satisfaction 
of allowing the daughter to go to the party to 0.24, and increases her expected 
satisfaction of forbidding the daughter to go to the party to 0.51. The father increases his 
expected satisfaction of allowing the daughter to go to the party to 0.64, and decreases 
his expected satisfaction of forbidding the daughter to go to the party to 0.11. The 
expected satisfactions of the other two possible actions to perform to their daughter 
inserted in the system increase to 0.44 for both the parents.  
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This leads the mother to forbid her daughter to go to the party, and the father to 
allow his daughter to go to the party. Therefore, the mother beliefs the father is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-0.25), while she holds herself 
responsible for facilitating this goal (value = 0.25). The father, on his turn, holds the 
mother responsible for inhibiting the goal of their daughter having fun (value = -0.25), 
while he holds himself responsible for facilitating this goal (value = 0.25).  
Because the parents both keep performing the same action, the next timestep these 
values are increased to 0.44 and -0.44. Further, because the father beliefs the daughter 
should be having fun starting from this timepoint, while this is not the case, he blames 
the mother for keeping their daughter from having fun with a value of -0.11, while he 
praises himself for trying to make his daughter have fun with a value of 0.11. Because 
of this, he gets a bit angry at the mother, with a value of 0.10, and his general level of 
anger increases to 0.05. 
Further, because he focuses relatively much of his attention to the beauty of his 
daughter while increasing his level of anger, the father increases the belief that beauty 
causes anger to 0.002, while this belief is only increased to 0.0006 for the other features. 
 
Experiment-5: Father performs cognitive change 
 
Parameter settings: 
 
Statement Meaning 
designed(Daughter, Beautiful) = 1 The daughter is designed to be 
beautiful 
agent_ambition(Mother, Daughter_has_fun) = 1 The mother wants her daughter to 
have fun 
agent_ambition(Mother, Daughter_is_safe) = 1 The mother wants her daughter to 
be safe 
agent_ambition(Father, Daughter_has_fun) = 1 The father wants her daughter to 
have fun 
agent_ambition(Father, Daughter_is_safe) = 1 The father wants her daughter to be 
safe 
belief(Mother, Beautiful, Daughter, facilitates, 
Daughter_is_safe) = -1 
The mother beliefs the beauty of her 
daughter inhibits the goal of her 
daughter being safe 
 
belief(Father, Beautiful, Daughter, facilitates, 
Daughter_has_fun) = 1 
The father beliefs the beauty of his 
daughter facilitates the goal of his 
daughter having fun 
belief(Mother, Allow_to_go_to_party, Daughter, 
facilitates, Daughter_is_safe) = -1 
The mother believes allowing her 
daughter to go to the party will 
inhibit the goal of her daughter 
being safe 
belief(Mother, Forbid_to_go_to_party, Daughter, 
facilitates, Daughter_is_safe) = 1 
The mother believes forbidding her 
daughter to go to the party will 
facilitate the goal of his daughter 
being safe 
belief(Father, Allow_to_go_to_party, Daughter, The father believes allowing his 
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facilitates, Daughter_has_fun) = 1 daughter to go to the party will 
facilitate the goal of his daughter 
having fun 
belief(Father, Allow_to_go_to_party_with_restrictions, 
Daughter, facilitates, Daughter_has_fun) = 1  
belief(Father, Allow_to_go_to_party_with_restrictions, 
Daughter, facilitates, Daughter_is_safe) = 1 
The father believes allowing his 
daughter to go to the party with 
some restrictions will facilitate the 
goal of his daughter having fun as 
well as his daughter being safe. 
 
belief(Father, Forbid_to_go_to_party, Daughter, 
facilitates, Daughter_has_fun) = -1 
The father believes forbidding his 
daughter to go to the party will 
inhibit the goal of his daughter 
having fun 
threshold_guilt = -0.1 The threshold for blameworthiness 
of self to perform cognitive change 
is set to -0.1 
agent_bel_should_be_reached(Mother, 
Daughter_has_fun) = true 
Mother beliefs her daughter should 
be having fun at timestep 2 
agent_bel_should_be_reached(Father, 
Daughter_has_fun) = true 
Father beliefs his daughter should 
be having fun starting from timestep 
2 
 
Results: 
This experiment uses the same parameter settings as experiment 4. Only now, the 
father beliefs that allowing their daughter to go to the party facilitates all goals inserted 
in the system. This leads the father to have an expected utility of 1 for allowing the 
daughter to go to the party with some restrictions regarding both the goals of the 
daughter having fun and being safe. Therefore, he generates an action tendency of 0.75 
for this action. This increases his general positivity in action tendencies to 0.25. This 
increases his perceived relevance towards the daughter to 0.30, and decreases his 
perceived irrelevance towards her to 0.71. Further, it increases his perceived positive 
valence of his daughter to 0.36. 
This increases his involvement with his daughter to 0.44, and decreases his distance 
towards her to 0.05. This causes an increase of involvement distance trade-off to the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ased to 0.36. This leads to an 
expected satisfaction of 0.41 for interacting with his daughter. 
Compared to experiment 4, the father increases his expected satisfaction of allowing 
his daughter to go to the party to 0.75, and performs this action. This causes him to 
belief he is responsible for facilitating all goals inserted in the system (value = 0.25). 
Also, the mother does not see him anymore as inhibiting their daughter having fun, 
because she does not have any beliefs about allowing the daughter to go to the party 
with some restrictions.  
Because he keeps performing the same action, the next timestep these values are 
increased to 0.44. Further, because the father beliefs the daughter should be having fun 
starting from this timepoint, while this is not the case, and he did not allow her to go to 
the party without restrictions while he also believed this would facilitate the daughter 
having fun, as an emotion regulation strategy he decreases the belief that allowing his 
daughter to go to the party without restrictions would have led to the daughter having 
fun to 0.8. 
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Abstract. A classical debate in economics addresses the advantages and 
drawbacks of modeling from a macroeconomics perspective as opposed to 
modeling from a microeconomics perspective. Form the latter psychological 
aspects at an individual level can be taken into account in a differentiated manner. 
Within computer science and AI, a similar debate exists about the differences 
between agent-based and population-based modeling. This paper aligns both 
debates by exploring the differences and commonalities between population-based 
and agent-based modeling in economical context. A case study is performed on 
the interplay between individual greed as a psychological concept and global 
economical concepts. It is shown that under certain conditions agent-based and 
population-based simulations show similar results. 
Keywords: economics, greed, agent-based and population-based modeling. 
1   Introduction 
Traditionally, macroeconomics addresses the behavior of a world-wide, national or 
regional economy as a whole [3], whereas microeconomics investigates the economic 
behavior and decision making of individual agents, for example, consumers, households 
or firms [11]. Since the latter aims to understand why and how agents make certain 
economic decisions, various social, cognitive, and emotional factors of human behavior 
are studied. This has resulted in the emergence of the field of behavioral economics 
[14]. Although this may be very useful when one wants to analyze the behavior of 
individual agents, there is some debate about the extent to which it is useful to 
incorporate these aspects when studying global processes in economics, e.g., [5]. Do 
personal factors such as risk avoidance, greed, and personal circumstances provide more 
insight in the global patterns, or can they simply be ignored or treated in a more 
abstract, aggregated manner? This paper provides some answers to these questions from 
a computational perspective.  
In recent years, various authors have studied processes in economics by building 
computational models of them, and analyzing the dynamics of these models using 
agent-based simulation techniques [15]. Ironically, also in the area of agent-based 
modeling, a debate exists about the pros and cons of two perspectives, namely agent-
based and population-based modeling. Agent-based models are often assumed to 
produce more detailed, faithful behavior, whereas population-based models abstract 
from such details to focus on global patterns (e.g., [2], [7], and [9]).  
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Given these similarities between the debate between macro- and microeconomics on 
the one hand, and the debate between population-based and agent-based modeling on 
the other hand, it makes sense to align the two debates. Hence, the goal of the current 
paper is to explore the differences and commonalities between population-based and 
agent-based modeling in an economical context. This will be done via a case study on 
the interplay between individual greed and the global economy. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the existing debate between agent-
based and population-based modeling is briefly explained. In Section 3, both an agent-
based and a population-based model are introduced for the example domain. In Section 
4, a number of simulation results of both models are shown, and the similarities are 
discussed. Next, Section 5 provides a mathematical analysis on the models. Section 6 
concludes the paper with a discussion. 
2   Agent-Based versus Population-Based Modeling  
The classical approaches to simulation of processes in which larger groups of agents are 
involved are population-based: a number of groups are distinguished (populations) and 
each of these populations is represented by a numerical variable indicating their number 
or density (within a given area) at a certain time point. The simulation model takes the 
form of a system of difference or differential equations expressing temporal 
relationships for the dynamics of these variables. Well-known classical examples of 
such population-based models address ecological processes, for example, predator-prey 
dynamics (e.g., [6], [12], [13] and [16]), and the dynamics of epidemics (e.g., [1], [6], 
and [8]). Such models can be studied by simulation and by using analysis techniques 
from mathematics and dynamical systems theory. 
From the more recently developed agent system area it is often taken as a 
presupposition that simulations based on individual agents are a more natural or faithful 
way of modeling, and thus will provide better results (e.g.,  [2] and [7]). Although for 
larger numbers of agents such agent-based approaches are more expensive 
computationally than population-based approaches, such a presupposition may provide 
a justification of preferring their use over population-based approaches, in spite of the 
computational disadvantages. In other words, they are justified because the results are 
expected to deviate from the results of population-based simulation, and are considered 
more realistic. However, in contrast there is another silent assumption sometimes made, 
namely that for larger numbers of agents (in the limit), agent-based simulations 
approximate population-based simulations. This would indicate that for larger numbers 
of agents agent-based simulation just can be replaced by population-based simulation, 
which would weaken the justification for agent-based simulation discussed above. In, 
e.g., ([4; 9]), these considerations are explored for the domains of epidemics and crime 
displacement, respectively. The results put forward in these papers reveal several 
commonalities between both types of simulation, but also some differences. For 
example, for some specific parameter settings (concerning population size and 
rationality of the individual agents, among others), the results of population-based 
simulation seem to approximate those of agent-based simulation, whereas for other 
situations some differences can be observed. Furthermore, as could be expected, the 
computation time of the populations-based simulations is shown to be much lower than 
that of the agent-based simulation.  
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In the next sections, similar issues are explored, but this time for a domain within 
economics. Comparative simulation experiments have been conducted based on 
different simulation models, both agent-based and population-based. 
3   The Agent-Based and Population-Based Simulation Model 
In this section, the two simulation models are introduced. First, an agent-based 
perspective is taken. The main idea behind this model is that the state of the global 
(world) economy influences the level of greed of the individual agents in the population, 
which is supposed to relate to the risk level of their investment decisions: in case the 
economic situation is positive, then people are tempted to take more risk. Moreover, the 
investment decisions of the individual agents in turn influence the global economy: in 
case agents become too greedy [10], this is assumed to have a negative impact on the 
economic situation, for example, due to higher numbers of bankruptcy. In addition, the 
state of the economy is assumed to be influenced by technological development which 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the global economy is modeled as a dynamical system, in a way that has some similarity 
to predator-prey models in two variations: agent-based, where each agent has its own 
greed level, and population-based, where only an average greed level of the whole 
population is considered.  
 The agent-based model assumes n heterogeneous agents, which all interact within a 
certain economy. For each agent k, the individual greed is represented using a variable 
yk, and the global economic situation is represented using a variable x. The complete set 
of variables and parameters used in the model is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Variables and parameters used in the agent-based model 
Variables x World economy 
 y(1), ..., y(n) Greed of individual agents 
 z Average greed of the agents (i.e., arithmetic mean of all y(k)) 
 TD Technological development level 
Parameters a Growth rate of the economy 
 b Decrease rate of the economy due to average greed 
 c1, ..., cn ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 e1, ..., en ????????????????????????????????? 
 inn Innovation rate 
 
Based on these concepts, a system of difference equations was designed that consists 
of n+3 formulae; here (2) specifies a collection of n equations for each of the n agents, 
where each agent has its individual values for y(k), ck and ek: 
 
 (1) Updating the world economy 
xnew = xold + (a*xold - b*xold* zold?????? 
 
 (2) Updating the greed of the agents 
y(k)new = y
(k)
old + (ck*b* xold*y
(k)
old *(2-y
(k)
old) / TDold - ek*y
(k)
old??????????(for all agents k) 
 
 (3) Updating the technological development 
TDnew = TDold + inn* TDold ??? 
 
 (4) Aggregating greed 
zold = ( k  y
(k)
old)/n 
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Table 2. Variables and parameters used in the population-based model 
Variables x World economy 
y Average greed of the population 
TD Technological development level 
Parameters a Growth rate of the economy 
b Decrease rate of the economy due to population greed 
c Growth rate of the population greed based on the economy 
e Decrease rate of the population greed 
inn Innovation rate 
 
The population-based dynamical model is similar to the agent-based model, but the 
difference is that it abstracts from the differences of the individual agents. This is done 
by replacing the average greed z over all y(k) in formula (1) by one single variable y 
indicating the greed of the population as a whole, and using a single formula (2), which 
is only applied at the population level, in contrast to the collection of formulae (2) in the 
agent-based model, which are applied for all agents separately. The resulting 
population-based model is shown in Table 2 and in the formulae below. 
 
 (1) Updating world economy 
xnew = xold + (a*xold - b*xold* yold?????? 
 
 (2) Updating the greed of the population 
ynew = yold + (c*b* xold*yold *(2-yold) / TDold - e*yold?????? 
 
 (3) Updating the technological development 
TDnew = TDold + inn* TDold ??? 
 
Note that in differential equation format the agent-based and population-based 
dynamical model can be expressed by n+2, respectively 3 differential equations as 
shown in Table 3. Moreover, as the innovation rate inn is assumed constant over time, 
for both cases the differential equation for TD can be solved analytically with solution 
TD(t) = TD(0) einn t. 
Table 3. The two models expressed by n+2, respectively 3 differential equations 
Agent-based model Population-based model 
dx/dt  = ax - bxz  
d y(k) /dt  = (ckb xy(k)(2- y(k)) / TD) - ek y(k)     
dTD/dt  = inn TD  
z = ( k  y(k) )/n 
dx/dt = ax - bxy 
dy/dt =( cb xy(2-y) / TD ) - ey 
dTD/dt = inn TD 
 
4   Simulation Results 
Based on the model introduced above, a number of simulation experiments have been 
performed under different parameter settings (with population size varying from 2 to 
400 agents), both for the agent-based and for the population-based case. Below, a 
number of them are described. First an agent-based simulation experiment is described. 
In this first experiment, 25 agents were involved. The initial settings used for the 
variables and parameters involved in the experiment are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Initial settings for variables and parameters 
Parameter Value Variable Initial value 
a 1.5 x 5 
b 5.8 y random in [0.2, 0.3] 
c random in [0.0260, 0.0274] TD 1 
e random in [ 0.85, 0.89]   
inn 0.01 t 0.1 
 
The results of the simulations are shown in Figure 1a and 1b. In Figure 1a, time is on 
the horizontal axis and the value of the world economy is represented on the vertical 
axis. It is evident from the graph that the economy grows as time increases (but 
fluctuating continuously). Figure 1b shows the individual greed values of all 25 agents. 
As can be seen they fluctuate within a bandwidth of about 25% with lowest points 
between about 0.1 and 0.15, and highest points around 0.45. The pattern of the average 
greed over all 25 agents is shown in Figure 1c.  
For the population-based simulation, all the parameter settings are the same as in 
Table 4, except parameters y, c and e. The values for parameters y, c and e used in the 
population-based simulation were determined on the basis of the settings for the agent-
based simulations by taking the average y, c and e for all fifty agents: 
y = ( k yk )/n  c = ( k ck )/n   e = ( k ek )/n 
The results of the population-based simulations are shown in Figure 2a (economy) 
and 2b (greed). As can be seen from these figures, the results approximate the results for 
the agent-based simulation. The difference of the world economy for the population-
based and agent-based simulation (averaged over all time points) turns out to be 0.112, 
and the difference between the average greed of the 25 agents in the agent-based 
simulation and the greed for the population-based simulation is 0.005.  
In addition, a number of simulation runs have been performed for other population 
sizes. Figure 3a displays the (maximum and average) difference between the world 
economy in the agent-based model and the world economy in the population-based 
model for various population sizes. Similarly, Figure 3b displays the difference between 
the average greed in the agent-based model and the greed in the population-based model 
for various population sizes. The red line indicates the maximum value and the blue line 
the average value over all time points. As the figures indicate, all differences 
approximate a value that is close to 0 as the population size increases. Although the 
results of these particular simulation experiments should not be over-generalized, this is 
a first indication that for higher numbers of agents, the results of the agent-based model 
can be approximated by those of the population -based model. 
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Fig. 1. Agent-based simulation results: 
a) world economy, b) individual greed of 25 agents, and c) average greed (over 25 agents) 
 
Fig. 2. Population-based simulation results: a) world economy, and b) greed 
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Fig. 3. Difference between both models for various population sizes:  
a) world economy, and b) greed 
5   Mathematical Analysis 
In this section a mathematical analysis is presented concerning the conditions under 
which partial or full equilibria occur; it is assumed that the parameters a, b, c and e are 
nonzero. For an overview of the equilibria results, see Table 5. 
Dynamics of the economy The economy grows when dx/dt > 0 and shrinks when dx/dt 
< 0; it is in equilibrium when dx/dt = 0.  Assuming x nonzero, according to equation (1) 
for the population-based model, this can be related to the value of the greed as follows 
     economy grows                dx/dt > 0   ax - bxy > 0    a - by > 0    y < a/b 
     economy shrinks           dx/dt < 0   ax - bxy < 0    a - by < 0    y > a/b 
     economy in equilibrium          dx/dt = 0   ax - bxy = 0    a - by = 0    y = a/b 
So, as soon as the greed exceeds a/b the economy will shrink (for example, due to too 
many bankruptcies), until the greed has gone below this value. This indeed can be 
observed in the simulation traces. For the agent-based model similar criteria can be 
derived, but then relating to the average greed z instead of y. 
Full Equilibria for the Population-Based Model The first issue to be analyzed is 
whether (nonzero) equilibria exist for the whole population-based model, and if so, 
under which conditions. This can be analyzed by considering that x, y and TD are 
constant and nonzero. For x constant above it was derived from (1) that the criterion is y 
= a/b. For TD constant the criterion is inn = 0 as immediately follows from (3). The 
criterion for dy/dt = 0 can be derived from (2) as follows 
     dy/dt = (cbxy(2-y) / TD - ey) = 0    cbx (2-y) / TD = e   x = (e / ((2b-a) c)) TD 
This provides the conditions for a full equilibrium 
0
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(1) y = a /b  (2) x = (e / ((2b-a) c)) TD  (3) inn = 0 
It turns out that for any nonzero setting for the parameters a, b, c and e and for setting 
inn = 0 for the innovation parameter and for any value of TD a nontrivial equilibrium is 
(only) possible with values as indicated above. Note that this shows that for inn nonzero 
a nontrivial full equilibrium is not possible, as TD will change over time. However, 
partial equilibria for greed still may be possible. This will be analyzed next 
Equilibria for greed in the population-based model Suppose that the innovation inn 
is nonzero. In this case it cannot be expected that technological development TD and 
economy x stay at constant nonzero values. However still for the greed variable y an 
equilibrium may exist. From the second equation (2) by putting dy/dt = 0 it follows  
cbx (2-y) / TD = e   x =  TD      with  = e / cb (2-y) 
By filling this in differential equation (1) it follows 
d  TD /dt  = a  TD - b  TD y  d TD /dt  = (a - by) TD   
By differential equation (3) it can be derived 
d TD /dt  = (a - by) TD  = inn TD     (a - by) = inn     y = (a ?inn)/b  
Note that for inn = 0 this also includes the result for the full equilibrium obtained 
earlier. Moreover, as the equation for TD can be solved analytically, and x =  TD, also 
an explicit solution for x can be obtained: 
TD(t) = TD(0) einn t              x(t) =  TD(t) =  TD(0) einn t = x(0) einn t 
Here  can be expressed in the parameters as follows: 
 = e / cb (2-y) = e / cb (2-(a ?inn)/b) =  (e / c) / (2b - a +inn)  
This shows that according to the model greed can be in an equilibrium y = (a ?inn)/b, in 
which case the economy shows a monotonic exponential growth. 
Full Equilibria for the agent-based model  Similar to the approach followed above: 
(1) dx/dt  = (ax - bxz) = 0 
(2) d y(k) /dt  = (ckbx y(k) (2- y(k)) / TD - ek y(k)) = 0    (for all agents k) 
(3) dTD/dt  = inn TD = 0 
(4) z = ( k  y
(k) )/n 
 A full equilibrium can be expressed by the following equilibria equations: 
(1) ax = bxz  (2)  ckbx y
(k) (2- y(k)) / TD = ek y
(k)       
(3) inn TD = 0 (4)  z =  ( k  y
(k) )/n 
It is assumed that a, b, ck and ek are nonzero. One trivial solution is x = y(k) = 0. 
Assuming that x, y(k) and TD all are nonzero, the equations (1) to (3) are simplified: 
       (1)  a = bz (2)  ckbx (2- y
(k)) / TD = ek        (3)  inn = 0 (4)   z = ( k
  y(k) )/n 
This provides  
       (1)  z = a /b (2)  y(k
) = 2- ek TD/(ckbx)           (3)  inn = 0 (4)   z = ( k  y
(k) )/n 
From the second, first and last equation it follows that 
a /b = ( k  y(k) )/n = ( k  (2- ek TD/(ckbx) ) )/n  = 2 - k  (ek TD/(ckbx) ) /n =  
2 ? (TD/bx) ( k  (ek /ck) )/n     x = TD k  (ek /ck) / (2b ? a)n 
From this the values for the y(j) can be determined: 
y(j) = 2- ej TD/(cjbx) = 2- ej TD/(cjb TD k  (ek /ck) / (2b ? a)n) 
= 2- ej /(cjb k  (ek /ck) / (2b ? a)n) = 2- ej(2b ? a)n /(cjb k  (ek /ck) ) 
= 2- ej(2 ? (a/b))n /(cj k  (ek /ck) ) = 2- (2 ? (a/b))n /( k  (ek / ej )(cj / ck) ) 
It turns out that for any nonzero setting for the parameters a, b, ck and ek and for setting 
inn = 0 for the innovation parameter, and for any value of TD a nontrivial equilibrium is 
(only) possible with values as indicated above. 
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Equilibria for greed for the agent-based model From the second equation  ckbx (2-
y(k)) / TD = ek    with y(k)  constant it follows that x = k TD with k the constant k = ek 
/ ck b (2-y
(k)) which aparantly does not depend on k, as both x and TD do not depend on 
k, so the subscript in k can be left out. Filling this in (1) provides: 
d  TD/dt  = (a  TD - b  TD z)     d TD/dt  = (a - bz) TD   
By differential equation (3) it can be derived 
dTD/dt  = (a - bz) TD  = inn TD   (a - bz) = inn    z = (a ?inn)/b  
Now the equilibrium values for y(j) can be determined as follows.  
 = ek / ck b (2-y
(k))    2-y(k) = ek /  ck b    y
(k) = 2- ek / ck b 
Next the value of  is determined z = ( k y
(k) )/n = k (2- ek / ck b)/n  = 2- (1/ bn) k ek 
/ ck . Since  z =  (a ?inn)/b it follows 
(a ?inn)/b = 2- (1/ bn) k ek / ck    (1/n ) k ek / ck = 2b- (a ?inn)   
k ek / ck = (2b- (a ?inn)) n       = k (ek / ck )/ (2b- (a ?inn))n 
Given this value for  the equilibrium values for the greed y(j) are 
y(j) = 2- ej / cj b = 2- ej / b cj k (ek / ck) / (2b- (a ?inn))n 
= 2- (2- (a - inn ) /b)  n /  k (ek cj / ej ck ) 
Table 5. Overview of the equilibria of the two models 
 Agent-based model Population-based model 
Full 
equilibrium 
inn = 0 
x =(1/(2b ? a)) ( k  (ek /ck) / n) TD 
z = a /b 
y(j) = 2- (2 ? (a/b)) n  /  k  (ek / ej )(cj / ck)  
inn = 0 
x = (1/(2b-a))( e /c)) TD 
y = a/b 
 
Partial 
equilibrium 
for 
greed 
TD(t) = TD(0) einn t 
x(t) =(1/(2b- a +inn)) ( k (ek /ck )/ n)  TD(0) einn t 
z = (a ?inn)/b  
y(j) =2- (2- ((a - inn ) /b)) n /  k (ek / ej )(cj / ck) 
TD(t) = TD(0) einn t 
x(t) =(1 /(2b - a +inn)) (e / c) TD(0) einn t  
y = (a ?inn)/b  
6  Discussion 
This paper discusses similarities and dissimilarities between agent-based models and 
population-based models in behavioral economics. Inspired by variants of predator prey 
models (e.g., [6], [12], [13], and [16]), a dynamic behavioral economical model was 
?????????? ???? ???? ????????????? ???????? ??????????? ???????? ?????? ???? ???? ???????
economy. Simulation experiments for different population sizes were performed for 
both an agent-based and a population-based model. For both cases the results show that 
the world economy grows in a fluctuating manner over time and the average greed of 
the agents fluctuates between 0.1 and 0.45. A mathematical analysis was performed for 
both, showing the conditions under which equilibria occur. 
It turned out that, in particular for large population sizes, the differences in the 
economy and average greed between agent-based and population based simulations are 
close to zero. In different domains, in [4] and [9], under certain conditions similar 
results were obtained. In literature on agent-based simulation such as in (e.g., [2] and 
[7]), it is argued that although agent-based modeling approaches are more expensive 
computationally than population-based modeling approaches, they are preferable due to 
more accuracy. In contrast to this, the results in the current paper indicate that for the 
considered domain the agent-based approaches can be closely approximated by 
population-based simulations. On the other hand, for cases with a rather small number n 
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of agents the population-based approach may be inadequate. This may raise the question 
whether a more differentiated point of view in the debate can be considered, namely that 
for numbers of n agents exceeding a certain N, population-based models are as adequate 
as agent-based models, whereas for n < N agent-based models are more adequate. A 
challenge may be to determine this number N for different cases. 
For future work, more differentiated personality aspects will be included in the agent 
model, concerning risk profile and emotions (e.g., feeling insecure) involved, depending 
upon which decisions are made for the investment (in banking products or stock 
market). A further aim is to develop a web-based business application incorporating a 
virtual agent that will interact with a client and regulate the emotions. 
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Abstract. In the area of modeling financial decision making within economics it 
is more and more acknowledged that psychological states and personality 
characteristics play an important role. Examples of such states are feeling insecure 
in relation to financial risks, and being greedy in relation to opportunities to obtain 
serious gains. This paper presents an agent-based model of human decision 
making behavior in economic situations, based on such psychological states and 
characteristics. The model takes ideas underlying the Modern Portfolio Theory 
within economics into account, and incorporates psychological concepts like 
greed and a personality characteristic concerning risk. Thus a model is obtained 
that may provide a basis for the development of personalized intelligent agents 
that support a person in financial decisions. To evaluate the model a number of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ty 
to mimic investment behavior of different types of personalities. In addition, a 
mathematical analysis of equilibrium states of the model is presented. 
1   Introduction 
Financial decision making is not a trivial task for human beings. Already in 
1979, Kahneman and Tversky [5] stated that people do not behave completely 
rationally when they have to decide between alternatives that involve risk, as, for 
example, in financial situations. Since then from time to time it has been argued 
that theories of economic decision making need to incorporate psychological 
factors such as greed and fear [3, 9, 11, 13]. 
The current paper is part of a project that aims to develop a personalized 
intelligent agent which supports persons that have to make investment decisions. 
The main goal of the project is to develop an agent that has insight in the 
individual psychological states and characteristics of persons that are working 
with financial applications, and is able to exploit this insight in order to provide 
appropriate support, both in following these states and characteristics in a 
personalized manner, and in encouraging reflection by the person through 
mirroring his or her states and decision making processes. For example, the agent 
may show the person how greedy he or she behaves. 
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In order to develop such a support agent, as a first step, a solid computational 
model of human decision making in financial context is needed. The 
development of such a model is the main contribution of the current paper. The 
model takes the main principles underlying the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) 
[4, 12] as a basis, and extends these with mechanisms to incorporate 
psychological factors (inspired, among others, by [2, 6, 8, 9, 11]). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, a global 
overview of the agent model for economic decision making is presented. In 
Section 3, this model is formalized in terms of mathematical formulae. Some 
simulations of the model are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 presents a 
mathematical analysis of equilibrium states of the model. Finally, Section 6 
provides a summary of the work and a discussion about future research. 
2   Overview of the Agent Model 
A global overview of the agent model for financial decision making and its interaction 
with the world is depicted in Figure 1. In this figure, the dotted boxes represent, from 
left to right, the human agent that makes the investment decisions, and the world. The 
small circles denote states of human and world. Note the difference between input states 
(depicted at the left hand side of a box), internal states (depicted within the box), and 
output states (depicted at the right hand side). The arrows indicate (causal) relationships 
between states. 
As shown in Figure 1, the agent model includes a notion of greed as a mental state of 
an individual. This greed is assumed to be a dynamic state, which is continuously 
influenced by two other concepts, namely the observed results of investments and the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
considered to be the result of (dynamic) real world investments, depending, among 
??????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????? ???????? ??r the moment the latter is 
assumed to be a static characteristic of an individual. 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the Agent Model and its Interaction with the World. 
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term) personality profile (e.g., some persons are more risk seeking than others), 
combined with observations about recent events (e.g., if many investments have failed 
recently, persons are more likely to reduce their greed and as a consequence take less 
risk). This main idea is similar to the ideas in existing literature such as [2, 6, 8, 9, 11].  
The greed directly affects the investment decisions that the individual makes: a person 
with higher greed will decide for more risky investments. To create an appropriate 
economic context, one particular type of investment decision is considered, namely the 
task to choose a financial product characterized by two factors concerning risk and 
expected gain. Thus the set of products is represented using a standard risk/return curve 
as proposed in the literature on Modern Portfolio Theory (see Section 3 for more 
details).  
After an investment decision has been made, the selected product is transferred to the 
world, where it is determined what the result of the investment will be. As shown at the 
right hand side of Figure 1, this result depends not only on the selected product (in the 
sense that a more risky product has a lower probability to result in some return), but also 
on the economic state of the world. Thus, in case the situation of the economy becomes 
more positive, then the probability of receiving some return increases. Note that, for 
simplicity, the current model considers the economic status as an external variable, 
although in reality this variable may depend on many other factors, such as the 
economic behavior of other agents in the system (cf. [2]).  
Finally, the results of investments are in turn observed by the individual, which 
completes the interactive loop between agent and world. 
3   Formalizing the Agent Model 
In this section, the global relations presented above are formalized in terms of 
mathematical specifications. In the model 10 products are used. Individuals are able to 
choose between these products by taking two characteristics into account, namely risk 
and expected return. To create a realistic range of products, the following parabolic 
equation is used for the relation between expected risk X and expected return Y (cf. [4, 
12]): 
 
X=aY2+bY+c  
 
with a=1, b= -0.1 and c=0.1. 
 
The graph is shown in Figure 2. The idea is that more greedy persons will select 
products that are further to the right hand side of the curve. The formulae used in the 
model are as follows:  
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Figure 2. Expected Risk/Return Curve 
Updating greed 
The dynamics of greed are modeled by the following formula: 
 
G(t+ t) = G(t) +  (((p+1)/2)*E ? G(t)) t 
 
In this formula, G(t+ t) is the updated greed, G(t) is the old greed, E is the world event 
concerning the return on the earlier chosen product, and p is the individual static risk 
profile (0 means that the individual is low risk taking and 1 means the individual is high 
risk taking). The persistency factor  is the proportion of the old greed that is taken into 
account to determine the new greed. Simulation tests indicated that  = 0.1 give realistic 
results. The values of G, E and p are in the range between 0 and 1. 
Thus, the underlying idea of the formula is that people may show more greedy 
behavior if their individual risk profile is more risk taking, and if they have received 
more positive experiences in the recent past (see also [2, 6, 8, 9, 11]). 
Selecting a product 
Next, based on the greed and the personality characteristic p the person selects a 
product. As a first step the following factor r is determined: 
r = (1/G)-1 ) / (2*(p+1)) 
This r is taken as the required slope of the curve (depicted in Figure 2) for the product 
to be chosen, according to Modern Portfolio Theory. The actual choice of the product is 
made as follows. For each of the considered products (X, Y) the following is calculated: 
Z(X, Y) =Y - r*X   
Then the product (X, Y) is chosen with the highest Z(X, Y). This product is the closest 
approximation of the point at the curve with slope r. 
Determining the return 
The algorithm for calculating the return E of the investment is as follows; here W is the 
state of the world (taken between 0 and 1), and (X, Y) is the selected product: 
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1. Generate a random number C between 0 and 1 (both inclusive) 
2. IF  C   X * (1-W)  THEN E = Y 
3. IF  C < X * (1-W)  THEN E = 0 
 
This shows, for example, that when the state of the economy W is maximal, there is 
no risk to have no return, and when W is minimal this risk is with probability X. 
4   Simulation Results 
Based on the agent model introduced in the previous section, a number of simulation 
experiments have been performed under different parameter setting s of p. In Figures 
3 to 11, the time is on the horizontal axis and G, W, E and the average profit received by 
the person are represented on the vertical axis. In all the simulation experiments, the 
initial value of greed is 0.5 and  = 0.1. For every simulation the value of p is different. 
For the value of W, a scenario has been established that is based on existing empirical 
data. For these data, the global Gross Domestic Product data over the period 1969-2008 
have been taken from [16]. 
 
 
Figure 3. Simulation Results for p=0. 
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Figure 4. Simulation Results for p=0.15. 
 
 
Figure 5. Simulation Results for p=0.3. 
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Figure 6. Simulation Results for p=0.4. 
 
 
Figure 7. Simulation Results for p=0.5. 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 51 101 151 201 251 301 351 401 451
Greed
W
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 51 101 151 201 251 301 351 401 451
E
AVG-PROFIT
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 51 101 151 201 251 301 351 401 451
Greed
W
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 51 101 151 201 251 301 351 401 451
E
AVG-PROFIT
166 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Simulation Results for p=0.6. 
 
 
Figure 9. Simulation Results for p=0.7. 
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Figure 10. Simulation Results for p=0.85. 
 
 
Figure 11. Simulation Results for p=1. 
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As illustrated by these simulation, in most cases the person adapts its greed G to the 
status of the economy W. Thus, the persons quickly learn which level of greed is most 
appropriate in which situation. Only in the cases with very low p, after a while the greed 
becomes so low that the person cannot recover from that anymore (because it will never 
have very positive experiences).  
Moreover, when comparing the different graphs with each other, one can note that 
the values of the events (and thus also the average profit) are highest in the case where 
p=0.6. In cases with a higher p, the average profit slightly decreases, although not 
much.  
 
 
Figure 12. Relation between average greed and p. 
 
Figure 13. Relation between profit and p. 
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greed and average profit. In Figure 12, and Figure 13, p is on the horizontal axis and 
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then becomes more or less stable. The point where average profit is maximal lies at 
p=0.6, as also predicted based on the simulation shown in Figure 8. Hence, apparently 
this is a scenario where it is optimal to have a personal risk profile of 0.6. In other 
scenarios (e.g., with a very bad economy), other risk profiles may be more beneficial. 
5   Mathematical Analysis 
In this section a mathematical analysis of equilibrium states of the model is discussed. 
For any given fixed values of p and W, the process indeed approaches an equilibrium 
state, as was found by various example simulations. Knowledge of how these 
equilibrium states are for each pair of values for of p and W, is also useful to analyze 
functioning of the process for changing W, as after each change in W, the process will 
aim to reach an equilibrium state for this new value. 
The general setup is based on a continuous model given by the following differential 
equation for G: 
 
dG/dt =  (((p+1)/2)E - G) 
 
The products characterized by pairs (X, Y) are taken from the curve 
 
X = a Y2 + bY + c    
with    a=1     b=-0.1      c = 0.1 
 
Each time the product is chosen on this curve for which dY/dX  = r or dX/dY  =  1/r  
(according to Modern Portfolio Theory) with r=((1/G)-1)/(2(p+1)). 
 
Relation between G and the product chosen 
 
From the curve equation follows that dX/dY = 2aY + b. Therefore: 
 
2aY + b = 1/r = 2(p+1)/((1/G)-1) = 
 2(p+1)G/(1-G)= 2(p+1)G/(1-G) 
This can be used to express y in G as follows: 
 
2aY = 2(p+1)G/(1-G) - b 
 
Y = (2(p+1)G/(1-G) - b)/2a  
    = (2(p+1)G ? b(1-G))/2a(1-G)  
    = ((2p+2+b)G ? b)/2a(1-G)  
    = ((2p+1.9)G +0.1)/2(1-G)  
    = ((20p+19)G  + 1)/20(1-G) 
 
So, at each point in time 
 
Y =  ((20p+19)G  + 1)/20(1-G) 
X =  Y2 -0.1Y + 0.1 
Some special cases are: 
 
G = 0    Y =  1/20 
p = 0 Y =  (19G  + 1)/20(1-G)
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Determining an expectation value for E  
 
An equilibrium for G has to satisfy dG/dt = 0. Given the differential equation this is 
equivalent to (((p+1)/2)E = G. However, the events that are considered outcomes E 
depend on a random number C in [0, 1]: if C  X.(1-W) then E=Y, else E=0. Therefore: 
 
E = 0   with probability  X.(1-W) 
E = Y  with probability  1 - X.(1-W) 
 
From this the expectation value ExpVal(E)  for E is determined as follows: 
 
ExpVal(E) = X.(1-W) *0 + (1 - X.(1-W)) *Y   
    = (1 - X.(1-W)) Y 
 
As E itself is always fluctuating due to the randomness no real equilibrium can occur. 
Therefore, for an equilibrium analysis it is better to take the expectation value 
ExpVal(E) instead of E itself. 
 
The equilibrium equations for G 
 
An estimation for an equilibrium can be obtained when for E its expectation value is 
taken. Then the equation for dG/dt = 0 is: 
 
(((p+1)/2)*ExpVal(E) = G 
 
This can be rewritten into 
 
(((p+1)/2)* (1 - X.(1-W)) Y = G  
 
G = 0.5 Y (p+1)(1 - X.(1-W))  
 
This equation can be combined with the previous one to form the following set of 
three equilibrium equations with three unknowns: 
 
G = 0.5 Y (p+1)(1 - X.(1-W))  
X =  Y2 -0.1Y + 0.1 
Y =  ((20p+19)G  + 1)/20(1-G) 
 
An example solution obtained from simulations for p=1 and W=0 is: 
 
G = 0.226 Y = 0.265 X = 0.144 
 
Some special cases are: 
 
p = 0     G = 0.5 Y (1 - X.(1-W))  
p = 1     G = Y (1 - X.(1-W))  
W = 1    G = 0.5(p+1)Y 
p = 0   &  W = 1   G =0.5 Y 
p = 1   &  W = 1   G = Y 
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Overview of solutions of the equilibrium equations 
A large number of simulations have been performed for different values of p and W. 
The outcome of the equilibrium values for G found is shown in Figures 14 (G against p 
for different values of W) and 15 (G against W for different values of p).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Dependence of the equilibrium value of G on p for some values of W. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Dependence of the equilibrium value of G on W for some values of p. 
In Figure 14 it is shown that practically always the equilibria values for G depend on 
the basic personal characteristic p in a monotonically increasing manner; this expresses 
that the personal characteristic p indeed relates to the greed of the person, even while 
the latter is dynamic. Moreover, in Figure 15 it is shown that the equilibria values for G 
also depend on the state W of the economy in a monotonically increasing manner. This 
shows that a better economy leads to higher greed. Note, however, that for low values 
of p (from 0 to 0.3) the state W of the economy has not much impact, unless it is 
extremely high (W close to 1). 
 
Solving the equilibrium equations 
In principle, the equilibrium equations can be solved symbolically by algebraic 
manipulation in order to obtain an algebraic expression for G as a function of p and W. 
The following equation for G can be obtained: 
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(p+1)(1 - X.(1-W)) Y = 2G  
 
(p+1)(1 ? (Y2 -0.1Y + 0.1).(1-W)) Y = 2G  
 
(p+1)(1 ? ((((20p+19)G  + 1)/20(1-G))2 - 
0.1(((20p+19)G + 1)/20(1-G))+ 0.1). 
(1-W)) (((20p+19)G  + 1)/20(1-G)) = 2G 
 
(p+1)(1 ? ((((20p+19)G  + 1)2 - 
0.1(((20p+19)G  + 1) 20(1-G))+ 0.1(20(1-G))2). 
(1-W)) (((20p+19)G  + 1) = 2G (20(1-G))3 
 
Although this fourth degree equation in G can be solved symbolically to obtain G as 
a function of p and W, this is omitted as it provides a rather complex expression for G as 
a function of p and W. A second way of solving the equilibrium equations is by 
numerical approximation methods such as Newton-Raphson [7]. This can be only done 
for given values of p and W.  
A third way of solving the equilibrium equations is to derive a differential equation 
for G as a function of p. This can be done by differentiating the three equilibrium 
equations to p as follows: 
 
dG/dp = d0.5 Y (p+1)(1 - X.(1-W)) /dp 
 
d20(1-G)Y/dp = d ((20p+19)G  + 1) /dp 
 
dX/dp =  d(Y2 -0.1Y + 0.1) /dp 
 
thus obtaining: 
 
(p+1) (1 - X.(1-W)) dY/dp +  2G/(p+1) =  
2 dG/dp + (p+1) Y.(1-W) dX /dp 
 
20(1-G) dY/dp  =  (20p+ 20Y +19) dG/dp  + 20G  
 
dX/dp = (2Y ? 0.1) dY/dp 
 
Here the third equation can be used to eliminate dX/dp from the first two equations, 
providing two equations in dG/dp and dY/dp, which can be solved by expressing each of 
dG/dp and dY/dp in G, X, Y (and p and W). From these X can be easily eliminated by 
using the curve equation. The resulting two first-order differential equations for G and Y 
can be solved numerically for any given starting point. It is also possible to derive one 
single first-order differential equation for G by replacing Y by ((20p+19)G+1) / 20(1-G) 
according to the third equilibrium equation. This single differential equation can also be 
used for numerical simulation. 
6   Discussion 
This paper presents an agent-based model of human decision making behavior in 
economic situations, based on psychological states and characteristics concerning greed 
and risk taking or risk avoidance. The model takes ideas underlying the Modern 
Portfolio Theory [4, 12] within economics into account, and incorporates the 
psychological concept greed and a risk characteristic. Thus a model is obtained that may 
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provide a basis for the development of personalized intelligent agents that support a 
person in financial decisions.  
In the area of modeling financial decision making within economics it is more and 
more acknowledged that psychological states and personality characteristics play an 
important role [3, 9, 11, 13]. Examples of such states are feeling insecure in relation to 
financial risks, and being greedy in relation to opportunities to obtain serious gains. The 
proposed agent model provides a computational formalization of such concepts. 
To evaluate the model a number of simulation experiments have been performed, which 
illust????? ???????????????????? ????????? ???????????behavior depending on the types of 
personality and the state of the economy. A mathematical analysis was contributed of 
the equilibrium states of the model.  
In recent years, various authors have studied processes in economics using agent-
based simulation techniques (e.g., [2, 14, 15]. However, the current paper differences 
from these approaches in that it attempts to study the decision making behavior of a 
single agent in detail, instead of analyzing the global dynamics of a multi-agent system. 
Future work aims at validation of the model, and at development of a virtual agent 
????????? ????? ????? ??????? ???? ????????? ???????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ???? ??????? ???
indicating choices of products that fit to the person???????????????????????????????????????
mirroring these aspects and implied behavior in order to stimulate reflection by the 
person. As pointed out by various authors (e.g., [1]), virtual characters with 
personalization features can augment involvement of users in financial (e.g., banking) 
applications. 
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Abstract. This paper presents an approach to incorporate emotion regulation as 
addressed within psychology literature into virtual characters. To this end, first 
??????? ????????? ??????? ??? ???????? ??????????? has been formalized using a 
dynamical system style modeling approach. Next, a virtual environment has been 
created, involving a number of virtual agents, which have been equipped with the 
formalized model for emotion regulation. This environment has been used to 
successfully generate a number of emergent virtual stories, in which characters 
regulate their emotions by applying regulation strategies such as situation 
selection and attentional deployment. The behaviors shown in the stories were 
found consistent with descriptions of human regulation processes. 
1  Introduction 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the area of virtual storytelling, 
addressing the development of computer systems that generate fictive stories in which 
the characters show realistic behavior. In order to develop virtual stories, a large variety 
of approaches have been proposed, e.g., [4], [5], [13]. A trend that can be observed in 
many of these approaches is the movement from stories with a fixed, pre-scripted 
storyline towards emergent narrative, i.e., stories in which only a number of characters 
and their personalities are fixed, rather than the precise script of the story [1]. In the 
latter type of storytelling, ideally, all the designer (or writer) has to do is to determine 
which (types of) characters will occur in the play (although usually it is still needed to 
roughly prescribe the course of events). Hence, advantages of emergent narrative are the 
reduced amount of work that has to be spent by the writer, and the non-deterministic 
and unpredictable behavior of the story. 
In parallel with the shift from fixed storylines to emergent narrative, there has been a 
development in the nature of the involved characters as well. Recently, the characters 
(or agents) that are present in virtual stories are transforming more and more from 
shallow avatars to complex personalities with human-like properties such as emotions 
and theories of mind, e.g., [15]. To accomplish this, researchers have started to 
incorporate cognitive models within virtual characters, e.g., [10], [12]. Despite these 
first promising attempts, there is still a wide area to explore when it comes to enhancing 
virtual agents with cognitive capabilities. 
In line with the development described above, this paper explores the possibilities to 
equip the characters involved in virtual stories with the capability of emotion regulation. 
Informally, emotion regulation can be described as the process humans undertake to 
increase, maintain or decrease their emotional response, see e.g., [7], [8], [11], [14]. The 
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idea is that, by offering virtual agents the capacity to actively regulate their emotions, 
they will be able to select those kinds of behaviors that they feel most comfortable with. 
As a result, such agents will 1) behave more realistically and 2) have more freedom in 
the choice of their actions, which enhances the emergent narrative effect. This approach 
is similar to the approach taken in [9], which aims at incorporating coping behavior into 
virtual humans.  
In order to build emotion regulation into virtual stories, in this paper the informal 
model by Gross [7] as found in psychology literature was taken as a basis. This model 
describes a number of strategies humans use to adapt their emotion response levels, 
varying from situation selection to cognitive change and response modulation. Next, 
this model has been formalized using a dynamical system style modeling approach (see 
also [3] for some initial steps). In addition, a virtual environment has been created, 
incorporating a number of virtual agents, and these agents have been equipped with the 
formalized model for emotion regulation. To test the behavior of the model, a series of 
simulation experiments has been performed using the LEADSTO simulation language 
[2]. The model has been connected to the Vizard Virtual Reality Toolkit [16], to 
visualize the resulting stories in a graphical environment.  
2  Emotion Regulation in the Virtual Agent Context 
Gross [8] describes a process model of emotion regulation using the following 
definition: ????????? ??????????? ????????? ???? ??? ???? ?????????? ???? ?????????????
strategies we use to increase, maintain, or decrease one or more components of an 
???????????????????? In his model, Gross distinguishes four different types of emotion 
regulation strategies, which can be applied at different points in the process of emotion 
generation. First of all, when applying situation selection, a person chooses to be in a 
situation that matches the emotional response level the person wants to have for a 
certain emotion. For example, you can stay home instead of going to a party, because 
you are in conflict with someone who is going to that party. Second, when applying 
situation modification, a person modifies an existing situation so as to obtain a different 
level of emotion. For instance, when watching an irritating television program, you zap 
to another channel. Third, attentional deployment refers to shifting your attention to a 
certain aspect. For example, you close your eyes when watching an exciting penalty 
shoot-out. Finally, cognitive change refers to selecting a cognitive meaning to an event. 
For example, when a person loses a tennis match and blames the weather circumstances, 
instead of his own capacities.  
To incorporate these strategies into virtual characters, a modeling approach was used 
that is based on the LEADSTO simulation environment [2] and the Vizard Virtual 
Reality Toolkit [16]. Due to space limitations, the technical details of LEADSTO and 
Vizard are not shown here. However, they can be found in Appendix A in [17]. Below, 
in Section 2.1, at a language-independent level a global overview is given of the model, 
of which an initial version can be found in [3]. Next, in Section 2.2, for each of the 
regulation strategies it is shown how it is used in the virtual agents playing as characters 
in virtual stories. The complete formal specification of the model (in LEADSTO 
notation) is shown in Appendix B in [17]. 
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2.1 Global Overview 
In order to incorporate emotion regulation strategies into virtual agents, a virtual 
environment is created that is populated by a number of agents. Each agent is equipped 
with a mechanism to regulate its emotions, which is based on the model as described 
informally by Gross [7]. To create a formal model, for any given type of emotion a 
number of variables have been introduced. For convenience, the model concentrates on 
one specific type of emotion. In principle, this can (at least) be any emotion that is 
considered to be a basic human emotion, e.g., sadness, happiness, or anger [6]. In order 
to describe the regulation of such an emotion, the model takes into account the four 
strategies discussed by Gross are used (i.e., situation selection, situation modification, 
attentional deployment, and cognitive change). Based on the four strategies mentioned, 
in the formalization four corresponding elements (denoted by k) are introduced, for the 
objects that are affected by the particular strategies: situation, sub-situation, aspect, and 
meaning. 
The model assumes that each agent aims at an optimal level of emotion. The 
regulation process in the virtual agents starts by comparing the actual emotion response 
level ERL to the emotion response level ERL_norm aimed at. The difference between the 
two is the basis for adjustment of the choices made for each of the elements k; based on 
these adjusted choices, each element k will provide an adjusted emotional value EVk. 
To obtain a quantitative model, the emotion response level and the emotional values 
for the different elements for a given type of emotion are represented by real numbers in 
the interval [0, 2] (where 0 is the lowest possible ERL (e.g., extreme sadness), and 2 the 
highest (e.g., extreme happiness)). In the model, the level of emotion to aim at (the ERL 
norm), is also expressed in a real number in the domain [0, 2]. Based on these concepts, 
the ERL is recalculated each step by the following difference equation formula: 
new_ERL = (1 ) * k (wk * EVk) + * ERL 
In this formula, new_ERL is the new emotion response level, and ERL is the old emotion 
response level. The persistency factor  is the proportion of the old emotion response 
level that is taken into account to determine the new emotion response level. Initial tests 
have indicated that values for  around 0.9 deliver realistic results. The new contribution 
to the emotion response level is calculated by the weighted sum of the emotional values: 
k wk * EVk. By normalization, the sum of all the weights wk is taken to be 1. The 
following section describes how the different strategies influence the values of EVk. 
2.2 Emotion Regulation Strategies 
Situation selection: which agent to meet. Every step, each agent chooses to be alone, 
or to contact another agent, by comparing the EVs it attaches to being alone and to 
being with other agents. The agent will always choose the option with the EV that is 
closest to its optimal ERL. When two agents contact each other, they decide to meet. 
When the agents are meeting, their EV for situation is set to the EV they attach to the 
other agent. When an agent chooses to be alone, its EV for situation is set to its EV for 
being alone. 
 
Situation modification: what to talk about. When two agents are in a meeting, they 
will talk about a certain conversation subject. To decide which of the agents will start 
talking, each agent has a personal dominance factor. The agent with the highest 
dominance factor will choose the first conversation subject. Each step after this, the 
180
agent who has not chosen the current conversation subject will choose the next 
conversation subject. When an agent gets to choose which conversation subject to talk 
about, it will compare the EVs it attaches to each conversation subject, and select the 
one that is closest to its optimal ERL. The EV for subsituation is set to the EV the 
agents attach to the conversation subject they are currently talking about. When an 
agent is not in a meeting, its EV for subsituation will be set to the neutral value of 1, 
since the agent is not in a subsituation. When an agent A talks to another agent B about 
a certain conversation subject CS, this will affect the way agent B thinks about agent A. 
Agent B's EV for agent A will change using the following formula: 
new_EVagent_A = friendship * EVagent_A + (1- friendship) * EVCS 
In this formula, new_EVagent_A is the new EV agent B will attach to agent A and EVagent_A is 
the old EV agent B attached to agent A. The persistency factor friendship is the proportion 
of the old EV that is taken into account to determine the new EV. Here, values for 
friendship bigger than 0.9 (where friendship will get bigger when an agent knows another agent 
for a longer time) deliver realistic results. The new contribution to the ERL is 
determined by EVCS: the EV agent B attaches to the conversation subject agent A is 
talking about. So how much an agent likes another agent, depends on how much an 
agent likes the conversation subjects another agent talks about. 
The extent to which an agent likes to talk about a certain conversation subject can be 
changed by external events. For example, an agent will start to like a sports team more 
when this team wins a match. To accomplish this, the following formulas are used: 
new_EVCSn = EVCSn + EVCSn 
When a positive event occurs: EVCSn =  * EVCSn * (dmax ? EVCSn) 
When a negative event occurs: EVCSn = - * EVCSn * (dmax ? EVCSn) 
In these formulas, new_EVCSn is the new EV the agent attaches to the conversation 
subject, and EVCSn is the old EV the agent attached to the conversation subject. Here is 
a variable that determines the speed of adjusting EVs to conversation subjects. A lower 
will result in slower adjustment. Here, an of 0.02 delivers realistic results. The part 
EVCSn * (dmax ? EVCSn) prevents EVCSn from under- or overadjustment. 
 
Attentional deployment: on which aspect to focus. When an agent is in a 
conversation, it can choose to pay attention to, or to distract its attention from the 
conversation. Every step, the agent chooses the option with the EV closest to its optimal 
ERL. The EVs the agent attaches to paying attention or distracting its attention, depends 
on the conversation subject the agent is currently talking about, according to the 
following formulas: 
new_EVpay_attention = asp * EVpay_attention + (1- asp) * EVCS 
new_EVdistract = asp * EVdistract + (1- asp) * (-EVCS + dmax) 
In these formulas, new_EVpay_attention and new_EVdistract are the new EVs for pay_attention and 
distract, and EVpay_attention and EVdistract are the old EVs for pay_attention and distract. The 
persistency factor asp is the proportion of the old EV that is taken into account to 
determine the new EV. The new contribution to the EV for pay_attention is determined 
by EVCS, the EV the agent attaches to the conversation subject it is talking about. The 
new contribution to the EV for distract is calculated by (-EVCS + dmax). This will reach a 
high value when the agent attaches a low EV to the conversation subject, and a low 
value when the agent attaches a high value to the conversation subject. So when the 
agent likes the conversation subject, it will be more likely to pay attention to the 
conversation. The agent chooses to distract from, or pay attention to the conversation, 
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by comparing the two EVs for paying attention and distracting, and picking the option 
with the EV closest to its optimal ERL. 
 
Cognitive change: which meaning to attach. Every step, agents can choose to apply 
self-talk. An agent can use self-talk to relativize its current state of mind, or on the other 
hand, to attach more meaning to its current state. Every step, an agent chooses to 
relativize, attach a stronger meaning, or to apply no self-talk, by picking the option with 
the EV closest to the optimal ERL of the agent. The EV for not applying self-talk 
always has the neutral value of 1. The EVs for relativizing and attaching more meaning 
depend on the ERL of the agent, and are updated every step according to the following 
?????????? 
new_EVrelativise= dmax - ERL 
new_EVattach_more_meaning = ERL + (ERL-1) * (1 ? abs(1-ERL)) 
When an agent has a high ERL, the EV for relativising will be low, and when an agent 
has a high ERL, the EV for relativizing will be high. So relativizing always influences 
the ERL of the agent to reach a more neutral value. 
When the ERL of the agent has the neutral value of 1, (ERL-1) will be 0, and the EV 
for attaching more meaning will be 1. When the ERL of the agent is smaller than 1, then 
ERL-1 will have a negative value, and the EV for attaching more meaning will have a 
value that is smaller than the current ERL. When the ERL of the agent is bigger than 1, 
then ERL-1 will be bigger than 1, and the EV for attaching more meaning will have a 
value that is bigger than the current ERL. So attaching more meaning always influences 
the ERL of the agent to a more extreme value than the current one. Multiplying by (1 ? 
abs(1-ERL)) prevents the EV from reaching values that are out of the domain. 
3  Simulation Experiments 
??????????????????????????????????? ??? ????? ???? ??????????????????????????? ????????????
interesting scenarios. To obtain movies in Vizard, events in the LEADSTO simulations 
were translated to visualizations in Vizard. The exact mapping that was used for this 
translation is shown in Appendix C in [17]. For example, the fact that an agent is happy 
is visualized by a certain type of smile, and the fact that an agent distracts from a 
conversation is visualized by this agent moving its head away from its conversation 
partner. 
In all of the simulations, three agents are involved, which will be called Barry, Gary, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is their amount of happiness. To enable this, the particular topics they are allowed to 
talk about are football (in particular, the Dutch football teams Ajax and Feyenoord) and 
hockey. The parameter settings of all agents used in three specific experiments are 
shown in Appendix D in [17].  
Due to space limitations, only one of the simulation experiments is discussed in this 
paper. The results of the LEADSTO simulation of this experiment can be seen in Figure 
1. Here, time is on the horizontal axis, whereas different events are displayed on the 
vertical axis. A dark box on top of a line indicates that an event is true at that time point; 
a light box below a line indicates than an event if false. A detailed description of what 
happens in this scenario is provided in Appendix E in [17]. 
As mentioned earlier, using a specific conversion program that has been 
implemented, LEADSTO simulations were translated into movies in Vizard. A 
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screenshot of an example Vizard movie (which corresponds to the scenario shown in 
Figure 1) is shown in Figure 2. This figure shows a situation in which (on the 
foreground) two agents are having a conversation. The left agent is talking about 
hockey, but the right agent tries to distract from the conversation by moving its head 
away from the conversation. The cognitive meaning that each agent attaches to its 
current thoughts is displayed (in red) above the heads of the agents. Meanwhile, in the 
background a third agent is standing alone. The full Vizard movie of this scenario (as 
well as the movies that correspond to the two other experiments described in Appendix 
D) can be found on [17]. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example Simulation Trace 
The resulting movies provide a first indication that the emotion regulation strategies 
as described by [7] have been implemented successfully within the virtual agents used 
as characters. To be specific, the agents are able to perform situation selection by 
selecting different conversation partners, and withdrawing from conversations if 
desired. Moreover, they can perform situation modification by changing conversation 
topics, they can perform attentional deployment by changing the amount of attention 
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they pay to a conversation, and they can perform cognitive change by changing the 
cognitive meaning they assign to their thoughts (e.g., by stating to themselves that 
something is not very important). These behaviors were found consistent with predicted 
behaviors for situations as described by Gross [7], [8] (which are based on empirical 
evidence).  
 
 
Fig. 2. Screenshot of an example scenario in Vizard 
4  Discussion 
Within the domain of virtual storytelling, the idea of emergent narrative has become 
more and more popular [1]. Moreover, there is a growing trend to incorporate cognitive 
models within the characters involved in virtual stories (e.g., [10], [12]). As a next step 
in that direction, the current paper aims at building emotion regulation as known from 
psychology literature into virtual characters. To this end, the informal model by Gross 
[7] was taken as a basis, and has been formalized using a dynamical system style 
modeling approach (see also [3] for some initial steps). A virtual environment has been 
created, which includes a number of virtual agents that have been equipped with the 
formalized model for emotion regulation. To test the behavior of the model in a 
prototyping phase, a series of simulation experiments has been performed using the 
LEADSTO simulation language [2]; in the Vizard Virtual Reality Toolkit [16], such 
simulations have been visualized in a graphical environment. The resulting movies 
provide a first indication that the emotion regulation strategies as described by [7] have 
been implemented successfully within the virtual characters. The simulation results 
have been compared with the behaviors for different situations as described by Gross 
[7], [8], and found consistent. Validation involving comparison with detailed empirical 
data is left for future work. 
Concerning related work, an approach in the literature that has similarities to the 
current approach is [9]. In that paper, a computational model is introduced that can 
????????? ???????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ??????? ????? ????? ?????????? ????? ??? ??????????
?????????????????? ???? ?????????? Their approach makes use of plan-based causal 
representations, augmented with decision-theoretic planning techniques, whereas our 
approach uses dynamical systems representations. Other differences are that they 
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???????? ?? ????????? ???????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ???????? ??? ?????
representations of the emotion-evoking situation, and that their work has been evaluated 
against clinical data. 
Virtual stories involving characters with elaborated cognitive or psychological 
capabilities can be used for a number of purposes. On the one hand, they may be used 
for entertainment (e.g., for creating computer games with more complex, unpredictable 
and more human-like characters). On the other hand, they may be used for educational 
purposes (e.g., to create a virtual training environment for psychotherapists, which 
enables them to practice anger management sessions with virtual clients). Further 
research will investigate whether the model is suitable for such purposes. As soon as 
these types of challenges will be tackled, also a more precise evaluation will be 
performed of how humans perceive the current characters (e.g. in terms of 
believability). 
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Abstract. Previous research indicates that self-help therapy is an effective method 
to prevent and treat unipolar depression. While web-based self-help therapy has 
many advantages, there are also disadvantages to self-help therapy, such as that it 
misses the possibility to regard the body language of the user, and the lack of 
personal feedback on the user responses. This study presents a virtual agent that 
guides the user through the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) questionnaire, 
which is used to measure the severity of depression. The agent responds 
empathically to the answers given by the user, by changing its facial expression. 
This resembles face to face therapy more than existing web-based self-help 
therapies. A pilot experiment indicates that the virtual agent has added value for 
this application. 
Keywords: Virtual agent, Self-help therapy, Emotion modeling 
1   Introduction 
Self-help therapies have been investigated for several decades. Self-help therapy started 
with bibliotherapy, in which clients follow a therapy from a book. Previous research 
indicates that this is a very effective form of therapy; e.g., a meta-analysis by Cuijpers 
[7] concluded that bibliotherapy in unipolar depression is an effective treatment 
modality, which is no less effective than traditional individual or group therapy.  
The advent of new communication technologies, like internet and videoconferencing, 
can also assist in the field of mental healthcare. Since the last decade, a lot of self-help 
programs have been delivered through the internet [5], [6], [12]. Several previous 
studies concluded that self-help therapies are useful and efficient in reducing mental 
health problems convincingly (e. g., [7], [12]). Compared to traditional therapy 
methods, web-based self-help may be more efficient and less expensive [4], [9].  
Web-based self-help therapy can also be a solution for people who would otherwise 
not seek help, wishing to avoid the stigma of psychiatric referral or to protect their 
privacy [13]. The majority of persons with a mental disorder in the general population 
do not receive any professional mental health services (an estimated 65%) [4]. In many 
occupations, such as the police force, the fire service and farming, there is much stigma 
attached to receiving psychological treatment, and the anonymity of web-based self-
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help therapy would help to overcome this [11]. Also many other people feel a barrier to 
seek help for their problems through regular health-care systems; e.g., in a study by 
Spek et al. [12] about internet-based cognitive behavioral therapy for subthreshold 
depression for people over 50 years old, many participants reported not seeking help 
through regular health-care systems because they were very concerned about being 
stigmatized. Patients may be attracted to the idea of working on their own to deal with 
their problems, thereby avoiding the potential embarrassment of formal psychotherapy 
[13]. Self-help therapy can also be offered to patients while they are on a waiting list, 
with the option to receive face to face therapy later, if required [11]. 
However, there is also critique on internet-based self-help therapy. Drop-out rates 
from self-help therapy can be high, especially when the use of self-help is unmonitored 
by a health care practitioner [13]. A wide range of drop-out rates for bibliotherapy have 
been estimated: from about 7% [7] up to 51.7% [12]. People may miss personal 
feedback when performing self-help therapy, which might decrease their motivation. By 
making self-help therapy more similar to face to face therapy, it can become a more 
personal and entertaining experience, which might decrease drop-out. 
Several self-help therapy programs are already available on the internet. Two well-
known examples of CBT (Cognitive Behavioral ????????? ????????? ???? ????????????
?????????????? [5]. BluePages gives information about the symptoms of depression 
whereas MoodGYM is designed to prevent depression [5], [6]. However, none of the 
existing online self-help therapies include a virtual agent that provides a kind of face to 
face assistance.  
There have already been developed several agents in the health-supporting domain.  
For example, [3] describes a virtual agent that explains health documents to patients.  
This study presents an application for performing the Beck Depression Inventory 
questionnaire [2]. The application is equipped with a virtual agent that responds 
empathically to the responses of the user. As the virtual agent is emotionally responsive 
to the answers given by the user throughout the questionnaire, the experience should 
resemble face to face therapy more than a similar application without a virtual agent. 
2   The application 
In the application, the user performs the BDI questionnaire [2]. The main goal of the 
BDI is to measure the characteristic attitudes and symptoms of depression. The BDI is a 
self-report inventory that consists of 21 multiple-choice questions, and is generally used 
for measuring the severity of depression. Every question has at least four answer 
options ranging in intensity from 0 to 3.  
The virtual agent asks the questions to the user, and the user selects the appropriate 
answer from a given drop-down box. This virtual agent has a certain emotional state, 
consisting of two emotions: happiness and empathy. According to Eisenberg [8], 
????????????An affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
feeling or would be expected to feel.?? ???????? ??? ????? ???????????? ?? ???????????
questionnaire is conducted, which means empathy concerns rather sad things, showing 
empathy consists of showing sadness. If during the questionnaire the user appears to be 
more depressed the virtual agent will show more sadness, expressed by a relatively sad 
facial expression. On the other hand, if the user appears to be completely fine, the agent 
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will show a relatively happy facial expression. When the webpage is loaded for the first 
time, the original emotional state of the virtual agent is loaded, which is a calm 
emotional state, with very little sadness and an average level of happiness.  
2.1. The emotion model of the agent 
The virtual agent responds empathically towards the user, by showing the right facial 
expressions on the answers given by the user. In consultation with clinical 
psychologists, we defined an impact of these answers as a real number in the domain [-
1, 1] on the emotions of the virtual agent, represented by a real number in the domain 
[0, 1]. Further we defined in consultation with the clinical psychologists how the agent 
should behave towards the users using these impacts. The impacts are used to detect 
how the user is feeling. When the user gives a lot of answers that indicate he or she is 
not feeling well, the agent should show empathy, by showing a sad facial expression, 
without showing any happiness. When the user is feeling fine, the agent should show a 
neutral, calm facial expression, with some happiness and no sadness. Because it would 
be undesirable if the emotions of the agent suddenly shift from very sad to very happy 
or vice versa, with any change in emotions, the old levels of the emotions are taken into 
account. If the answers of the user have no impact on the emotions of the agent, its 
facial expression should slowly return to the original emotional state it had at the start of 
the application. We have developed the following formula that meets the requirements 
as described above: 
 
New_emotion    =  Old_emotion + Decay + Change 
Decay  =  (Original_emotion ? Old_emotion) * Decay_factor 
Change  =   * Impact / (1 + (Original_emotion - Old_emotion) * Impact) 
 
New_emotion can be calculated by taking the old emotion, and adding decay and 
change. Here Old_emotion is the emotion of the virtual agent before the formula is 
applied. Decay is the size of the decay effect (i.e., how quickly the emotion will move 
towards the original emotion if the user response has no impact). Change is the change 
of the emotion of the virtual agent, according to the impact of the answer given by the 
user. 
Decay is calculated by subtracting Old_emotion from Original_emotion, and multiplying 
the result with the Decay_factor. In this formula, Decay_factor is a variable that determines 
the size of the decay effect, which is taken 0.1 in this paper. Original_emotion is the 
emotion of the virtual agent at the start of the application.  
Change is calculated by multiplying the impact of the answer given by the user with 
, and dividing the result by 1 + (Original_emotion - Old_emotion) * Impact. In this formula,  
is a variable that determines the speed with which the answers given by the user can 
modify the emotions of the virtual agent. Dividing Impact by 1 + (Original_emotion - 
Old_emotion) * Impact manages that when the current emotion of the agent deviates more 
from the original emotion the agent had at the start of the application, and the answer 
given by the user pushes the emotion of the agent even further away from the original 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
The emotions of the agent during two scenarios are shown in Figure 1. In this figure, 
along the x-axis the time is given and along the y-axis the levels of emotions are given. 
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The pink line shows happiness and the blue line shows sadness. In scenario 1, the agent 
interacts with a severely depressed user, while in scenario 2 the agent interacts with a 
user who scores average on feelings of depression.  
 
Fig. 1. The emotions of the agent during scenario 1 and scenario 2 
As can be seen in Figure 1, initially the virtual agent has a very small level of sadness 
(0.2) and an average level of happiness (0.5). Each time point the virtual therapist asks a 
question to the user and gets an answer. This answer affects the emotions of the agent. 
The user in scenario 1 is severely depressed, coming to a final score of 61 on the BDI 
questionnaire. During the questionnaire, the agent notices this, which increases her level 
of sadness and decreases her level of happiness. This results in the agent showing 
empathy towards the user by means of a sad facial expression. 
In scenario 2, the user got an average score on the BDI questionnaire (33). This 
means the user scores average on feelings of depression.  In Figure 1, the different 
emotional reactions of the agent on the answers of the user in scenario 2 can clearly be 
seen. On answers that indicate the user is depressed, such as the answer just before time 
?????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ??? ???????? ??????????? ???? ???? ???????? ?????? ??? ??????????
decreases. On the other hand, on answers that indicate the user is not depressed, such as 
???? ??????? ????? ??????? ????? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ??? ???????? ??????????? ???? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????he end of the questionnaire, the agent shows a 
facial expression with an average level of both sadness and happiness. 
2.2 The resulting website 
???? ????????? ???? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????????????? ???????????? ????????? [10]. Through 
this program we created the face of the virtual agent. Further, we created nine different 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
possible combination of the three levels of the emotions happiness and sadness 
(showing empathy). We created a webpage for the BDI questionnaire, on which the 
virtual agent was embedded as a Haptek player. We used JavaScript [1], a scripting 
language, in combination with scripting commands provided by the Haptek software 
[10], to control the Haptek player within a web browser.  
We performed a pilot experiment to test whether the virtual agent has added value for 
the application. To recruit participants, we invited people by sending an e-mail with a 
link to the website. The first page of this website does not show the virtual agent, and 
contains 8 demographic questions. The next page contains the 21 questions of the BDI 
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questionnaire. The virtual agent is shown on top of this page. Before the first question, 
the agent introduces itself, and states that it will guide the user through the 
questionnaire. Instead of showing all the questions in a form, only one question at a 
time was shown, to let the application more resemble face to face therapy. Each 
question is shown in a text area below the virtual agent. Below the question, there is a 
dropdown-box from which the user can select an answer.  
Because some of the possible participants were Dutch, we created a Dutch, as well as 
an English version of the website. In the English version, the virtual agent asks the 
question using speech. Because at the moment of this study, we did not have a Dutch 
speech synthesis engine available that included lip-syncing, in the Dutch version the 
question was only shown in the text area below the virtual agent. We used this 
shortcoming of the Dutch version to investigate the added value of speech in this 
application. 
Each time the user selected an answer from the drop-down box, the virtual agent 
changed its emotional state depending on the calculated values of the emotions, as 
described in section 3.1. Each answer has a score, as described in Section 2, and during 
the questionnaire these scores are accumulated to calculate the final score. When the 
user presses the submit button, it proceeds towards the next page, where the virtual 
agent gives feedback about the final score of the user on the questionnaire, showing an 
appropriate facial expression. When the final score was below 16, the virtual agent 
indicates that the user is less depressed as average and shows a facial expression with a 
low level of sadness and a medium level of happiness. When the user scores between 
16-41, the virtual agent indicates that the user scores average on feelings of depression 
and shows a facial expression with a medium level of sadness and a low level of 
happiness. When the user scores above 41, the virtual agent indicates that the user 
scores high on feelings of depression and shows a facial expression with a high level of 
sadness and a low level of happiness. If the user responded that he or she considers 
committing suicide, the agent stringently advises the user to contact his or her general 
practitioner. 
After receiving the feedback, the user clicks a button to proceed to the next page, 
which contains the evaluation form. This page consists of 5 questions about the virtual 
agent, such as whether the user prefers performing the BDI questionnaire with or 
without the virtual agent. The virtual agent itself is not shown on this page, to prevent 
the user from giving socially desirable answers towards the agent. 
3   Experiment 
We have performed a pilot experiment to test whether the virtual agent has added value 
for this application. 
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Participants. The participants were recruited by sending an e-mail with an invitation to 
participate in the experiment. The participants could choose between a Dutch and an 
English version of the questionnaire. 28 participants completed the experiment, of 
which 16 the English, and 12 the Dutch version. 
 
Procedure. First the participants entered some demographical information in a web-
form, without the virtual agent. Next the application with the virtual agent was loaded, 
and the participants performed the BDI questionnaire. When the questionnaire was 
finished, the participants received feedback from the virtual agent about their result. In 
the English version, the question was shown in a text area below the agent, and the 
agent additionally asked the questions to the participants using speech. In the Dutch 
version however, the virtual agent could not speak, and the text was only shown in the 
text area below the agent. Finally, the participants filled in an evaluation questionnaire, 
without the virtual agent present to prevent socially desirable answers towards the 
agent. The complete procedure can still be performed at [14]. 
 
Results. The participants evaluated on an eight-point scale whether they thought the 
virtual agent was friendly, interested, trustworthy and kind. In both the English and the 
Dutch version, for all properties, the participants scored the agent just above moderate, 
as can be seen in Table 1. No statistical differences were found between the English 
version with voice, and the Dutch version without voice. 
 
Table 1. The score of the virtual agent on several properties on an eight-point scale. 
 English Dutch 
 M SD M SD 
Friendly 4.75 1.98 4.91 1.30 
Interested 4.50 2.13 4.00 1.95 
Trustworthy 4.31 1.66 4.27 1.56 
Kind 4.75 1.69 4.55 1.44 
 
????????? ???? ????????????? ????????? ???? ????????? ???? ???? ????? ??? ??????????? ???? ?????
??????????????? ?????? ???? ??????? ??? ????? ????? ??? ???????? ???????? ?????????????? ??? ????
evaluation form. For the English version, with speech, 81% of the participants preferred 
to perform the questionnaire with the virtual agent (sign test, p = .021). However, for 
the Dutch version, without speech, only 64% of the participants preferred to fill in the 
questionnaire with the virtual agent (sign test, p = .55).  
The participants were asked to explain their answer in an open question. On this 
question people gave various responses, but a response that came back several times 
???? ?????????? ???? ???????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ?????????? ???? ????? ??? ??????? ?????????????
Participants also indicated that it was more fun to perform the questionnaire with the 
virtual agent. This indicates that the virtual agent makes it more attractive and 
entertaining to perform the questionnaire, and adding the virtual agent to a self-help 
application might decrease drop-out of the self-help therapy.  
Participants that preferred to perform the questionnaire without a virtual agent gave 
??? ???????? ???? ????? ????? ?????????????? ?????? ???? ??????????????????-???????????????? ????
Dutch version, without speech, that the agent did not have any added value.  
The r???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of participants responded that the agent should speak, while in the English version many 
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participants responded that the voice of the agent should be friendlier. In both versions 
many participants responded the agent should give feedback on each answered question.  
4   Discussion 
This study presents a virtual agent that guides the user through a questionnaire about 
depression. The agent responds empathically to the answers given by the user, by 
changing its facial expression. 
A pilot experiment has been performed to test the applicability of a virtual agent in 
this application. Due to time limitations, the way of recruitment of the participants was 
not ideal, and the participants are probably not a very good representation of the target 
group of online self-help applications. When the application has been improved, an 
extensive validation will need to be performed before it can be used in practice. 
However, the experiment has led to some interesting results that can be used to 
determine a direction for further research. 
In both the English version, with speech, and the Dutch version, without speech, the 
participants found the agent moderately friendly, interested, trustworthy and kind. 
Further, although there were not many participants, an interesting statistical significant 
result was found. For the English version, the amount of participants who preferred to 
perform the questionnaire with the virtual agent was significantly bigger than the 
amount of participants who preferred to perform the questionnaire without the virtual 
agent. For the Dutch version also more participants preferred to perform the 
questionnaire with the agent than without, but this result was not significant. However, 
none of the participants appeared to actually be depressed, and the agent thus will not 
have shown much obvious empathic expressive behavior. In the Dutch version of the 
application, without speech, this means the participants just saw a rather passive face 
above the questions. Given this information, and that there were only 12 participants, it 
is not very surprising that the for the Dutch questionnaire, the amount of participants 
that preferred performing the questionnaire with the agent was not significantly bigger 
than the amount of participants that preferred performing the questionnaire without the 
agent. 
Taking into account many improvements can still be made to the application, the 
results described above are very promising, and motivate further research in this 
direction. The response of a participant that he did not feel shy of the virtual interviewer 
as he would with a real one further indicates nicely the use of this kind of applications. 
For people who feel uncomfortable with undergoing face-to-face therapy and therefore 
choose not to seek help, an application like this can be a nice solution. 
As also indicated by the responses in the experiment, many improvements can still be 
made to the application. As pointed out by many participants in the open questions, the 
agent should provide appropriate feedback after each answer on a question. This should 
increase the humanness of the agent, enhancing the feelings of a personal, realistic 
experience during the questionnaire.  
Another possible point of improvement is the voice of the agent. The fact that with 
the Dutch version, without speech, the amount of participants that preferred to perform 
the questionnaire with the virtual agent was not significantly bigger than the amount of 
participants that preferred to perform the questionnaire without the virtual agent 
indicates that this is an important issue. Moreover, in the open questions, many 
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participants gave responses that indicated that speech should be added (in the Dutch 
version) or improved (in the English version). Since the application should ultimately 
also be available for Dutch speaking users, possibilities for adding Dutch speech 
synthesis including lip-syncing should seriously be considered. Also possibilities to 
create a friendlier voice that is able to show emotions should be considered. 
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Abstract. There is a growing belief that the environment plays an important role 
in the healing process of patients, supported by empirical findings. Previous 
research showed that psychological stress caused by loneliness can be reduced by 
artificial companions. As a pilot application for this purpose, this paper presents 
an affective agent playing tic-tac-toe with the user. Experimenting with a number 
of agents under different parameter settings shows the agent is able to show 
human-like emotional behavior, and can make decisions based on rationality as 
well as on affective influences. After discussing the application with clinical 
experts and making improvements where needed, the application can be tested in 
a clinical setting in future research. 
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1   Introduction 
Many people do not like the atmosphere in hospitals. Since two decades, there is a 
growing belief that not only the health care itself, but also the environment affects the 
healing process of the patients. This has increased the interest in healing environments. 
The role of the environment in the healing process is a growing concern among health 
care providers, environmental psychologists, consultants and architects. Among them 
the consensus is growing that not only the level of care, but also the design of the health 
care facility affects the wellness of its patients [7]. 
Researchers are finding that making changes and additions to the physical and social 
environment of the health care facility, thereby taking the patient into account, can 
????????????????????????????????????????(e.g., [2], [6], [18], [22], [25]). Moreover, health 
care professionals are finding that changes in design can enhance recovery in patients, 
and reduce the length of their stay in the hospital [15]. On the other hand, researchers 
are also finding that unfamiliar environments in clinics, hospitals, and nursing homes 
can produce psychological stress that can negatively affect healing and wellness. Poor 
design has even been linked to negative effects on the patient, such as anxiety, delirium, 
elevated blood pressure levels, and an increased intake of pain drugs [23]. 
One factor that can be reduced by a healing environment is psychosocial stress. An 
important predictor of psychosocial stress is loneliness [12]. Loneliness is a common 
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problem frequently encountered in the elderly in long-term care facilities. Many people 
that are staying in a long-term care facility lack social interaction. Artificial toys can be 
used to reduce loneliness. Previous research showed that animal-shaped toys can be 
useful as a tool for occupational therapy (e.g., [18], [26], [27]). Robot animal therapy 
has been widely investigated. For example, Dautenhahn and Robins [20], [28] used 
mobile robots and dolls respectively to treat autistic children. Wada and Shibata 
developed Paro [27], a robot shaped like a baby-seal that interacts with users to 
encourage positive mental effects. Interaction with Paro has been shown to improve 
??????? ??????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????? ???? ?????????????? ????? ????? ?????? ????
caregivers. Research groups have used Paro for therapy at eldercare facilities and with 
?????? ??????? ???????????? ???????? [14], [17]. Banks et al. [2] showed that animal-
assisted therapy with an AIBO dog helped just as good for reducing loneliness as 
therapy with a living dog. In their paper they indicate that AIBO was not used to its full 
capacity and that if more options were used, its effects might be further enhanced. 
Over the past decade, a lot of novel work on computational models of emotion in 
virtual agents can be observed. Nevertheless, compared to human affective complexity, 
current emotion models of virtual agents are still quite simple. If an artificial companion 
demonstrates human-like emotional behavior, this might increase its ability to reduce 
loneliness of patients in a long-term care facility, as part of a healing environment. 
In our paper, we present a virtual agent that could be seen as a pilot application for this 
purpose. The artificial companion is an affective virtual agent that can play tic-tac-toe, 
equipped with Silicon Coppélia [19], an integration of three affect-related models as 
proposed in [3]. Because it is equipped with these affect-related models, it can show 
human-like emotional behavior. Therefore, it might be a useful to serve as an artificial 
interaction partner for patients in a long-term care facility. 
2   The Application 
The application presented in this paper is an affective virtual agent that can play tic-tac-
toe against the user. The object of tic-tac-toe is to get three in a row on a three by three 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the board are filled, which means the game ends in a tie. For creating the virtual agent, 
??????????????????????????????????????[11]. Through this program we created the face 
of the virtual agent. The agent simulates 5 emotions: joy, distress, hope, fear and 
surprise, which can be expressed with either a low or a high intensity.  
We created 32 (25) different emotional states using peopleputty; one for each 
possible combination of two levels of intensity of the five emotions simulated by the 
agent. We created a webpage for the application, on which the virtual agent was 
embedded as a Haptek player. We used JavaScript [1], a scripting language, in 
combination with scripting commands provided by the Haptek software [11], to control 
the Haptek player within a web browser. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
game, and therefore looks sad. The website shows in the top left the agent which the 
user plays against. If the agent speaks a message, this is additionally shown in a textbox 
that is shown below the agent. Below this textbox, the ambition levels of the agent for 
winning and losing, and the importance of the current game for the agent are shown. 
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Fig. 1. The website with the tic-tac-toe application. 
Right next to this, the level of involvement and distance from the agent towards the user 
are shown. Right next to the textbox, the predictions of the agent about the expected 
next move and the outcome of the game are shown. Above this, just below the tic-tac-
toe board, the ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
click on to play a new game with the inserted amount of money as bet. Additionally, 
there is a hint button, which makes the agent give a hint to the user about in which 
square t??????? ????????????????? ?????? ??? ?? ???????????????????? ??? ???? ????? ??????? ?????
button, the agent will explain the rules of the game. 
Because the purpose of this paper is to show how the application works, the affective 
state is not only shown by means of a facial expression of the agent, but the emotion 
variables are also shown numerically on the top right. If the application would be 
designed to be used by human users, these numerical values would not be shown, and 
only the facial expression would be visible to the user. Below the affective state in 
numbers, the amount of money that is currently played for (current bet), the amount of 
money of the user (your money), and the amount of money of the agent (agent money) 
are shown. ?????? ??? ????? ?? ??????? ?????? ?utton, which resets the bets to the starting 
values. Below this, the number of games won by the user, the number of games won by 
the agent, and the number of ties is shown.  
The tic-tac-toe board is on the top center of the website, right next to the agent. The 
user can make a move by clicking on one of the squares, on which the agent will react 
by performing its own move. After each move of the human user, the agent speaks a 
message, which is additionally displayed in the text-area below its face, depending on 
the emotional state of the agent. If the game has finished, the amount of money bet for 
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will be added to the winner, and subtracted from the loser. The agent speaks a message, 
depending on the outcome of the game, and its emotional state. The user can enter a 
new bet and click the ?play again? button to play another game. 
2.1   The models incorporated in the agent 
This virtual agent presented in this paper was constructed by incorporating Silicon 
Coppélia [19], an integration of three affect-related models into an existing virtual agent 
that can play tic-tac-toe [29]. The three models that were integrated into Silicon 
Coppélia as suggested in [3] were:  
 
1. EMA [9], [16], a model to create agents that exhibit and cope with (negative) 
affect based on Smith ?? ????????? ??????? ??? ???????? [21]. A graphical 
representation of EMA is shown in Figure 2. 
 
  
Fig. 2. A graphical representation of EMA 
2. CoMERG [4] (the Cognitive Model for Emotion Regulation based on Gross), 
which can simulate different emotion regulation strategies explained by Gross 
[10] using a set of logical rules and difference equations. Figure 3 shows a 
graphical representation of the emotion regulation model by Gross. 
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Fig. 3. A graphical representation of the emotion regulation model by Gross 
3. I-PEFiCADM [13], a model for building agents that can trade rational for 
affective choices based on the concern-driven theory of Frijda [8]. A graphical 
representation of I-PEFiCADM is shown in Figure 4. 
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 Fig. 4. A graphical representation of I-PEFiCADM. Curved arrows indicate interaction 
 effects. 
Integrating these models enabled agents in simulation experiments to show richer 
interaction than they could with any of the models alone. Using the combined model, 
they could simulate emotions based on beliefs about states in the world, and how these 
states affect their goals. The model was also used to simulate affective decision making 
processes, in which decisions are made not only based on rationality, but also on 
affective influences, enabling the agent to make irrational decisions where appropriate. 
Further, emotion regulation strategies can be applied by the agent, to regulate its 
(simulated) emotions [19]. 
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 Fig. 5. A graphical representation of Silicon Coppélia. 
Figure 5 shows a graphical representation of Silicon Coppélia. On the far left of this 
figure, we see a virtual agent. The agent develops state predicates about her opponent. 
The agent acquires personal meaning for her opponent because she compares the 
features of her opponent with her own personal goals, beliefs, and concerns. This 
establishes her relevance and valence to her opponent. While relevance determines the 
intensity of affect, valence governs its direction. The agent can also take perspectives 
and look at others through the eyes of another person or agent.  
When the initial appraisal process is completed, the agent is ready to affectively 
respond to her opponent. Relevance and valence form an appraisal frame that feeds into 
her involvement and distance towards her opponent??????????????????????????????????????
several (perhaps ambiguous) emotions.  
During affective decision making, the agent selects the move in the game that 
promises the highest expected satisfaction. The performed action leads to a new 
situation, and after her opponent also made his/her move, the model loops until the 
game has finished. 
2.2   Determining which action to take 
In Silicon Coppélia [19], the agents ?????????????????????????????????????????????-PEFiC 
[24], by multiplying a designed value (a value the designer expects to raise in another 
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agent), and a bias for perceiving this feature. For this application, as starting values, all 
biases were set to the neutral value of 1 for the agent. The designed values of the human 
user were set as can be found in Table 1. These values were chosen arbitrarily, and in an 
application with real users they should be reconsidered together with an expert. This 
will lead the agent to perceive the human user with the following variables: 
Table 1.  Designed values for perceiving the features of the human user. 
Feature Designed value of human user 
Good 0.6 
Bad 0.2 
Beautiful 0.5 
Ugly 0.3 
Realistic 0.9 
Unrealistic 0.1 
Intended Aid 0.7 
Intended Obstacle 0.4 
 
In Silicon Coppélia, the agents also have beliefs that features of other agents affect 
certain goal-states in the world. For this application, the possible goal-??????????????????
?????????? ???????????????????????????????? ????????? ????????????? ??????????-states were 
set as can be seen in Table 2: 
Table 2.  Designed values for perceiving the features of the human user.  
Feature or Action ???????????????????????? ???????????????????????? 
Good 0.5 -0.5 
Bad -0.5 0.5 
Beautiful 0.1 0.1 
Ugly 0.1 0.1 
Realistic 0.1 0.1 
Unrealistic 0.1 0.1 
Intended Aid 0.7 -0.7 
Intended Obstacle -0.7 0.7 
  
The agent also has beliefs about actions facilitating goal-states. As there are nine 
squares on the board, there are nine possible actions for the agent: putting an O in each 
possible place. In Silicon Coppélia, the agents have beliefs that action facilitate goal-
states in the range [-1, 1], where -1 means the agent beliefs the action strongly inhibits 
the goal-state, and 1 means the agent beliefs the action strongly facilitates the goal-state. 
Each turn, the beliefs that actions facilitate goal-states are calculated based on a 
heuristic that estimates the chances of winning when a certain move is made. If the 
?????? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ??? ?? ????? ???? ??????? ????? ??????????? ????? ??????? ??????????s 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-1. If the 
human user ???? ???????? ??? ?? ????? ???? ???? ?????? ??????? ??? ????? ???? ??? ?????? ??????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????-0.9. If a square is already occupied, the 
belief that putting an O on this square facilitates a goal is set to 0 for both goals, as it is 
an illegal move. If none of these rules apply for a square, the belief that putting an O on 
the middle square ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????-0.5. Similarly, the belief that putting an O on corner squares (A1, A3, C1 and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-0.3. Finally, 
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the belief that putting an O on the remaining squares (A2, B1, B3 and C2) facilitates 
????????????? ??? ???? ??? ???? ???? ???? ????????????? ????? ??? ???? ??? -0.1. For actions which 
facilitate desired goals, and inhibit undesired goals (i.e., actions with a high expected 
utility, generalized over multiple goals), strong action tendencies are calculated [19]. 
In Silicon Coppélia, each action has a level of positivity and a level of negativity. In this 
application, the level of negativity of each action is defined as the belief of the agent 
that the action facilitates winning the game. The level of negativity of the action is 
defined as 1 minus this belief.  
Using these variables, the affective decision-making of Silicon Coppélia [19] is used 
to determine the action of the agent. The expected satisfaction is calculated using the 
following formula, and the action with the highest level of expected satisfaction is 
picked. 
 
ExpectedSatisfaction(Action) =  
wat * Action_Tendency +  
wpos * (1 - abs(positivity ? biasI * Involvement)) +  
wneg * (1 - abs(negativity ? biasD * Distance)) 
 
The agent will search for the action with the level of positivity that is closest to the 
level of (biased) involvement towards the user, the level of negativity closest to the 
level of (biased) distance towards the user, and the strongest action tendency. The 
importance of positivity, negativity and action tendency for selecting an action can be 
adjusted by changing the weights (wpos, wneg, and wat respectively). If an agent wants to 
perform more positive actions, it can, for example, increase its bias for involvement, 
and decrease its bias for distance. This way, the agent will prefer more positive and less 
negative actions. 
Note that this way, the agent can also deliberately lose by setting a high ambition 
level fo????????????human ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to win each game. The agent can also determine its ambition level for winning on the 
outcomes of the previous games, and the amount of money that is played for. For 
example, it can try to win the game if it has less money than the human user, and 
deliberately try to lose if it has more money than the human user. The agent can also 
determine the importance of each game, by dividing the amount that is played for by the 
total amount of money the agent has left. This importance can then be the deviation 
from 0 in the ambition level. 
2.3   Calculating the emotions of the agent 
The agent simulates some emotions while playing the game, based on the actions that 
are being performed by the user, the perceived likelihood of winning and losing, and the 
outcome of the game. Hope and fear are calculated each time the agent has made its 
move and the human user is on turn. The hope and fear of the agent are based on the 
perceived likelihood it will win or lose the game. If the human user is on turn and can 
make a winning move, it estimates the likelihood for losing 0.8, the likelihood for a tie 
0.1, and the likelihood for winning 0.1. If the agent could make a winning move if it 
would be on turn (but it cannot, because the human user is), it will estimate its 
likelihood for winning 0.5, the likelihood for a tie 0.4 and its likelihood for losing 0.1. 
Otherwise, the likelihood for winning and losing are both estimated 0.3 by the agent and 
the likelihood for a tie is estimated 0.4. 
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The found likelihoods are used in the following function to calculate the hope for a 
goal. This function is similar to the function described in [5]. 
 
IF f >= likelihood THEN hope_for_goal =  
-0,25 * ( cos( 1 / f * * likelihood(goal) ) -1,5) * ambition_level(goal) 
 
IF f < likelihood THEN hope_for_goal =  
-0.25 * ( cos( 1 / (1-f) * * (1-likelihood(goal)) ) -1.5) * ambition_level(goal) 
 
These functions differ from most approaches present in the literature, since their top 
is not situated at the point where the likelihood is 0. In these functions, f is a shaping 
parameter (in the domain [0, 1]) that can be used to manipulate the location of the top of 
the hope curve. The value of this parameter may differ per individual, and represents 
??????????? ???? ?????????????? ???? ???? ??? ???? ???????????????-curve is always situated at 
the point where likelihood = f. Thus, for an f close to 1, the top of the curve is situated to 
???? ???????? ?????? ?????????????? ???????? ????? ????? ??????? ??? ????? ???? ??????? ????? ?????
probabilities). Similarly, for an f close to 0, the top of the curve is situated to the 
extreme left (representing persons that already start hoping for events with low 
probabilities). In this paper, f is set at 0.5. We chose a smooth function instead of a 
linear function, because this function best matches the emotion curves found in humans. 
Furthermore, a higher ambition level simply leads to a higher hope (which is standard in 
the literature). If the ambition level is negative (i.e., the goal is undesired), the outcome 
of hope_for_goal will be a negative value. 
The following algorithm is performed to the found values for hope_for_goal 
 
1. Sort the values in two lists: [0?1] and [0?-1] 
2. Start with 0 and take the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list. Continue 
until the list is finished. Do this for both the negative and the positive list. 
3. Hope = Outcome positive list. Fear = abs(Outcome negative list). 
 
The values are sorted in a list with positive hope_for_goal??? ???????hope for desired 
goals), and negative hope_for_goal??????????fear for undesired goals). For both the lists, 0 
is the starting point, and the mean of the value you have and the next value in the list 
(where the next value is the value closest to 0 that is left in the list) is picked until the 
end of the list is reached. The new level of hope for the agent is the outcome of the 
positive list, and the new level of fear for the agent is the absolute value of the outcome 
of the negative list. 
The joy and distress of the agent are based on reaching or not reaching desired or 
undesired goal-states. If a goal-state becomes true (i.e., the agent wins or the human 
user wins), the levels of joy and distress are calculated by performing the following 
formulas: 
 
  IF ambition_level(goal) >= 0 THEN: 
     new_joy  = old_joy + mf_joy * ambition_level(goal) * (1-old_joy) 
     new_distress  = old_distress + mf_distress * -ambition_level(goal) * old_distress 
 
  IF ambition_level(goal) < 0 THEN: 
     new_joy  = old_joy + mf_joy * ambition_level(goal) * old_joy 
     new_distress  = old_distress + mf_distress * -ambition_level(goal) * (1-old_distress) 
 
In this formula, mf_joy and mf_distress are modification factors that determine how 
quickly joy and distress change if the agent wins or loses the game. In this paper, the 
values were both set at 1. These modification factors are multiplied with the impact 
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value, which is ambition_level(goal) for joy and -ambition_level(goal) for distress. This 
way, if a desired goal is reached, this will increase joy and decrease distress, and 
reaching an undesired goal will decrease joy and increase distress. Multiplying with 
limiter (1-old_joy) for joy and old_distress for distress if the goal is desired manages the 
formula does not go out of range. Further, it ??????????????????????????? level of joy or 
distress approaches an extreme value, it will be harder to push it further to the extreme, 
and easier to get it back to a less extreme value.  If the reached goal is undesired, 
old_joy is used as limiter for joy and (1-old_distress) as limiter for distress, because the 
values of joy and distress will move in the opposite direction as when the goal is 
desired. 
The level of surprise is calculated in a similar manner as in [5], [29]. To calculate the 
level of surprise during the game, the agent generates expectations about which move 
the user will make. If a square is free, that square gets a point. If the user can make three 
in a row, or prevent the agent from making three in a row the next turn, the square of 
that move gets 1 extra point. If the user has one X in a row, and the remaining squares 
of that row are free, those squares get 0.5 point. After all the squares have got their 
points, the sum of all points of the squares is normalized to 1. The resulting values for 
each square are the predicted likelihoods of the human making a move on that square. If 
the user makes a move on a certain square, the level of surprise for the agent is 1 ? 
likelihood(move). If the game finishes, the level of surprise for the agent is 1 minus the 
perceived likelihood that the game would end that way. 
After each move of the human user, the agent speaks a message, depending on the 
level of surprise. In the system, there is a small database of messages, labeled with 
certain emotion intensities. If the level of surprise is very low, it will show that it 
expected this move, with a ?????????????????????????????????????????? ????A predictable 
move?? On the other hand, if the agent is very surprised by the move of the user, it will 
?????? ??????? ??????????????????? ????? ??????????? ??????????????? ??? ????? ???? ????? ???
??????????? 
All five emotions inserted in the system (joy, distress, hope, fear and surprise) are 
simulated in parallel. If the level of joy, distress or surprise is below 0.5, a low intensity 
of the emotion is shown by the agent. If the level of joy, distress, or surprise is greater 
or equal than 0.5, a high intensity of the emotion is shown by the agent. Because 
playing the tic-tac-toe game rarely leads to extreme values of hope and fear in the agent, 
for hope and fear this boundary is set to 0.25. 
After each game has ended, the level of satisfaction for the agent is calculated in the 
range [-1, 1]. If the agent wins, the level of satisfaction will be the ambition level for 
??????? ??????? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??? ????????????? ????? ??? ????
ambition leve????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of the game is 
calculated by dividing the amount that is played for by the total amount of money of the 
agent. The satisfaction of the agent after a tied game is then calculated by multiplying 
the importance of the game with 0.5. 
Also a level of relief is calculated for the agent after each game, in the range [-1, 1], 
by multiplying the level of satisfaction with the level of surprise. Further, a message is 
displayed, based on the outcome of the game and the level of satisfaction and relief, the 
agent speaks a message in a similar way as after each move. If the agent wins, and the 
level of relief is low, and the level of satisfaction is low, it will display a neutral 
???????? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ????????????? ??? ???????? ??? ????? ???????? ?? ?????
????????????? ???????? ????? ???????? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? level of relief is higher, it 
speak?? ????? ???????????? ?????????? ????? ???????? ????? ??? ????? ?? ????? ????????? ??? ???? ??????
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loses, and has a relatively neutral level of satisfaction close to 0, it will display a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????atisfied, with a value close to -1, it will 
speak ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? If the game ends in a tie, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????? ????????
and it wins, it will show a happy facial expression. If it loses, it will look sad. If the 
???????? ????????? ???? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ??????? ???????????? ??? ????
ambition was to lose and it loses, the facial expression will be happy. 
3   Results 
To test the application, the behavior of the agent has been tested under various 
parameter settings. All agents experimented with can be found at [30]. 
Agent 1: The agent tries to win 
The ambition level for winning of agent 1 is set to 1, and its ambition level for losing is 
-1. The weight of the affective influences in the decision making process is set to 0. 
Under these parameter settings, the agent will always try to win. Because in tic-tac-toe 
it is impossible to lose if you play it right and you do not want to lose, it is impossible to 
win of the agent. The best game outcome that can be achieved is a draw.  
If the agent wins, it will increase its joy and decrease its distress. If the agent loses, it 
will decrease its joy and increase its distress. If you make a move the agent does not 
expect, or the game ends otherwise than expected, it will be surprised. The expectations 
of the agent can be seen on the website. If the agent thinks it is likely that it will win, it 
will have a relatively high level of hope, and if it thinks it is likely that it will lose, it 
will have a relatively high level of fear. 
Agent 2: The agent deliberately tries to lose 
Agent 2 has an ambition level for winning of -1, and an ambition level for losing of 1. 
This means for the agent, winning is an undesired goal, and losing is a desired goal. The 
weight of the affective influences in the decision making process have set to 0, so the 
agent will always try to lose. The only way to let the agent win is to make sure you 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? of the agent, it can do nothing else 
than make the winning move. Because the agent wants to lose, it will increase its level 
of joy and decrease its level of distress when it loses. If it wins, it will decrease its level 
of joy, and increase its level of distress. 
Agent 3: The agent decides whether it wants to win based on its money 
For agent 3, the ambition level for winning and losing is dependent on its amount of 
money compared to the amount of money of the human. If the agent has more money 
than the human, it will have an ambition level for winning of -1*importance and an 
ambition level for losing of 1*importance. If the amount of money of the agent is less or 
equal than that of the human, the agent will have an ambition level for winning of 
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1*importance and an ambition level for losing of -1*importance. The weight of the 
affective influences of the agent is set to 0. This causes the agent to try to win, unless it 
already has more money than the human user. If the agent has the ambition to win and it 
does, it will decrease its joy, and decrease its distress, and if it loses it will decrease its 
joy and increase its distress. However, if the agent has the ambition to lose, and it wins, 
it will decrease its joy and increase its distress, and vice versa if it loses. How big the 
increases and decreases of joy and distress are, depends on the importance of the game. 
Agent 4: The agent is too involved with the user to win 
Agent 4 is very involved with its user. It is programmed to perceive its user as good, 
beautiful, realistic, and intending to aid (designed values set to 1). It is also programmed 
to perceive its user as not bad, not ugly, not unrealistic, and not intending to obstruct. 
This causes the agent to be very involved with the user with a value of 0.85, and not 
much at a distance towards the user, with a value of 0.08 at the start of the simulation. 
The ambition level of the agent to win is defined as the importance of the game, and the 
ambition level to lose as the negation of this importance. The weight of rational 
influences in the decision-making process is set to 0. This makes the agent want to 
perform actions towards the user with a high level of positivity, and a low level of 
negativity. Because actions to win the game have a relatively low level of positivity and 
a high level of negativity, the agent will perform actions that facilitate losing the game. 
Because this agent always has a positive ambition to win and a negative ambition to 
lose, winning will always increase its level of joy, and decrease its level of distress, and 
losing will always decrease its level of joy, and increase its level of distress. How big 
this increase or decrease is, is dependent on the importance of the game. 
Agent 5: The agent is balanced, and wins sometimes, and loses sometimes 
Agent 5 perceives the user with values as can be seen in Table 1. This leads the agent to 
be involved with the user with a value of 0.63, and to be at a distance with the user with 
a value of 0.26 at the start of the simulation. The ambition level of the agent to win is 
defined as the importance of the game, and the ambition level to lose as the negation of 
this importance. The rational influences in the decision-making process are set to 0.8, 
and the influences of positivity and negativity of action are both set to 0.1. Despite 
having a higher ambition to win than to lose under all circumstances, the agent will be 
too involved with the user to try to win in a game for a small amount of money. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
agent finds the game so important that it will do its best to try to win. 
Similarly to agent 4, if agent 5 wins, this will increase joy and decrease distress, and 
vice versa if it loses. 
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4   Discussion 
This study presents an affective virtual agent that can play tic-tac-toe. Because it is 
equipped with Silicon Coppélia [19], an integration of three affect-related models as 
suggested in [3], it can show human-like emotional behavior. 
We created five different agents, each with different parameter settings, to test the 
behavior under various conditions. We manipulated the ambition levels of the agent, 
and thereby created agent 1, an agent that always tries to win, and agent 2, an agent that 
always deliberately tries to lose. Agent 3 determines its ambition level for winning and 
losing on whether it has more money than the user or not. If the user has more money 
than the agent, it will deliberately try to lose, but otherwise it will try to win. Agent 4 
bases its decisions in the game on emotions, and because it is designed to be very 
involved with the user, it will perform actions that facilitate the user winning the game. 
Agent 5 bases its decisions partly on emotions, and partly on rationality. Agent 5 always 
has more ambition to win than to lose. How big this difference in ambition is, is 
dependent on the amount of money that is played for. This results in the agent trying to 
win if the agent plays for a big amount of money, or when its money is almost gone. 
However, if the game is only about a small amount of money, the agent will be too 
involved with the user to try to win. Based on whether the agent reaches its goals 
(winning and losing when the agent has ambitions to win or lose), the likelihood of 
these goals, and the expectedness of the move of the user and the outcome of a game, 
the emotions joy, distress, hope, fear and surprise are simulated and shown by the agent 
by means of facial expressions. 
This virtual agent presented in this paper should be seen as a pilot application. Many 
improvements can still be made, such as giving feedback in a more sophisticated 
manner. Before it can be tested in a clinical setting, we should first discuss with experts 
where the application could be improved. We should also discuss with them what type 
of behavior the agent should show under which conditions, and adjust the parameter 
settings to meet these requirements. After that, user studies should indicate under which 
parameter settings participants find the agent most human-like.  
However, experimenting with a number of agents, each with different parameter 
settings indicates that a realistic affective agent playing tic-tac-toe can be created. 
Previous research already showed that interacting with a robot pet could decrease 
loneliness in patients staying in a long-term care facility. An artificial interaction partner 
that can show human-like emotional behavior might even have a greater beneficial 
effect on decreasing loneliness in patients. In future research, we intend to perform user 
studies to show whether this really is the case. 
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Abstract. In order to enhance user involvement in financial services, this paper 
proposes to combine the idea of adaptive personalization with intelligent virtual 
agents. A computational model for human decision making in financial context is 
introduced, and is incorporated within an intelligent virtual agent. To test whether 
the agent enhances user involvement, a web application has been developed, in 
which users have to make a number of investment decisions. This application has 
been evaluated in an experiment for a number of participants interacting with the 
system and afterwards providing their judgement by means of a questionnaire. 
The preliminary results indicate that the virtual agent can show appropriate 
emotional expressions related to states like happiness, greed and fear, and has 
high potential to enhance user involvement. 
Keywords: user involvement, finance, greed and risk, adaptive personalization. 
1   Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a huge increase in the amount of services that are being 
offered via the Internet. These services include, among others, financial services such as 
Internet banking [19]. Despite the success of such services, an existing challenge in this 
area concerns the question how to make people more involved in such financial 
applications. According to [1], customer involvement in financial services can be 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????16]). 
In order to increase this state of involvement in users of financial applications, some 
authors claim that personalization is an important criterion (e.g., [2, 7]): by having the 
system learn certain characteristics of the customer, this person will feel more 
understood and will be more likely to accept the service that is offered. However, there 
is also research that suggests that personalization alone is not sufficient for financial 
services to attract users for longer periods (e.g., [9]). 
To deal with this last issue, the current paper proposes to enhance user involvement 
in financial applications by combining adaptive personalization with the use of an 
intelligent virtual agent. As pointed out by various authors (e.g., [14]), human-like 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
finding was the inspiration to develop a personalized intelligent agent which supports 
persons that have to make financial (investment) decisions. As known from behavioral 
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economics, humans do not behave completely rationally when they have to decide 
between alternatives that involve risk (as, for example, in financial situations). Since 
then, from time to time it has been argued that theories of economic decision making 
need to incorporate psychological factors such as greed and fear [6, 13, 15, 18]. Thus, 
the main goal of this paper is to develop a virtual agent that has insight in and adapts to 
the individual psychological characteristics and states over time of persons that are 
working with financial applications. The virtual agent should exploit this on the one 
hand by providing appropriate support, in following these (dynamical) states and 
characteristics in an adaptive personalized manner. On the other hand, by showing the 
appropriate emotions at the right moment the virtual agent encourages involvement and 
reflection by the person through mirroring his or her states and decision making 
processes; for example, the agent may show the person how greedy he or she behaves. 
In order to develop such a supporting virtual agent, as a basis a solid computational 
model of human decision making in financial context is needed. To this end, the model 
presented in [3] is taken. This model takes some of the main principles underlying the 
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) [8, 17] as a point of departure, and extends these with 
mechanisms to incorporate psychological factors (inspired, among others, by [4, 10, 11, 
13, 15]). In the current paper, this model is extended and incorporated within an 
intelligent virtual agent. To test whether the agent enhances user involvement, a simple 
web application has been developed, in which users make a number of investment 
decisions. This application has been evaluated by a number of participants in an 
experiment in which they interacted with the agent and afterwards provided their 
judgement by means of a questionnaire. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the basic model for 
financial decision making (taken from [3]) is summarized, and extended to make it 
suitable for functioning in an interactive context. In Section 3, the extended model is 
illustrated by means of some simulations. Next, Section 4 describes how the model was 
incorporated within an intelligent virtual agent. Section 5 introduces the experiment that 
was performed to evaluate the virtual agent, and Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 
concludes the paper with a discussion. 
2   The Agent Model to Analyze Financial Decision Making 
This section presents the computational model that the virtual agent will use to analyze 
??????????behavior with respect to financial decision making. In particular, this model 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
risk taking. In Section 2.1, a global overview of the basic model (from [3]) is provided, 
and in Section 2.2, a mathematical formalization of this model is presented. Section 2.3 
presents an extension of the model that allows it to learn ????????????????????risk profile. 
2.1 Overview 
The agent model to analyze the financial decision making of a person is based on the 
??????????? ????? ?? ??????????????? ??? ????????????y her (long-term) personality profile 
(e.g., some persons are more risk seeking than others), combined with observations 
about recent events (e.g., if many investments have provided high returns recently, 
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persons are more likely to increase their greed, and as a consequence take more risk). 
These assumptions can also be found in existing literature such as [4, 10, 11, 13, 15]. A 
global overview of the agent model for financial decision making and its interaction 
with the world is depicted in Figure 1. In this figure, the dotted boxes represent, from 
left to right, the human agent that makes the investment decisions, and the world. The 
small circles denote states of human and world. Note the difference between input states 
(depicted at the left hand side of a box), internal states (depicted within the box), and 
output states (depicted at the right hand side). The arrows indicate (causal) relationships 
between states. 
As shown in Figure 1, the agent model includes a notion of greed as a mental state of 
an individual. This greed is assumed to be a dynamic state, which is continuously 
influenced by the results of earlier ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
concerning risk taking or risk avoidance. The former is considered to be depending, 
among ot???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
assumed to be a static characteristic of an individual. The greed directly affects the 
investment decisions that the individual makes: a person with higher greed will decide 
for more risky investments. To create an appropriate economic context, one particular 
type of investment decision is considered, namely the task to choose a financial product 
characterized by two factors concerning risk and expected gain. Thus the set of products 
is represented using a standard risk/return curve as proposed in the literature on Modern 
Portfolio Theory; e.g., [8].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the Agent Model and its Interaction with the World 
After an investment decision has been made, within the world the results of the 
investment are determined. These results depend not only on the selected product (in the 
sense that a more risky product has a lower probability to result in some return), but also 
on the economic state of the world. For simplicity, the current model considers the 
economic status as an external variable, although in reality this variable may depend on 
many other factors, such as the economic behavior of other agents in the system (cf. 
[4]). The results are observed by the individual, which completes the interactive loop 
between agent and world. 
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2.2 Formalization of the Adaptive Decision Making Process Model 
The model assumes that the user can choose between a finite number of products (in 
this paper, 10 products are used). Individuals are able to choose between these products 
by taking two aspects of a product into account, namely risk and expected return. To 
create a realistic range of products, the following parabolic equation is used for the 
relation between expected risk X and expected return Y (cf. [8, 17]): X=aY2+bY+c with 
a=1, b= -0.1 and c=0.1. The graph is shown in Figure 2. The idea is that more greedy 
persons will select products that are further to the right hand side of the curve.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Expected Risk/Return Curve 
In contrast to a risk profile of a human, which is usually considered a static personal 
characteristic, in the model presented here a dynamic state of greed is used as a basis for 
decision making. The dynamics of greed are modeled by the following difference 
equation: 
 
G(t+ t) = G(t) +  [((p+1)/2) E(t) ? G(t)] t 
 
Here G(t+ t) is the updated greed, G(t) is the old greed, E(t) is the world event 
concerning the return on the earlier chosen product, and p is the individual static risk 
profile (a personal characteristic; 0 means that the individual is low risk taking and 1 
means the individual is high risk taking). The flexibility factor  indicates the 
proportion of the old greed that is taken into account to determine the new greed;  = 
0.1 has been taken. The values of G, E and p are in the range between 0 and 1. The 
underlying idea of the formula is that persons may show more greedy behavior if their 
individual risk profile is more risk taking, and if they have received more positive 
experiences in the recent past (see also [4, 10, 11, 13, 15]). The initial values of P, G, 
and E are taken 0.5. 
Next, based on the greed and the personality characteristic p the person selects a 
product. As a first step the following factor r is determined: 
 
r = ((1/G)-1 ) / (2(p+1)) 
 
This r is taken as the required slope of the curve (depicted in Figure 2) for the 
product to be chosen, according to Modern Portfolio Theory. The actual choice of the 
product is made as follows. For each of the considered products (X, Y) the following is 
calculated: Z(X, Y) =Y - r*X. Then the product (X, Y) is chosen with the highest Z(X, Y). 
This product is the closest approximation of the point at the curve with slope r. 
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The model for calculating the return E of the investment is as follows; here W is the 
state of the world (taken between 0 and 1), and (X, Y) is the selected product: 
 
1. Generate a random number C between 0 and 1 (both inclusive) 
2. IF  C   X * (1-W)  THEN E = Y 
3. IF  C < X * (1-W)  THEN E = 0 
 
This shows, for example, that when the state of the economy W is maximal, there is no 
risk to have no return, and when W is minimal this risk is with probability X. 
 The decision model as described is adaptive in the sense that it adapts not only to the 
state of the world but also to the psychological state of greed of the person. In this way 
it follows more closely the decision making of a person over time than would be the 
case when only a static risk profile p was used as a personal characteristic. However, in 
the dynamics of this state of greed still the risk profile p plays its role. For each user, an 
appropriate value of this p has to be determined as well. How this is done in an adaptive 
manner, is described in the following subsection. 
2.3 Adapting the Value of the Risk Profile to the User 
The risk profile p is a characteristic that depends on the person. In case the model is 
used only for simulation (as in [3]), the modeler can simply fill in a value for this 
parameter. However, as in the current paper the model is applied at runtime to real 
humans, a mechanism is needed to estimate this value in an adaptive manner for a 
particular individual. To this end, this estimation is based ??????????????????????????????
In each iteration, the model compares the actual product as selected by the human (Xh, 
Yh) with the product that the software agent predicted to be selected (Xa, Ya). For each of 
these products (X, Y) the value of r(X, Y) is determined as indicated in the previous 
section. Then the value for p is adapted as follows. 
 
p(t+ t) = p(t) +  p(t) [ (r(Xa, Ya) - r(Xh, Yh))/ r(Xh, Yh) ] t 
if    r(Xa, Ya) - r(Xh, Yh)  0 
p(t+ t) = p(t) +  (1-p(t) )[ (r(Xa, Ya) - r(Xh, Yh))/ r(Xh, Yh) ] t 
if    r(Xa, Ya) - r(Xh, Yh)  0 
 
Here the adaptation rate  has been chosen 0.8. Thus, this mechanism adapts the value 
for p with a percentage that is proportional to the difference between the actual and 
predicted value of r.  
3   Example Simulations 
A number of simulation experiments have been performed before incorporating the 
model in the virtual agent application. First, some experiments were performed to 
evaluate the global behavior of the model. An example simulation trace is shown in 
Figure 3. Here, time is on the horizontal axis and G, W, E and the average profit 
received by the person are represented on the vertical axis. Moreover, the initial value 
of G = 0.5, p = 0.6, and  = 0.1. For the value of W, a scenario has been established that 
is based on existing empirical data. For these data, the global Gross Domestic Product 
data over the period 1969-2008 have been taken from [21]. As illustrated by this 
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simulation, the person continuously adapts its greed G to the status of the economy W. 
Thus, the person quickly learns which level of greed is most appropriate in which 
situation. For more simulation results, see [3]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example Simulation Results 
Next, some simulation experiments have been performed to test whether the agent 
correctly learns the risk profile of a (simulated) person. To this end, two versions of the 
decision making model were simulated: one for the human, and one for the agent which 
has ??? ????????? ???? ???????? ????? ????????? ????? ??????? ????? ???? ????? ????????? ????
parameter settings, but the values for p were different. For the human, different (static) 
values for p were taken, as shown in Figure 4: ph = 0, ph = 0.25, ph = 0.75 and ph = 1. 
For the agent, as initial value, pa = 0.5 was taken, but over time this value was adapted 
based on the mechanism described in Section 2.3. Moreover, in these formulae, the 
adaptation rate ? was taken 0.8. 
As indicated by the different graphs in Figure 4, in all cases the model was able to 
??????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
some cases the model over-compensates a bit due to the high value of ?, but this effect 
is minimal. 
Despite this positive result, one should be aware that these were ideal scenarios for 
???? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ???????? ????? ????????? ?????? ???? ???????????? ??????? ????????
exactly according to the decision making model. For real humans, this behavior will be 
more irregular, and thus the risk profiles will be more difficult to learn. 
 
     
ph = 0     ph = 0.25 
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ph = 0.75    ph = 1 
Fig. 4. Risk Profile of Agent and Person (Agent: blue line, Person: red line) 
4   The Use of a Virtual Agent 
The agent model described in Section 2 is able to analyze ????????????????????????????
by observing her decisions and the received returns, while tuning the risk profile to the 
person. Within this analysis not only this personal risk profile is available, which is 
assumed static for the person, but also the more dynamic greed level that actually 
determines the decisions. By having this, at each point in time the model can predict 
what a reasonable decision would be for the human, given her personal background and 
history. In particular at all stages of the process it can estimate and show the type and 
level of emotions expected. These emotions have been incorporated within a virtual 
agent, which can be shown to the human at runtime. 
To design and implement ????????????????????????????Peopleputty software [22] has 
been used. Through this software the face of the virtual agent was created. More 
specifically, twelve different faces were designed using the built in sliders for happy, 
sad, anger, mellowness, suspicion, and curiosity (which are related to facial 
expressions), and ego, aggression and energy (which are related to head movement). 
Each of these twelve faces represented a particular emotional state; one for each 
possible combination of the three required levels of the emotions happiness 
(slightly_happy, happy and very_happy), sadness (slightly_sad, sad and very_sad), fear 
(slightly_scared, scared and very_scared) and greed (slightly_greedy, greedy and very_greedy). 
In addition, a face for the state neutral was used. A web-based application was 
implemented, within which the virtual agent was embedded as a Haptek player. For this 
the scripting language JavaScript [20] was used, in combination with scripting 
commands provided by the Haptek software [22], to control the Haptek player within a 
web browser. 
Within the application, a human can make a number of consecutive investment 
decisions, while the virtual agent mimics the estimated emotional states related to 
happiness, sadness, greed and fear of the human (see the screenshot in Figure 5). In this 
application, in total 10 (represented by letters from A to J) products are given. The 
characteristics of these products are represented by the two variables X and Y, which are 
shown on the right hand part of the screen. Here, as in Section 2, X represents the risk of 
the product, and Y represents the expected return of the product. Note that in the model 
both X and Y have a value in the domain [0, 1], but in the application the values of Y 
have been scaled to the domain [0, 1000], to have them represent US dollars.  
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Fig. 5. Screenshot of the Application 
During a number of rounds, the human is asked to select a product from the given 
products (from A to J). After she selected a product, some time will pass, until a 
???????? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ???? ???????? ??? ????? ??????????? ????? ????? ???
???????????? ?????? ??? again takes some seconds until the real result is shown on the 
screen. To determine what this result will be, the formulae shown in Section 2.2 are 
used. Note that these formulae make use of the parameter W which represents the 
economic situation of the world. The value of this parameter fluctuates over time, and is 
not known to the user. 
In every round, the virtual agent shows emotional facial expressions at appropriate 
moments. The following fixed scheme determines when to show which type of 
emotional expression: 
 
1. human is asked to select a product 
2. agent shows face related to greed 
3. human selects a product 
4. agent shows face related to greed 
5. message is shown stating that result will soon be announced 
6. agent shows face related to fear 
7. result of investment is announced 
8. agent shows face related to happiness/sadness 
9. go back to 1. 
 
The criteria that determine the exact faces that are displayed are as shown in Table 1 
(where risk equals the X value of the selected product, profit equals the result of the 
investment (i.e., either 0 or the Y value of the selected product), and greed equals the 
value of G as estimated by the model). 
When the agent shifts from one facial expression to another, it would be undesirable 
if the emotions of the agent would shift too quickly. Therefore, these shifts are 
performed in a more fluent manner. For instance, if the agent shifts from very happy to 
very greedy, the following faces are shown consecutively: 
  very happy ? happy ? slightly happy ? neutral ? slightly greedy ? greedy ? very greedy 
Such a scenario is used when the agent shifts from any emotional state to another 
emotional state. 
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Table 1. Criteria for the displayed Face Expressions 
 Criterion Displayed 
Fear risk  0.5        neutral face 
risk > 0.5    &  risk  0.7   scared face 
risk > 0.7    &  risk  1 very scared face 
Happiness/Sadness profit = 0   very sad face 
profit > 0     &  profit  300 slightly happy face 
profit > 300  &  profit  600 happy face 
profit > 600) &  profit  1000 very happy face 
Greed greed  0.1 neutral face 
greed > 0.1  &  greed  0.3 slightly greedy face 
greed > 0.3  &  greed  1 very greedy face 
 
While the application is running, some information about the user is displayed in the 
??????? ?????? ????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ??????? ???? ????? ???????????? ????????? ???? ???????
estimated amount of fear and greed (in the domain [0, 1]), her current amount of profit 
received, and her total (cumulative) amount of profit. 
5   Experiments with the Virtual Agent 
A number of experiments were performed to test to what extent users of the application 
feel involved with the agent. In total, 15 participants were recruited to perform the 
experiment. The age of the participants ranged between 24 and 34, with a mean age of 
29 and a standard deviation of 2.78. Among the participants, 11 were male and 4 were 
female. 
Two variants of the experiment were designed, one with which the virtual agent was 
showing the appropriate emotions and one in which it did not show any emotions. All of 
the participants were asked to perform both variants (where we used counterbalancing 
to determine the order in which they were performed). 
Before they started the experiment, each participant was first are asked to read the 
following instructions:  
Imagine that you are an investor in a stock market. During a number of subsequent rounds, 
you have to select a product from a given set of products. Each round, the same 10 products 
are available. The characteristics of these products are represented by two variables (called 
X and Y), which are shown on the screen. Here, X is a value in the domain [0, 1] which 
represents the risk of the product (i.e., a higher value for X means that it is more likely that 
you will not receive the corresponding return), and Y is a value in the domain [0, 1000] 
which represents the expected return of the product in US dollars (i.e., a higher value for y 
means that you will earn more profit). The value of X is related to the probability p of not 
receiving the corresponding return Y according to the formula p = X * (1-W). Here, W is a 
number in the domain [0, 1] which represents the economic situation of the world (i.e., a 
higher value for W means that it is more likely that you will receive the corresponding 
return). However, the value of W fluctuates during the simulation, and is not shown to you. 
After you have selected a product, some time will pass, until a message is shown on the screen 
that the result of your investment will soon be announced. Next, it still takes some seconds 
until the real result is shown on the screen. As mentioned above, the probability of receiving 
the profit also depends on the economic status of the world. After the result of your investment 
has been announced, a new round starts, in which you are asked to make a new investment. In 
total, the experiment lasts 20 rounds. 
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Next, a small training was given to each participant, and after that the participants 
performed the actual experiment. When the experiment was finished, the person was 
asked to fill in a questionnaire. In this questionnaire (cf. [5]), the participants were 
asked to evaluate, using a 7 point Likert scale [12] (with 1=strongly disagree, 
7=strongly agree and 4=neutral), various properties of the agent related to involvement. 
In particular, they were asked whether they thought the virtual agent was friendly, 
trustworthy, showing emotions adequately, realistic, showing happiness, showing 
sadness, showing greed, showing fear and human-like.  
In each experiment, the value of the economic state W fluctuated between 0 and 1, as 
shown in Figure 6. However, the participants were not aware of this. 
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Fig. 6. Fluctuation of W during the Experiment 
6   Results of the Experiment 
This section presents the results of the experiment. First, some results are shown with 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
questionnaire are discussed. 
6.1 Risk Profile 
During the experiments, the values of the selected products, ???????????????????????risk 
profile p, and greed value G have been logged. This allows us to investigate the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this, we consider two scenarios. 
The risk profile p of two different persons as learned by the agent during the 
experiment is shown in Figure 7 and 8. In these figures, time is along the x-axis whereas 
the value of the estimated risk profile p is along the y-axis. In Figure 7, the agent 
interacts with a person with an extremely high risk profile, as this person was always 
selecting products with a high risk value. As can be seen from Figure 7, initially the 
value of estimated value of p fluctuates a lot, but eventually this value approaches 1. In 
this scenario, the person eventually obtained a profit of 11800 US$. 
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Fig. 7. Risk Profile of Person 1  Fig. 8. Risk Profile of Person 2 
In Figure 8, the agent interacts with a person with an extremely low risk profile. In 
this scenario, the person was always selecting products with low risk. As can be seen 
from Figure 8, initially the value of risk profile p drops to 0.017, then to almost 0 and 
stays around this value for the rest of the scenario. In this scenario, the person 
eventually obtained a profit of 2900 US$. 
In addition, Figure 9 shows the risk profiles of 6 different persons (P1 to P6) in one 
picture. As can be seen from this figure, P6 is very conservative, P2 is moderately 
conservative, P1 and P3 are moderately aggressive, and P4 and P5 are very aggressive 
investors. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Risk Profile of 6 Different Persons 
In the above experiments, the users did not know about the state of the world 
economy while making their decisions. To test whether such knowledge would make a 
difference, some additional experiments (with 6 new participants) have been conducted, 
in which the users are made more aware of the economic situation during the scenario 
(i.e., at each round the value of W, in the domain [0, 1], is shown to the user). Two 
different scenarios for the experiments have been created, one with a fluctuating value 
for W (identical to the scenario used above, see Figure 6), and one in which W was 
constantly set to 0.5. The results of these experiments are summarized in Figure 10 and 
11. In the latter case, with a constant world state the values seem to stabilize more than 
in the other cases. These results may suggest that the ???????????????????????????????????
world state may be a nontrivial factor in this context. 
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Fig. 10. Risk Profile during Scenario 1  Fig. 11. Risk Profile during Scenario 2 
(fluctuating world economy)   (constant world economy with W=0.5) 
6.2 Questionnaire 
In addition, the answers provided by the participants to the questions about their 
involvement with the virtual agent were analyzed by means of paired sample t-tests. 
The results are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Results of the Questionnaire 
Q # Question With 
Emotions 
Without 
Emotions 
Paired Sample Test 
Mean SD Mean SD t Sig(2tailed) 
1 Friendly 4.47 1.506 3.53 1.992 2.168 .048 
2 Trustworthy 4.13 1.598 2.47 1.246 4.183 .001 
3 Adequate emotions 4.93 1.223 2.40 1.844 4.219 .001 
4 Realistic 4.93 1.534 3.47 1.922 2.442 .028 
5 Happiness 5.84 0.834 2.13 1.457 9.153 .000 
6 Sadness 5.67 1.113 2.20 1.474 7.124 .000 
7 Greed 2.67 1.877 2.00 1.195 1.323 .207 
8 Fear 4.27 1.751 2.00 1.254 5.264 .000 
9 Happiness at right time 5.60 0.986 2.20 1.656 7.462 .000 
10 Sadness at right time 5.87 0.990 2.00 1.363 9.648 .000 
11 Fear at right time 4.13 1.598 1.93 1.387 4.036 .001 
12 Human-like 4.67 1.291 2.93 1.667 2.578 .022 
 
As shown in the table, for all properties except ???????, the participants scored the 
virtual agent with emotions above moderate. Similarly, for all properties except ???????, 
the participants appreciated this variant more than the virtual agent without emotions. 
The participants were also asked to give suggestions or comments about the application. 
Some participants said, for example, that the fear emotion should be more intense, while 
others said that the greed emotion should be improved, as they did not see this very 
well. Participants also indicated that they were more involved with the virtual agent 
with emotions. In addition, some participants were of the opinion that the agent should 
speak as well.  
The fact that greed did not score very well in this first test may depend on the type of 
face expression chosen for greed. To explore how the perception of greed could be 
enhanced, another small experiment was conducted. For this purpose 9 different 
alternative faces for greed were created using the Peopleputty software [22]. Six new 
participants were asked to rate each face on a 7 point scale, for its appropriateness to 
express greed. After all the participants gave their responses, for each face the average 
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score over all participant responses was taken, and the face with the highest average 
value was selected for a next experiment (again with 6 new participants). This 
experiment was identical to the experiment of which the results are given in Table 2, 
only in this case the new face was used to display the greed. Table 3 shows (part of) the 
results of this experiment. 
Table 3. Results of the Questionnaire for the Additional Experiment related to Greed 
Q # Question With Emotions Without Emotions Paired Sample Test 
Mean SD Mean SD t Sig(2-tailed) 
1 Greed 5.167 0.983 2.33 1.366 3.782 .013 
 
As can be seen, this time the greed was evaluated much better than in the first 
experiment, and resembles the evaluations of the other emotions. 
7   Discussion 
In this paper an adaptive agent model was presented combining adaptive personalization 
with intelligent virtual agents, in order to enhance user involvement in financial 
services. To this end a computational model for human decision making in financial 
context was introduced, and incorporated within an intelligent virtual agent. This 
computational model enables the virtual agent to have a form of understanding of the 
????????? ???????????? ??????? ???? ????????? ??????? ?????????? ??? ??? ????????? ????????
Moreover, a second way in which the agent was made adaptive was by equipping it 
with a model to tune the risk profile parameter to the person. 
A web application has been developed, in which users make a number of investment 
decisions. This application has been used to test whether the virtual agent enhances user 
involvement. This has been evaluated in an experiment for a number of participants 
interacting with the system and afterwards providing their judgement by means of a 
questionnaire. The preliminary results indicate that the virtual agent can be given facial 
expressions showing emotional states like happiness, greed and fear that are evaluated 
as appropriate (regarding the type of facial expression as well as the moments on which 
the expressions are shown). In particular, getting an appropriate expression for greed 
was nontrivial. 
For future work the virtual agent may be tested in a real environment to analyze 
whether it makes humans perform better in financial decision making, for example in 
the form of a Smartphone application. One of the factors that may need some more 
attention is the level of awareness of the person of the state of the world.  
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Discussion and Future Work 
The main goal of this dissertation as described in the first chapter is to explore how 
computational models of affect can be integrated within virtual agents. To this end 
different models have been analyzed, formalized, combined, simulated, and evaluated 
within applications in health care, business and game context. This thesis is composed 
of six parts, which comprise in total 13 chapters. For modeling and implementation, 
different modeling environments and implementation techniques were exploited, e.g., 
LEADSTO, C++, HTML, JAVASCRIPT, PHP and HAPTEK PeoplePutty. To check 
whether the models behaved as expected, both simulation experiments and empirical 
validation (partially) have been performed. 
Overview 
The research presented in each part of the thesis is discussed below. 
 
In ???????, the first investigated model put forward describes to which extent an agent 
becomes involved with another agent, or stays at a distance from it, by formalizing in a 
computational manner the previously informally described I-PEFiC model. More 
specifically, in Chapter 2, the informal theoretical model for involvement-distance 
trade-offs presented in [14] has been translated into a computational model, formalized 
in the language LEADSTO [1]. Two main results were established. First, the model 
turned out to be adequate for simulating the dynamics of involvement distance trade-
offs and their influence on satisfaction. Second, and perhaps more surprisingly, it was 
found that positive features can increase the level of distance, and that negative features 
can increase involvement. This is explained by the fact that these aspects do not directly 
influence involvement and distance, but only indirectly via the factors of similarity, 
relevance and valence. Although this finding may be counterintuitive, it corresponds to 
empirical evidence presented in [25, 26]. Chapter 3 presents an extension of the 
computational I-PEFiC model as described in Chapter 2 by goal-directed judgment 
formation and overt actions to enable software agents to combine rational with affective 
processing. Models of decision-making usually assume the process to be rational, which 
would exclude the possibility of emotions playing a role other than by disturbing the 
process [12]. However, humans often involve the emotions they feel in decision making 
in a constructive manner [24]. Simulation experiments have been conducted, and it was 
found that agents preferred affect-driven decision options to rationally driven decision 
options in situations where choices for low expected utility are irrational. Chapter 4 is 
an extension of the work described in Chapter 3, which manages that the actions agents 
undertake have an effect on other agents. The agents change their perceptions and 
beliefs about other agents if actions are taken. 
 
In Part III, the integration of three models of affect is addressed. The approach taken in 
this part was to select three of the more influential models, which share that they can be 
used to enhance believability of virtual characters: CoMERG [2] (Computational Model 
of Emotion Regulation based on Gross theory), EMA [20] (Emotion and Adaptation) 
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and I-PEFiCADM [16]  (?????? ?????????? ?????????? ???????? ??). First, in Chapter 5 these 
three computational models, which describe the processes related to emotion elicitation 
and regulation, are compared. The theories by which they were inspired cover a large 
amount of psychological literature in affect-related processes, including the works of 
Frijda [8], Lazarus [18], and Gross [10]. In this chapter, it is argued that each of the 
three approaches has its specific focus. For example, CoMERG [2] covers a wide 
variety of emotion regulation strategies, whereas I-PEFiCADM [16] provides an 
elaborated mechanism for encoding of different appraisal domains, which have 
empirically shown to be crucial in human-robot interaction. EMA on its turn contains 
very sophisticated mechanisms for both appraisal and coping, which have already 
proved their value in various applications. Because several of these features are 
complementary to each other, this chapter explores possibilities to integrate them into 
one combined model of affect for virtual agents. Chapter 6 presents Silicon Coppélia, a 
computational model which integrates of CoMERG [2], I-PEFiCADM [16], and EMA 
[20]. Compared to the model in I-PEFiCADM [16] the agents have goal-related beliefs 
that lead to emotions. Also, some emotion regulation strategies were added to the 
system based on [2, 24]. Simulation experiments show that Silicon Coppélia can 
simulate richer agent behavior than CoMERG [2], I-PEFiCADM [16] or EMA [20] can 
do alone. 
 
Part IV focuses on affective states of a person in financial/economical context. This 
part addresses how involvement in social life in the form of individual investment 
decisions depends on a personal risk profile, the state of greed of the person, and the 
state of the world economy. Chapter 7 discusses similarities and dissimilarities 
between agent-based models and population-based models in this context. Inspired by 
variants of predator-prey models (e.g., [5, 19, 21, 27]), a dynamic model was developed 
???? ???? ????????????? ???????? ??????????? ???????? ?????? ???? ???? state of the global 
economy. Simulation experiments for different population sizes were performed for 
both an agent-based and a population-based model. It turned out that, in particular for 
not too small population sizes, the differences in the economy and average greed 
between agent-based and population based simulations are close to zero. Chapter 8 
presents a different agent-based model of human financial decision-making behavior in 
economic context, based on psychological states and characteristics concerning greed 
and risk taking or risk avoidance. The model takes into account ideas underlying the 
Modern Portfolio Theory [13, 22] within finance, and incorporates a psychological 
concept greed and a risk characteristic. To evaluate the model a number of simulation 
???????????? ????? ????? ??????????? ?????? ??????????? ???? ???????? ???????? ??? ??????
investment behavior depending on the types of personality and the state of the economy.  
 
Part V addresses applications of virtual agents that show emotions. Here some of the 
computational models as presented in earlier parts are built in virtual agents in order to 
let them show the right emotions at the right time. Chapter 9 aims at building in 
emotion regulation into virtual characters. To this end, the informal model by Gross 
[10] was taken as a basis, as previously formalized using a dynamical system-style 
modeling approach [2]. A virtual environment has been created, which includes a 
number of virtual agents that have been equipped with the formalized model for 
emotion regulation. To test the behavior of the model in a prototyping phase, a series of 
simulation experiments has been performed using the LEADSTO simulation 
environment [1]; using the Vizard Virtual Reality Toolkit [28], these simulations have 
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been visualized in a graphical environment. The resulting movies provide a first 
indication that the emotion regulation strategies as described by [10] have been 
implemented successfully within the virtual characters. The simulation results have 
been compared with the behaviors for different situations as described by Gross [10] 
and found consistent. Chapter 10 presents a virtual agent that guides a person through 
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) questionnaire, which is used to estimate the 
severity of a depression. The agent responds empathically to the answers given by the 
user, by changing its facial expression. This resembles face to face therapy more than 
existing web-based self-help therapies. Chapter 11 describes a study of an affective 
virtual agent that can play tic-tac-toe. Being equipped with the integrated model as 
discussed in Chapter 6, which is an integration of three affect-related models as 
discussed in Chapter 5, it can show human-like emotional behavior. Simulation 
experiments with a number of agents were performed under different parameter settings, 
and pointed out that the agent is able to indeed show human-like emotional behavior, 
and can make decisions based on rational as well as affective influences. Chapter 12 
deals with a web-based financial investment support system equipped with a virtual 
agent. The virtual agent in the application tries to replicate human emotions, for 
example, related to greed, fear and disappointment when a person makes investment 
decisions and learns about the returns. Experiments with humans indicated that the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? application. 
Characterization of the chapters 
Various similarities and differences in characteristics can be found when comparing the 
different chapters of the thesis. In Table 1, an overview of the characteristics of the 
different chapters of the thesis is presented. The table indicates which chapter uses 
which theories or models, the domain of the model, the modeling environment for 
implementation used, and whether simulation and/or empirical validation was 
performed. Column 1 and 2 represent part and chapter numbers respectively, the next 
column indicates which theories or models were used as inspiration for the 
corresponding chapters. Column 4 indicates the discipline of the domain of the model 
(psychology, social science, economics). Next to this, Column 5 indicates which 
modeling environments were used in which chapters. Column 6 and 7 indicate whether 
simulations and/or empirical validation were used in each of the different chapters. A 
cross indicates that a certain dimension is employed in a certain chapter. The 
abbreviations used in Table 1 are given below. 
  
P    =  Psychology    S =  Simulation  
EF    =  Economics and Finance SS =  Social Sciences  
EV    =  Empirical Validation  MPT =  Modern Portfolio Theory 
FTE    =  Frijda, Theory of Emotion PBM =  Population Based Modeling 
EMA    =  Emotion and adaptation 
GTER    =  Gross Theory of Emotion Regulation   
LBE    =  Literature from Behavioral Economics 
EKCP    =  Expert Knowledge from Clinical Psychologists  
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I-PEFiC    =  Interactively, perceiving and experiencing fictional characters 
CoMERG =  Computational Model of Emotion Regulation based on Gross theory 
Table 1. Overview of the aspects addressed in different chapters of the thesis 
As can be seen from Table 1, most models and theories used as inspiration were taken 
from Social Sciences and Psychology, except Chapters 7, 8 and 12 in which literature 
from Economics and Finance was taken as a point of departure. In this thesis, an 
interdisciplinary approach was taken; to this end different theories / models were taken 
from different fields and have been combined to develop integrative models of affect. 
Most of these models have first been used for simulation, to test whether their overall 
behavior was satisfactory. For this, various modeling environments have been used, 
such as LEADSTO and C++. Next, in some chapters these models have been 
incorporated within applications related to health care, game and business context. 
These applications have been developed using JavaScript, in combination with the 
Vizard toolkit. Finally, for two of the applications (Chapter 10 and 12), user tests have 
been performed. The preliminary results of these tests show that through these 
applications, users are more involved in the applications. 
Part 
No. 
Chapter 
No. 
Theories  OR 
Models used 
Model 
Domain 
Modeling 
Environment 
S EV 
 
?? 
2 I-PEFiC SS 
P 
LEADSTO X  
3 I-PEFiC 
FTE 
SS  
P 
LEADSTO X  
4 I-PEFiC, 
I-PEFiCADM    
FTE 
SS  
P 
LEADSTO X  
 
 
??? 
5 CoMERG 
EMA 
I-PEFiCADM 
SS 
P 
   
6 CoMERG 
EMA 
I-PEFiCADM 
SS 
P 
JavaScript X  
 
?? 
7 LBE 
 
EF 
P 
C++ X  
8 MPT  
LBE 
EF 
P 
LEADSTO 
C++ 
X  
 
 
V 
9 GTER 
CoMERG 
P Vizard VR  
Toolkit 
X  
10 EKCP P JavaScript 
 
X X 
11 CoMERG  
EMA 
I-PEFiCADM 
SS 
P 
 
JavaScript 
 
X  
12 MPT 
LBE 
P 
EF  
P 
JavaScript 
 
X X 
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Future Work 
Concerning future work, the work discussed in the thesis opened numerous possibilities. 
In this section a number of them are discussed. 
A first direction for future work would be to validate the model discussed in Part III. 
For this purpose a speed date application will be developed in which users will interact 
with the agent to make an appointment for a date. The dating partner would be 
performed by an I-PEFiCADM [16] based software agent. The emotionally laden context 
of speed dating will be chosen because that context will make it easy to ask the users 
what the invisible counterpart would think of them, ethically, aesthetically, and whether 
they believe the other would want to make an appointment with them. Attention will be 
paid to five issues of I-PEFiCADM [16] that are particularly of interest to a speed date 
situation. The issues are Aesthetics (beautiful, ugly), Ethics (good, bad), relevance to 
personal concerns [9] (Relevance), feeling involved (Involvement), feeling distance 
(Distance), and intentions to use e.g., willingness to meet again (Use Intentions). An 
interesting question is whether users would recognize that the agent is making ethical 
and aesthetic asse???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
meet) them again either in another dating session or in real life. During these speed-
dating sessions possibly 7 topics (Family, Sports, Appearance, Hobbies, Music, Food, 
and Relationships) will be used. Using the application, various hypotheses as derived 
from the I-PEFiCADM [16] model will be tested. 
Another direction for future work would be to extend the application discussed in 
Chapter 12. The idea is to develop a banking application in which a virtual agent guides 
a client during investment decisions. The application would be equipped with an 
intelligent virtual agent (IVA), which will determine the risk profile of the client, among 
others using a questionnaire. After that, the IVA will decide, what kind of investment is 
preferable for the client. In addition to that the IVA will also try to regulate the 
emotions of the client. The application would be developed in JavaScript and PHP and 
the IVA would speak with the agent interactively. 
A final possibility for future research is to extend the application discussed in 
Chapter 10. As a first step, it is planned to validate the application with patients with 
depression. After validation, similar kinds of self-help therapy applications for 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Reinforcing Behavioral Therapy (RBT) can 
be developed,  as it is evident from literature that CBT is effective for the treatment of a 
variety of problems, including mood, anxiety, personality, eating, substance abuse, and 
psychotic disorders [6], [7]. By developing such applications, the potential of the 
developed models for affect would be further explored. 
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Samenvatting  
 
Onderzoekers zijn de afgelopen jaren in toenemende mate geïnteresseerd geraakt in de 
toepassing van intelligente virtuele agenten in verschillende domeinen. Intelligente 
virtuele agenten (IVAs) zijn autonome, grafisch belichaamde agenten in een virtuele 
omgeving die in staat zijn om op een intelligente manier interactie te hebben met de 
omgeving, andere IVAs, of met menselijke gebruikers. Recentelijk is veel onderzoek 
gewijd aan het ontwikkelen van virtuele agenten met meer realistische grafische 
representaties. Echter, de affectieve eigenschappen van zulke agenten zijn doorgaans 
vrij beperkt, and niet erg menselijk. Hoewel veel IVAs tegenwoordig bijvoorbeeld de 
mogelijkheid hebben om op de één of andere manier emoties te tonen door middel van 
verschillende gezichtsuitdrukkingen, is het behoorlijk moeilijk voor ze om de juiste 
emotie op het juiste moment te tonen. Om nog een stap verder te gaan, het is zelfs nog 
moeilijker voor ze om de emotionele toestand van andere agenten daadwerkelijk te 
begrijpen en om daar op een empathische manier op te reageren. Dit is in tegenspraak 
met de behoefte van virtuele agenten om menselijk affectief gedrag nauwkeurig te 
kunnen nabootsen. Verschillende studies in de Sociale Wetenschappen hebben 
aangetoond dat dit een belangrijke voorwaarde is voor een agent om menselijke 
betrokkenheid binnen een virtuele omgeving te vergroten. Daarom zijn bestaande op 
IVAs gebaseerde systemen niet zo effectief als ze zouden kunnen zijn. Eigenschappen 
die zij typisch ontberen zijn de mogelijkheid om emoties te tonen (niet alleen in termen 
van gezichtsuitdrukking, maar ook in termen van gedrag), in samenhang met inzicht in 
de cognitieve en affectieve toestanden van elkaar en van mensen. 
Om dit probleem aan te pakken stellen sommige auteurs voor om de affectieve 
eigenschappen van interactieve softwareagenten te vergroten door kennis van de 
Psychologie en Cognitiewetenschappen als basis te gebruiken voor het rekenkundig 
modelleren van de cognitieve en affectieve processen in kwestie. Recentelijk is een 
verscheidenheid van zulke computermodellen ontwikkeld voor verschillende aspecten 
van menselijk gedrag. Voorbeelden omvatten modellen voor redeneerprocessen, visuele 
aandacht, emotieregulatie, gedachten lezen, stress en werkdruk, en gemoedstoestanden. 
Wanneer zulke computermodellen beschikbaar zijn in een formele notatie, opent dit de 
mogelijkheid om IVAs met ze uit te rusten. Echter, de stap van bestaande 
computermodellen (die grotendeels gebruikt worden voor simulatiedoeleinden) naar 
modellen die direct kunnen worden ingeplugd in een virtuele (3D) omgeving, zodanig 
dat de IVAs zich volgens het cognitieve model gedragen, is een niet triviale. In 
werkelijkheid betreft deze stap een iteratief proces, bestaande uit, onder anderen, de 
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volgende subtaken: het verfijnen van het computermodel, het vertalen naar een 
specifieke programmeeromgeving, en het testen en evalueren van het resulterende 
model in de virtuele setting.  
Het voornaamste onderzoeksdoel van dit proefschrift is om te onderzoeken hoe 
computermodellen van emoties kunnen worden geïntegreerd binnen virtuele agenten. 
Hiertoe zijn verschillende theorieën vanuit verschillende gebieden (bv, Sociale 
Wetenschappen, Psychologie, Economie) beschouwd en gecombineerd om integratieve 
modellen van emoties te ontwikkelen. De meeste van deze modellen zijn eerst gebruikt 
voor simulatie, om te testen of hun gehele gedrag bevredigend was. Hiervoor zijn 
verschillende modelleeromgevingen gebruikt, zoals LEADSTO en C++. Vervolgens 
zijn deze modellen ingebouwd binnen toepassingen gerelateerd aan de zorg, games, en 
het bedrijfsleven. Deze toepassingen zijn ontwikkeld met behulp van JavaScript, in 
combinatie met de Vizard toolkit. Uiteindelijk zijn voor sommige toepassingen 
gebruikerstests uitgevoerd. De voorlopige resultaten van deze tests tonen aan dat 
gebruikers dankzij de ontwikkelde modellen meer betrokken raken bij de toepassingen.  
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift wordt de mate waarin een agent betrokken 
raakt bij een andere agent, of op afstand hiervan blijft, gemodelleerd, door op een 
rekenkundige manier het (eerder informeel beschreven) I-PEFiC model te formaliseren. 
Deze maten hangen af van verschillende aspecten van de andere agent zoals ethiek 
(goed of slecht), esthetiek (mooi of lelijk), realisme (hoe realistisch of onrealistisch de 
andere agent is), gelijkheid (overeenkomsten tussen de twee agenten) en mogelijkheden 
die de andere agent biedt als hulpmiddel of obstakel voor de taakuitvoering van de 
agent. Als tweede wordt de integratie van de drie modellen van emoties behandeld. De 
in dit deel gekozen aanpak is om drie van de meer invloedrijke modellen te selecteren, 
die gemeenschappelijk hebben dat ze kunnen worden gebruikt om geloofwaardigheid 
van virtuele karakters te vergroten: CoMERG (Computational Model of Emotion 
Regulation based on Gross theory), EMA (Emotion and Adaptation) en I-PEFiCADM (I-
PEFiC uitgebreid met een module voor ?Affective Decision Making?). Daarna focussen 
we op het modelleren van affectieve toestanden van een persoon in economische 
context. Deze economische context wordt beschouwd als een grootschalig multi-
agentsysteem bestaande uit duizenden of miljoenen andere agenten. In dit deel wordt 
beschreven hoe iemands betrokkenheid bij deze andere agenten in de vorm van 
individuele investeringsbeslissingen afhangen van een persoonlijk risicoprofiel, de mate 
van hebzucht van de persoon, en de toestand van de wereldeconomie. Ten slotte worden 
in het laatste deel van het proefschrift toepassingen van virtuele agenten die emoties 
tonen in de domeinen van de zorg, het bedrijfsleven en games gepresenteerd en 
geëvalueerd. 
 
 
SIKS Dissertation Series 
 
2010 
 
2010-01 
Matthijs van Leeuwen (UU)  
Patterns that Matter  
 
2010-02 
Ingo Wassink (UT) 
Work flows in Life Science 
 
2010-03 
Joost Geurts (CWI)  
A Document Engineering Model and 
Processing Framework for Multimedia 
documents  
 
2010-04 
Olga Kulyk (UT) 
Do You Know What I Know? Situational 
Awareness of Co-located Teams in 
Multidisplay Environments 
 
2010-05 
Claudia Hauff (UT) 
Predicting the Effectiveness of Queries and 
Retrieval Systems  
 
2010-06 
Sander Bakkes (UvT) 
Rapid Adaptation of Video Game AI 
 
2010-07 
Wim Fikkert (UT ) 
A Gesture interaction at a Distance  
 
2010-08 
Krzysztof Siewicz (UL) 
Towards an Improved Regulatory 
Framework of Free Software. Protecting 
user freedoms in a world of software 
communities and eGovernments 
 
 
2010-09 
Hugo Kielman (UL) 
Politiële gegevensverwerking en Privacy, 
Naar een effectieve waarborging 
 
2010-10 
Rebecca Ong (UL) 
Mobile Communication and Protection of 
Children  
 
2010-11 
Adriaan Ter Mors (TUD) 
The world according to MARP: Multi-
Agent Route Planning  
 
2010-12 
Susan van den Braak (UU) 
Sensemaking software for crime analysis 
 
2010-13 
Gianluigi Folino (RUN)  
High Performance Data Mining using Bio-
inspired techniques  
 
2010-14 
Sander van Splunter (VU) 
Automated Web Service Reconfiguration 
 
2010-15 
Lianne Bodenstaff (UT) 
Managing Dependency Relations in Inter-
Organizational Models  
 
2010-16 
Sicco Verwer (TUD) 
Efficient Identification of Timed Automata, 
theory and practice 
 
2010-17 
Spyros Kotoulas (VU)  
Scalable Discovery of Networked 
Resources: Algorithms, Infrastructure, 
Applications 
244 
2010-18 
Charlotte Gerritsen (VU) 
Caught in the Act: Investigating Crime by 
Agent-Based Simulation 
 
2010-19 
Henriette Cramer (UvA)  
People's Responses to Autonomous and 
Adaptive Systems 
 
2010-20 
Ivo Swartjes (UT) 
Whose Story Is It Anyway? How Improv 
Informs Agency and Authorship in 
Emergent Narrative  
 
2010-21 
Harold van Heerde (UT)  
Privacy-aware data management by means 
of data degradation 
 
2010-22 
Michiel Hildebrand (CWI)  
End-user Support for Access to\\ 
Heterogeneous Linked Data  
 
2010-23 
Bas Steunebrink (UU)  
The Logical Structure of Emotions 
 
2010-24 
Dmytro Tykhonov  
Designing Generic and Efficient 
Negotiation Strategies  
 
2010-25 
Zulfiqar Ali Memon (VU)  
Modelling Human-Awareness for Ambient 
Agents: A Human Mindreading Perspective 
 
2010-26 
Ying Zhang (CWI) 
XRPC: Efficient Distributed Query 
Processing on Heterogeneous XQuery 
Engines 
 
2010-27 
Marten Voulon (UL) 
Automatisch contracteren 
 
2010-28 
Arne Koopman (UU) 
Characteristic Relational Patterns 
 
2010-29 
Stratos Idreos (CWI) 
Database Cracking: Towards Auto-tuning 
Database Kernels 
 
2010-30 
Marieke van Erp (UvT) 
Accessing Natural History - Discoveries in 
data cleaning, structuring, and retrieval 
 
2010-31 
Victor de Boer (UVA) 
Ontology Enrichment from Heterogeneous 
Sources on the Web 
 
2010-32 
Marcel Hiel (UvT) 
An Adaptive Service Oriented Architecture: 
Automatically solving Interoperability 
Problems  
 
2010-33 
Robin Aly (UT) 
Modeling Representation Uncertainty in 
Concept-Based Multimedia Retrieval  
 
2010-34 
Teduh Dirgahayu (UT)  
Interaction Design in Service Compositions 
 
2010-35 
Dolf Trieschnigg (UT) 
Proof of Concept: Concept-based 
Biomedical Information Retrieval 
 
2010-36 
José Janssen (OU) 
Paving the Way for Lifelong Learning 
Facilitating competence development 
through a learning path specification 
 
2010-37 
Niels Lohmann (TUE) 
Correctness of services and their 
composition 
 
2010-38 
Dirk Fahland (TUE) 
From Scenarios to components 
 
2010-39 
Ghazanfar Farooq Siddiqui (VU) 
Integrative Modeling of Emotions in 
Virtual Agents 
SIKS Dissertation Series                                                                                               245 
2009 
 
2009-01 
Rasa Jurgelenaite (RUN) 
Symmetric Causal Independence Models 
 
2009-02 
Willem Robert van Hage (VU) 
Evaluating Ontology-Alignment 
Techniques 
 
2009-03 
Hans Stol (UvT) 
A Framework for Evidence-based Policy 
Making Using IT  
 
2009-04 
Josephine Nabukenya (RUN) 
Improving the Quality of Organisational 
Policy Making using Collaboration 
Engineering 
 
2009-05 
Sietse Overbeek (RUN) 
Bridging Supply and Demand for 
Knowledge Intensive Tasks - Based on 
Knowledge, Cognition, and Quality 
 
2009-06 
Muhammad Subianto (UU)  
Understanding Classification  
 
2009-07 
Ronald Poppe (UT) 
Discriminative Vision-Based Recovery and 
Recognition of Human Motion 
 
2009-08 
Volker Nannen (VU)  
Evolutionary Agent-Based Policy Analysis 
in Dynamic Environments 
 
2009-09 
Benjamin Kanagwa (RUN) 
Design, Discovery and Construction of 
Service-oriented Systems 
 
2009-10 
Jan Wielemaker (UVA)  
Logic programming for knowledge-
intensive interactive applications 
 
 
2009-11 
Alexander Boer (UVA) 
Legal Theory, Sources of Law & the 
Semantic Web  
 
2009-12 
Peter Massuthe (TUE, Humboldt-
Universitaet zu Berlin) 
Operating Guidelines for Services  
 
2009-13 
Steven de Jong (UM) 
Fairness in Multi-Agent Systems  
 
2009-14 
Maksym Korotkiy (VU) 
From ontology-enabled services to service-
enabled ontologies (making ontologies 
work in e-science with ONTO-SOA)  
 
2009-15 
Rinke Hoekstra (UVA) 
Ontology Representation - Design Patterns 
and Ontologies that Make Sense 
 
2009-16 
Fritz Reul (UvT) 
New Architectures in Computer Chess  
 
2009-17 
Laurens van der Maaten (UvT) 
Feature Extraction from Visual Data 
 
2009-18 
Fabian Groffen (CWI) 
Armada, An Evolving Database System  
 
2009-19 
Valentin Robu (CWI) 
Modeling Preferences, Strategic Reasoning 
and Collaboration in Agent-Mediated 
Electronic Markets 
 
2009-20 
Bob van der Vecht (UU) 
Adjustable Autonomy: Controling 
Influences on Decision Making  
 
2009-21 
Stijn Vanderlooy (UM) 
Ranking and Reliable Classification 
 
 
246 
2009-22 
Pavel Serdyukov (UT) 
Search For Expertise: Going beyond direct 
evidence  
 
2009-23 
Peter Hofgesang (VU) 
Modelling Web Usage in a Changing 
Environment 
 
2009-24 
Annerieke Heuvelink (VU) 
Cognitive Models for Training Simulations  
 
2009-25 
Alex van Ballegooij (CWI) 
"RAM: Array Database Management 
through Relational Mapping"  
 
2009-26 
Fernando Koch (UU) 
An Agent-Based Model for the 
Development of Intelligent Mobile Services  
 
2009-27 
Christian Glahn (OU) 
Contextual Support of social Engagement 
and Reflection on the Web 
 
2009-28 
Sander Evers (UT) 
Sensor Data Management with Probabilistic 
Models  
 
2009-29 
Stanislav Pokraev (UT) 
Model-Driven Semantic Integration of 
Service-Oriented Applications 
 
2009-30 
Marcin Zukowski (CWI) 
Balancing vectorized query execution with 
bandwidth-optimized storage  
 
2009-31 
Sofiya Katrenko (UVA) 
A Closer Look at Learning Relations from 
Text 
 
 
 
 
 
2009-32 
Rik Farenhorst (VU) and Remco de Boer 
(VU)  
Architectural Knowledge Management: 
Supporting Architects and Auditors  
 
2009-33 
Khiet Truong (UT) 
How Does Real Affect Affect Affect 
Recognition In Speech? 
 
2009-34 
Inge van de Weerd (UU) 
Advancing in Software Product 
Management: An Incremental Method 
Engineering Approach  
 
2009-35 
Wouter Koelewijn (UL) 
Privacy en Politiegegevens; Over 
geautomatiseerde normatieve informatie-
uitwisseling 
 
2009-36 
Marco Kalz (OU) 
Placement Support for Learners in Learning 
Networks  
 
2009-37 
Hendrik Drachsler (OU) 
Navigation Support for Learners in 
Informal Learning Networks 
 
2009-38 
Riina Vuorikari (OU) 
Tags and self-organisation: a metadata 
ecology for learning resources in a 
multilingual context  
 
2009-39 
Christian Stahl (TUE, Humboldt-
Universitaet zu Berlin)  
Service Substitution -- A Behavioral 
Approach Based on Petri Nets  
 
2009-40 
Stephan Raaijmakers (UvT) 
Multinomial Language Learning: 
Investigations into the Geometry of 
Language  
 
 
 
SIKS Dissertation Series                                                                                               247 
2009-41 
Igor Berezhnyy (UvT)  
Digital Analysis of Paintings  
 
2009-42 
Toine Bogers (UvT) 
Recommender Systems for Social 
Bookmarking  
 
2009-43 
Virginia Nunes Leal Franqueira (UT) 
Finding Multi-step Attacks in Computer 
Networks using Heuristic Search and 
Mobile Ambients  
 
2009-44 
Roberto Santana Tapia (UT) 
Assessing Business-IT Alignment in 
Networked Organizations  
 
2009-45 
Jilles Vreeken (UU) 
Making Pattern Mining Useful  
 
2009-46 
Loredana Afanasiev (UvA) 
Querying XML: Benchmarks and 
Recursion  
 
2008 
 
2008-01 
Katalin Boer-Sorbán (EUR) 
Agent-Based Simulation of Financial 
Markets: A modular, continuous-time 
approach 
 
2008-02 
Alexei Sharpanskykh (VU) 
On Computer-Aided Methods for Modeling 
and Analysis of Organizations 
 
2008-03 
Vera Hollink (UVA) 
Optimizing hierarchical menus: a usage-
based approach 
 
2008-04 
Ander de Keijzer (UT) 
Management of Uncertain Data - towards 
unattended integration 
 
 
2008-05 
Bela Mutschler (UT) 
Modeling and simulating causal 
dependencies on process-aware information 
systems from a cost perspective 
 
2008-06 
Arjen Hommersom (RUN) 
On the Application of Formal Methods to 
Clinical Guidelines, an Artificial 
Intelligence Perspective 
 
2008-07 
Peter van Rosmalen (OU) 
Supporting the tutor in the design and 
support of adaptive e-learning 
 
2008-08 
Janneke Bolt (UU) 
Bayesian Networks: Aspects of  
Approximate Inference 
 
2008-09 
Christof van Nimwegen (UU) 
The paradox of the guided user: assistance 
can be counter-effective 
 
2008-10 
Wouter Bosma (UT) 
Discourse oriented summarization 
 
2008-11 
Vera Kartseva (VU) 
Designing Controls for Network 
Organizations: A Value-Based Approach 
 
2008-12 
Jozsef Farkas (RUN) 
A Semiotically Oriented Cognitive Model 
of Knowledge Representation 
 
2008-13 
Caterina Carraciolo (UVA) 
Topic Driven Access to Scientific 
Handbooks 
 
2008-14 
Arthur van Bunningen (UT) 
Context-Aware Querying; Better Answers 
with Less Effort  
 
 
 
248 
2008-15 
Martijn van Otterlo (UT) 
The Logic of Adaptive Behavior: 
Knowledge Representation and Algorithms 
for the Markov Decision Process 
Framework in First-Order Domains. 
 
2008-16 
Henriette van Vugt (VU) 
Embodied agents from a user's perspective 
 
2008-17 
Martin Op 't Land (TUD) 
Applying Architecture and Ontology to the 
Splitting and Allying of Enterprises 
 
2008-18 
Guido de Croon (UM) 
Adaptive Active Vision 
 
2008-19 
Henning Rode (UT) 
From Document to Entity Retrieval: 
Improving Precision and Performance of 
Focused Text Search 
 
2008-20 
Rex Arendsen (UVA) 
Geen bericht, goed bericht. Een onderzoek 
naar de effecten van de introductie van 
elektronisch berichtenverkeer met de 
overheid op de administratieve lasten van 
bedrijven. 
 
2008-21 
Krisztian Balog (UVA) 
People Search in the Enterprise 
 
2008-22 
Henk Koning (UU) 
Communication of IT-Architecture 
 
2008-23 
Stefan Visscher (UU) 
Bayesian network models for the 
management of ventilator-associated 
pneumonia  
 
2008-24 
Zharko Aleksovski (VU) 
Using background knowledge in ontology 
matching 
 
2008-25 
Geert Jonker (UU) 
Efficient and Equitable Exchange in Air 
Traffic Management Plan Repair using 
Spender-signed Currency 
 
2008-26 
Marijn Huijbregts (UT) 
Segmentation, Diarization and Speech 
Transcription: Surprise Data Unraveled 
 
2008-27 
Hubert Vogten (OU) 
Design and Implementation Strategies for 
IMS Learning Design 
 
2008-28 
Ildiko Flesch (RUN) 
On the Use of Independence Relations in 
Bayesian Networks 
 
2008-29 
Dennis Reidsma (UT) 
Annotations and Subjective Machines - Of 
Annotators, Embodied Agents, Users, and 
Other Humans 
 
2008-30 
Wouter van Atteveldt (VU) 
Semantic Network Analysis: Techniques 
for Extracting, Representing and Querying 
Media Content 
 
2008-31 
Loes Braun (UM) 
Pro-Active Medical Information Retrieval 
 
2008-32 
Trung H. Bui (UT) 
Toward Affective Dialogue Management 
using Partially Observable Markov 
Decision Processes 
 
2008-33 
Frank Terpstra (UVA) 
Scientific Workflow Design; theoretical and 
practical issues 
 
2008-34 
Jeroen de Knijf (UU) 
Studies in Frequent Tree Mining 
 
 
SIKS Dissertation Series                                                                                               249 
2008-35 
Ben Torben Nielsen (UvT) 
Dendritic morphologies: function shapes 
structure 
 
2007 
 
2007-01 
Kees Leune (UvT) 
Access Control and Service-Oriented 
Architectures 
 
2007-02 
Wouter Teepe (RUG) 
Reconciling Information Exchange and 
Confidentiality: A Formal Approach 
 
2007-03 
Peter Mika (VU) 
Social Networks and the Semantic Web 
 
2007-04 
Jurriaan van Diggelen (UU) 
Achieving Semantic Interoperability in 
Multi-agent Systems: a dialogue-based 
approach 
 
2007-05 
Bart Schermer (UL) 
Software Agents, Surveillance, and the 
Right to Privacy: a Legislative Framework 
for Agent-enabled Surveillance 
 
2007-06 
Gilad Mishne (UVA) 
Applied Text Analytics for Blogs 
 
2007-07 
Natasa Jovanovic' (UT) 
To Whom It May Concern - Addressee 
Identification in Face-to-Face Meetings 
 
2007-08 
Mark Hoogendoorn (VU) 
Modeling of Change in Multi-Agent 
Organizations 
 
2007-09 
David Mobach (VU) 
Agent-Based Mediated Service Negotiation 
 
 
 
2007-10 
Huib Aldewereld (UU) 
Autonomy vs. Conformity: an Institutional 
Perspective on Norms and Protocols 
 
2007-11 
Natalia Stash (TUE) 
Incorporating Cognitive/Learning Styles in 
a General-Purpose Adaptive Hypermedia 
System 
 
2007-12 
Marcel van Gerven (RUN) 
Bayesian Networks for Clinical Decision 
Support: A Rational Approach to Dynamic 
Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
 
2007-13 
Rutger Rienks (UT) 
Meetings in Smart Environments; 
Implications of Progressing Technology 
 
2007-14 
Niek Bergboer (UM) 
Context-Based Image Analysis 
 
2007-15 
Joyca Lacroix (UM) 
NIM: a Situated Computational Memory 
Model 
 
2007-16 
Davide Grossi (UU) 
Designing Invisible Handcuffs. Formal 
investigations in Institutions and 
Organizations for Multi-agent Systems 
 
2007-17 
Theodore Charitos (UU) 
Reasoning with Dynamic Networks in 
Practice 
 
2007-18 
Bart Orriens (UvT) 
On the development an management of 
adaptive business collaborations 
 
2007-19 
David Levy (UM) 
Intimate relationships with artificial 
partners 
 
 
250 
2007-20 
Slinger Jansen (UU) 
Customer Configuration Updating in a 
Software Supply Network 
 
2007-21 
Karianne Vermaas (UU) 
Fast diffusion and broadening use: A 
research on residential adoption and usage 
of broadband internet in the Netherlands 
between 2001 and 2005 
 
2007-22 
Zlatko Zlatev (UT) 
Goal-oriented design of value and process 
models from patterns 
 
2007-23 
Peter Barna (TUE) 
Specification of Application Logic in Web 
Information Systems 
 
2007-24 
Georgina Ramírez Camps (CWI) 
Structural Features in XML Retrieval 
 
2007-25 
Joost Schalken (VU) 
Empirical Investigations in Software 
Process Improvement 
 
2006 
 
2006-01 
Samuil Angelov (TUE) 
Foundations of B2B Electronic Contracting 
 
2006-02 
Cristina Chisalita (VU) 
Contextual issues in the design and use of 
information technology in organizations 
 
2006-03 
Noor Christoph (UVA) 
The role of metacognitive skills in learning 
to solve problems 
 
2006-04 
Marta Sabou (VU) 
Building Web Service Ontologies 
 
 
 
2006-05 
Cees Pierik (UU) 
Validation Techniques for Object-Oriented 
Proof Outlines 
 
2006-06 
Ziv Baida (VU) 
Software-aided Service Bundling - 
Intelligent Methods & Tools for Graphical 
Service Modeling 
 
2006-07 
Marko Smiljanic (UT) 
XML schema matching -- balancing 
efficiency and effectiveness by means of 
clustering 
 
2006-08 
Eelco Herder (UT) 
Forward, Back and Home Again - 
Analyzing User Behavior on the Web 
 
2006-09 
Mohamed Wahdan (UM) 
Automatic Formulation of the Auditor's 
Opinion 
 
2006-10 
Ronny Siebes (VU) 
Semantic Routing in Peer-to-Peer Systems 
 
2006-11 
Joeri van Ruth (UT) 
Flattening Queries over Nested Data Types 
 
2006-12 
Bert Bongers (VU) 
Interactivation - Towards an e-cology of 
people, our technological environment, and 
the arts 
 
2006-13 
Henk-Jan Lebbink (UU) 
Dialogue and Decision Games for 
Information Exchanging Agents 
 
2006-14 
Johan Hoorn (VU) 
Software Requirements: Update, Upgrade, 
Redesign - towards a Theory of 
Requirements Change 
 
 
SIKS Dissertation Series                                                                                               251 
2006-15 
Rainer Malik (UU) 
CONAN: Text Mining in the Biomedical 
Domain 
 
2006-16 
Carsten Riggelsen (UU) 
Approximation Methods for Efficient 
Learning of Bayesian Networks 
 
2006-17 
Stacey Nagata (UU) 
User Assistance for Multitasking with 
Interruptions on a Mobile Device 
 
2006-18 
Valentin Zhizhkun (UVA) 
Graph transformation for Natural Language 
Processing 
 
2006-19 
Birna van Riemsdijk (UU) 
Cognitive Agent Programming: A Semantic 
Approach 
 
2006-20 
Marina Velikova (UvT) 
Monotone models for prediction in data 
mining 
 
2006-21 
Bas van Gils (RUN) 
Aptness on the Web 
 
2006-22 
Paul de Vrieze (RUN) 
Fundaments of Adaptive Personalisation 
 
2006-23 
Ion Juvina (UU) 
Development of Cognitive Model for 
Navigating on the Web 
 
2006-24 
Laura Hollink (VU) 
Semantic Annotation for Retrieval of 
Visual Resources 
 
2006-25 
Madalina Drugan (UU) 
Conditional log-likelihood MDL and 
Evolutionary MCMC 
 
2006-26 
Vojkan Mihajlovic (UT) 
Score Region Algebra: A Flexible 
Framework for Structured Information 
Retrieval 
 
2006-27 
Stefano Bocconi (CWI) 
Vox Populi: generating video 
documentaries from semantically annotated 
media repositories 
 
2006-28 
Borkur Sigurbjornsson (UVA) 
Focused Information Access using XML 
Element Retrieval 
 
2005 
 
2005-01 
Floor Verdenius (UVA) 
Methodological Aspects of Designing 
Induction-Based Applications 
 
2005-02 
Erik van der Werf (UM) 
AI techniques for the game of Go 
 
2005-03 
Franc Grootjen (RUN) 
A Pragmatic Approach to the 
Conceptualisation of Language 
 
2005-04 
Nirvana Meratnia (UT) 
Towards Database Support for Moving 
Object data 
 
2005-05 
Gabriel Infante-Lopez (UVA) 
Two-Level Probabilistic Grammars for 
Natural Language Parsing 
 
2005-06 
Pieter Spronck (UM) 
Adaptive Game AI 
 
2005-07 
Flavius Frasincar (TUE) 
Hypermedia Presentation Generation for 
Semantic Web Information Systems 
 
 
252 
2005-08 
Richard Vdovjak (TUE) 
A Model-driven Approach for Building 
Distributed Ontology-based Web 
Applications 
 
2005-09 
Jeen Broekstra (VU) 
Storage, Querying and Inferencing for 
Semantic Web Languages 
 
2005-10 
Anders Bouwer (UVA) 
Explaining Behaviour: Using Qualitative 
Simulation in Interactive Learning 
Environments 
 
2005-11 
Elth Ogston (VU) 
Agent Based Matchmaking and Clustering - 
A Decentralized Approach to Search 
 
2005-12 
Csaba Boer (EUR) 
Distributed Simulation in Industry 
 
2005-13 
Fred Hamburg (UL) 
Een Computermodel voor het Ondersteunen 
van Euthanasiebeslissingen 
 
2005-14 
Borys Omelayenko (VU) 
Web-Service configuration on the Semantic 
Web; Exploring how semantics meets 
pragmatics 
 
2005-15 
Tibor Bosse (VU) 
Analysis of the Dynamics of Cognitive 
Processes 
 
2005-16 
Joris Graaumans (UU) 
Usability of XML Query Languages 
 
2005-17 
Boris Shishkov (TUD) 
Software Specification Based on Re-usable 
Business Components 
 
 
 
 
2005-18 
Danielle Sent (UU) 
Test-selection strategies for probabilistic 
networks 
 
2005-19 
Michel van Dartel (UM) 
Situated Representation 
 
2005-20 
Cristina Coteanu (UL) 
Cyber Consumer Law, State of the Art and 
Perspectives 
 
2005-21 
Wijnand Derks (UT) 
Improving Concurrency and Recovery in 
Database Systems by Exploiting 
Application Semantics 
 
2004 
 
2004-01 
Virginia Dignum (UU) 
A Model for Organizational Interaction: 
Based on Agents, Founded in Logic 
 
2004-02 
Lai Xu (UvT) 
Monitoring Multi-party Contracts for E-
business 
 
2004-03 
Perry Groot (VU) 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of 
Approximation in Symbolic Problem 
Solving 
 
2004-04 
Chris van Aart (UVA) 
Organizational Principles for Multi-Agent 
Architectures 
 
2004-05 
Viara Popova (EUR) 
Knowledge discovery and monotonicity 
 
2004-06 
Bart-Jan Hommes (TUD) 
The Evaluation of Business Process 
Modeling Techniques 
 
 
SIKS Dissertation Series                                                                                               253 
2004-07 
Elise Boltjes (UM) 
Voorbeeldig onderwijs; voorbeeldgestuurd 
onderwijs, een opstap naar abstract denken, 
vooral voor meisjes 
 
2004-08 
Joop Verbeek (UM) 
Politie en de Nieuwe Internationale 
Informatiemarkt, Grensregionale politiële 
gegevensuitwisseling en digitale expertise 
 
2004-09 
Martin Caminada (VU) 
For the Sake of the Argument; explorations 
into argument-based reasoning 
 
2004-10 
Suzanne Kabel (UVA) 
Knowledge-rich indexing of learning-
objects 
 
2004-11 
Michel Klein (VU) 
Change Management for Distributed 
Ontologies 
 
2004-12 
The Duy Bui (UT) 
Creating emotions and facial expressions 
for embodied agents 
 
2004-13 
Wojciech Jamroga (UT) 
Using Multiple Models of Reality: On 
Agents who Know how to Play 
 
2004-14 
Paul Harrenstein (UU) 
Logic in Conflict. Logical Explorations in 
Strategic Equilibrium 
 
2004-15 
Arno Knobbe (UU) 
Multi-Relational Data Mining 
 
2004-16 
Federico Divina (VU) 
Hybrid Genetic Relational Search for 
Inductive Learning 
 
 
 
2004-17 
Mark Winands (UM) 
Informed Search in Complex Games 
 
2004-18 
Vania Bessa Machado (UvA) 
Supporting the Construction of Qualitative 
Knowledge Models 
 
2004-19 
Thijs Westerveld (UT) 
Using generative probabilistic models for 
multimedia retrieval 
 
2004-20 
Madelon Evers (Nyenrode) 
Learning from Design: facilitating 
multidisciplinary design teams 
 
2003 
 
2003-01 
Heiner Stuckenschmidt (VU) 
Ontology-Based Information Sharing in 
Weakly Structured Environments 
 
2003-02 
Jan Broersen (VU) 
Modal Action Logics for Reasoning About 
Reactive Systems 
 
2003-03 
Martijn Schuemie (TUD) 
Human-Computer Interaction and Presence 
in Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy 
 
2003-04 
Milan Petkovic (UT) 
Content-Based Video Retrieval Supported 
by Database Technology 
 
2003-05 
Jos Lehmann (UVA) 
Causation in Artificial Intelligence and Law 
- A modelling approach 
 
2003-06 
Boris van Schooten (UT) 
Development and specification of virtual 
environments 
 
 
 
254 
2003-07 
Machiel Jansen (UvA) 
Formal Explorations of Knowledge 
Intensive Tasks 
 
2003-08 
Yongping Ran (UM) 
Repair Based Scheduling 
 
2003-09 
Rens Kortmann (UM) 
The resolution of visually guided behaviour 
 
2003-10 
Andreas Lincke (UvT) 
Electronic Business Negotiation: Some 
experimental studies on the interaction 
between medium, innovation context and 
culture 
 
2003-11 
Simon Keizer (UT) 
Reasoning under Uncertainty in Natural 
Language Dialogue using Bayesian 
Networks 
 
2003-12 
Roeland Ordelman (UT) 
Dutch speech recognition in multimedia 
information retrieval 
 
2003-13 
Jeroen Donkers (UM) 
Nosce Hostem - Searching with Opponent 
Models 
 
2003-14 
Stijn Hoppenbrouwers (KUN) 
Freezing Language: Conceptualisation 
Processes across ICT-Supported 
Organisations 
 
2003-15 
Mathijs de Weerdt (TUD) 
Plan Merging in Multi-Agent Systems 
 
2003-16 
Menzo Windhouwer (CWI) 
Feature Grammar Systems - Incremental 
Maintenance of Indexes to Digital Media 
Warehouses 
 
 
2003-17 
David Jansen (UT) 
Extensions of Statecharts with Probability, 
Time, and Stochastic Timing 
 
2003-18 
Levente Kocsis (UM) 
Learning Search Decisions 
 
2002 
 
2002-01 
Nico Lassing (VU) 
Architecture-Level Modifiability Analysis 
 
2002-02 
Roelof van Zwol (UT) 
Modelling and searching web-based 
document collections 
 
2002-03 
Henk Ernst Blok (UT) 
Database Optimization Aspects for 
Information Retrieval 
 
2002-04 
Juan Roberto Castelo Valdueza (UU) 
The Discrete Acyclic Digraph Markov 
Model in Data Mining 
 
2002-05 
Radu Serban (VU) 
The Private Cyberspace Modeling 
Electronic Environments inhabited by 
Privacy-concerned Agents 
 
2002-06 
Laurens Mommers (UL) 
Applied legal epistemology; Building a 
knowledge-based ontology of the legal 
domain 
 
2002-07 
Peter Boncz (CWI) 
Monet: A Next-Generation DBMS Kernel 
For Query-Intensive Applications 
 
2002-08 
Jaap Gordijn (VU) 
Value Based Requirements Engineering: 
Exploring Innovative E-Commerce Ideas 
 
 
 
SIKS Dissertation Series                                                                                               255 
2002-09 
Willem-Jan van den Heuvel (KUB) 
Integrating Modern Business Applications 
with Objectified Legacy Systems 
 
2002-10 
Brian Sheppard (UM) 
Towards Perfect Play of Scrabble 
 
2002-11 
Wouter C.A. Wijngaards (VU) 
Agent Based Modelling of Dynamics: 
Biological and Organisational Applications 
 
2002-12 
Albrecht Schmidt (Uva) 
Processing XML in Database Systems 
 
2002-13 
Hongjing Wu (TUE) 
A Reference Architecture for Adaptive 
Hypermedia Applications 
 
2002-14 
Wieke de Vries (UU) 
Agent Interaction: Abstract Approaches to 
Modelling, Programming and Verifying 
Multi-Agent Systems 
 
2002-15 
Rik Eshuis (UT) 
Semantics and Verification of UML 
Activity Diagrams for Workflow Modelling 
 
2002-16 
Pieter van Langen (VU) 
The Anatomy of Design: Foundations, 
Models and Applications 
 
2002-17 
Stefan Manegold (UVA) 
Understanding, Modeling, and Improving 
Main-Memory Database Performance 
 
2001 
 
2001-1 
Silja Renooij (UU) 
Qualitative Approaches to Quantifying 
Probabilistic Networks 
 
 
 
2001-2 
Koen Hindriks (UU) 
Agent Programming Languages: 
Programming with Mental Models 
 
2001-3 
Maarten van Someren (UvA) 
Learning as problem solving 
 
2001-4 
Evgueni Smirnov (UM) 
Conjunctive and Disjunctive Version 
Spaces with Instance-Based Boundary Sets 
 
2001-5 
Jacco van Ossenbruggen (VU) 
Processing Structured Hypermedia: A 
Matter of Style 
 
2001-6 
Martijn van Welie (VU) 
Task-based User Interface Design 
 
2001-7 
Bastiaan Schonhage (VU) 
Diva: Architectural Perspectives on 
Information Visualization 
 
2001-8 
Pascal van Eck (VU) 
A Compositional Semantic Structure for 
Multi-Agent Systems Dynamics 
 
2001-9 
Pieter Jan 't Hoen (RUL) 
Towards Distributed Development of Large 
Object-Oriented Models, Views of 
Packages as Classes 
 
2001-10 
Maarten Sierhuis (UvA) 
Modeling and Simulating Work Practice 
BRAHMS: a multiagent modeling and 
simulation language for work practice 
analysis and design 
 
2001-11 
Tom M. van Engers (VUA) 
Knowledge Management: The Role of 
Mental Models in Business Systems Design 
 
 
 
 
256 
2000 
 
2000-1 
Frank Niessink (VU) 
Perspectives on Improving Software 
Maintenance 
 
2000-2 
Koen Holtman (TUE) 
Prototyping of CMS Storage Management 
 
2000-3 
Carolien M.T. Metselaar (UVA) 
Sociaal-organisatorische gevolgen van 
kennistechnologie; een procesbenadering en 
actorperspectief. 
 
2000-4 
Geert de Haan (VU) 
ETAG, A Formal Model of Competence 
Knowledge for User Interface Design 
 
2000-5 
Ruud van der Pol (UM) 
Knowledge-based Query Formulation in 
Information Retrieval. 
 
2000-6 
Rogier van Eijk (UU) 
Programming Languages for Agent 
Communication 
 
2000-7 
Niels Peek (UU) 
Decision-theoretic Planning of Clinical 
Patient Management 
 
2000-8 
Veerle Coupé (EUR) 
Sensitivity Analyis of Decision-Theoretic 
Networks 
 
2000-9 
Florian Waas (CWI) 
Principles of Probabilistic Query 
Optimization 
 
2000-10 
Niels Nes (CWI) 
Image Database Management System 
Design Considerations, Algorithms and 
Architecture 
 
2000-11 
Jonas Karlsson (CWI) 
Scalable Distributed Data Structures for 
Database Management 
 
1999 
 
1999-1 
Mark Sloof (VU) 
Physiology of Quality Change Modelling; 
Automated modelling of Quality Change of 
Agricultural Products 
 
1999-2 
Rob Potharst (EUR) 
Classification using decision trees and 
neural nets 
 
1999-3 
Don Beal (UM) 
The Nature of Minimax Search 
 
1999-4 
Jacques Penders (UM) 
The practical Art of Moving Physical 
Objects 
 
1999-5 
Aldo de Moor (KUB) 
Empowering Communities: A Method for 
the Legitimate User-Driven Specification of 
Network Information Systems 
 
1999-6 
Niek J.E. Wijngaards (VU) 
Re-design of compositional systems 
 
1999-7 
David Spelt (UT) 
Verification support for object database 
design 
 
1999-8 
Jacques H.J. Lenting (UM) 
Informed Gambling: Conception and 
Analysis of a Multi-Agent Mechanism for 
Discrete Reallocation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIKS Dissertation Series                                                                                               257 
1998 
 
1998-1 
Johan van den Akker (CWI) 
DEGAS - An Active, Temporal Database of  
Autonomous Objects 
 
1998-2 
Floris Wiesman (UM)  
Information Retrieval by Graphically 
Browsing Meta-Information  
 
1998-3 
Ans Steuten (TUD) 
A Contribution to the Linguistic Analysis 
of Business Conversations within the 
Language/Action Perspective 
 
1998-4 
Dennis Breuker (UM) 
Memory versus Search in Games 
 
1998-5 
E.W.Oskamp (RUL) 
Computerondersteuning bij Straftoemeting 
 

